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"DEFENDANT VETO" OR "TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES"? IT'S TIME FOR THE
SUPREME COURT TO STRAIGHTEN OUT THE




Commentators frequently claim that there is no single, coherent
doctrine of extra-territorial personal jurisdiction,' and unfortunately,
they are correct. International Shoe Co. v. Washington,2 commonly (but
inaccurately) thought of as the wellspring of the modern form of the
doctrine, announced a relatively straightforward, two-factor, four-
permutation test that worked well for resolving most cases.' In the
nearly sixty-year period following International Shoe, however, as the
Supreme Court expanded and refined the standard, what was once
straightforward and uncomplicated became convoluted and arcane. Two
general, and generally incompatible, versions of the doctrine competed
for dominance. The first, what might best be described as a "totality-of-
the-circumstances, 4 view, is essentially a balancing test which weighs the
convenience interests of litigants against the sovereignty interests of
State and Federal Governments to situate litigation wherever those
collective interests are reasonably accommodated. The second, perhaps
' Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. Work on this Article was
supported by a grant from the UM Foundation, for which I am grateful. The Article
benefited greatly from the contributions of several people during a presentation to the
Maryland Faculty Workshop, and Bill Reynolds, Fred Smalkin, Maxwell Chibundu, and
Mark Graber made very helpful comments on an early draft.
1. See Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business
Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 179 n.34 (2001).
2. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3. Id. at 316-19.
4. The expression comes from Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Burnham v.
Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 604-26 (1990) (plurality opinion) ("Justice Brennan's
approach does not establish a rule of law at all, but only a 'totality of the circumstances'
test, guaranteeing what traditional territorial rules of jurisdiction were designed precisely
to avoid: uncertainty and litigation over the preliminary issue of the forum's
competence."). For an example of lower court usage, see Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning
LLC, Civ. File No. CIV.02-791 (PAM/RLE), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17516, at *6-7 (D.
Minn. Sept. 4, 2002) ("In determining whether a defendant's contacts are sufficient for an
exercise of personal jurisdiction, a court must consider all of those contacts with the forum
in the aggregate and examine the totality of the circumstances.").
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best described as a "defendant-veto" 5 view, is a kind of "single-factor"
test that permits defendants to escape the extra-territorial reach of a
state's personal jurisdictional power by avoiding certain kinds of
purposeful contacts with the state. There is some overlap between these
two versions of the doctrine, of course, but also a considerable area of
difference, and the two views dictate opposite conclusions when the
forum a defendant has studiously tried to avoid is a (or even "the most")
convenient forum.
In the decade or so following International Shoe, the competition
between the two views remained in relative equilibrium, with neither
view gaining a clear upper hand. At the end of that period, in the
bookend cases of Hanson v. Denckla6 and McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co.,7 the Supreme Court reached opposite results, relying on
the defendant-veto view in Hanson and the totality-of-the-circumstances
view in McGee, when the reverse seemed to make more sense." It was as
if, after ten years of thinking about it, the Court was no clearer on what
form the doctrine should take than it was when it started. The doctrine
then sat nearly dormant for about twenty years, during which time the
Court made few systematic attempts to restate or reformulate it. It was
not until the early 1980s, in a spate of now well-known cases (Kulko v.
Superior Court,9 Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,'1 Insurance
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee," Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall,2 Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc.,3 Calder v. Jones,14 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz," and Asahi
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,16 among others), that the Court got
back into the field, mostly to reinforce the defendant-veto view which
had been losing ground in the lower federal and state courts. In this
5. The expression comes from Justice Brennan's dissent in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 312 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I would also,
however, strip the defendant of an unjustified veto power over certain very appropriate
fora-a power the defendant justifiably enjoyed long ago when communication and travel
over long distances were slow and unpredictable and when notions of state sovereignty
were impractical and exaggerated.").
6. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
7. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
8. Hanson, 357 U.S, at 251; McGee, 355 U.S. at 222.
9. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
10. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
11. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
12. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
13. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
14. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
15. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
16. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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important series of cases the Court added considerable sophistication to
the doctrine, but introduced a number of confusing elements as well.
The confusion was caused principally by the Court's unfortunate
propensity to use key concepts to mean more than one thing, to change
doctrinal terminology without indicating that it was doing so, to use more
than one term to express the same idea, to fail to ground the doctrine
adequately in the Constitution (causing many to question its legitimacy),
and to mix and match substantive law and jurisdictional concerns in
developing doctrinal principles, all the while professing that it was not
doing any of these.
Lower federal and state courts were confused by all of this, of course,
and began to add confusions of their own, relying sometimes on one part
of the Supreme Court's thinking and at other times on other parts. Many
courts, for example, all but eliminated the category of general
jurisdiction, 7 at least as originally understood and articulated in
International Shoe,1" by making its requirements either identical to, or
less demanding than, those required for what was intended to be the
easier-to-satisfy category of specific jurisdiction.' 9 Courts also ignored
the distinction between contacts and fairness considerations in the
specific jurisdiction standard, and began to treat both types of factors as
free-standing jurisdictional tests in their own right. While other courts
defined the nexus requirement of specific jurisdiction to include almost
any kind of relationship between the defendant's forum contacts and the
plaintiff's claim, all but eliminating the defendant's veto right in many
instances. These and equivalent doctrinal frolics-and-detours have
caused serious problems for litigants, lawyers, and judges, of course, who
want to know where suits may be brought and where they will have to
defend. The problem is especially serious in periods when the Supreme
Court is not taking personal jurisdiction cases, since there is little
prospect of reversing erroneous lower court decisions. The lack of a
clear standard also exacerbates the pressure on litigants to forum-shop,
and forum-shopping, in turn, reinforces the familiar "rule-of-law"
criticism of the American judicial system, that its decisions frequently
lack legitimacy because they are based more on home court prejudice
than on substantive entitlement.
17. See, e.g., Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.9 (defining general jurisdiction).
18. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). The Court described the
doctrine of general jurisdiction more fully in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,
342 U.S. 437, 446-47 (1952).
19. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8 (defining specific jurisdiction). The terms
"general" and "specific" jurisdiction were academic rather than judicial inventions, see
generally Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136-63 (1966), but have since been adopted
by the Supreme Court, e.g., Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 nn.8-9.
20041
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It may be that the Supreme Court is about to get back into the
personal jurisdiction business, however, in part to clear up the difficulties
described above, and in part to resolve new kinds of problems raised by
cases in which the defendant's forum contacts are made over the
Internet. The roughly twenty year dormancy period in which the Court,
historically, has not taken personal jurisdiction cases is coming to an end,
for one thing, and many of the Internet-contacts cases that have now
begun to proliferate present interesting questions not easily resolved by
existing doctrinal formulations. Early Internet (mostly commercial
dealing) cases were not all that different from the telephone contacts and
stream-of-commerce pollution contacts cases that were commonplace in
the International Shoe era,20 but the newest set of cases, principally those
involving libel and intellectual property claims, present questions not
easily answered by International Shoe-based formulations of the
standard, and they have produced a wide variety of not always consistent
or satisfactory responses in the lower federal and state courts.21 In this
Article, I hope to sort out some of these confusions, and offer
suggestions for how the Court, using the Internet cases, might get the
personal jurisdictional doctrine back on track.
II. THE CORE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD: INTERNATIONAL SHOE TO
WOODSON TO BURGER KING
A) The Beginning: International Shoe
While Pennoyer v. Neff 2 still does some things better,23 the Supreme
Court's decision in International Shoe is generally regarded as the origin
of the modern personal jurisdiction doctrine, and its well-known capias
ad respondendum language self-consciously seems to say as much.
24
20. See, e.g., Nat'l Egg Co. v. Bank Leumi le-Israel N.M., 504 F. Supp. 305,309 (N.D.
Ga. 1980) (finding personal jurisdiction over defendant whose only significant contact with
the forum state was a single telephone call).
21. The doctrine of "general jurisdiction" is as confused as a doctrine can be and still
be said to be a doctrine. See discussion infra notes 296-347, 474-79 and accompanying text.
22. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
23. For example, Pennoyer does a better job than International Shoe of justifying the
consideration of state sovereignty interests in the personal jurisdiction calculation because
it is grounded not only in the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, but also on
principles of international (or what the Court called "public") law. Id. at 722-23. The Due
Process Clause protects only the interests of persons, but public (or international) law
protects sovereignty interests as well. Id. at 722-23, 732-33.
24. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. The language reads:
[N]ow that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of
summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
[Vol. 54:53
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Perhaps because it saw itself as starting over from the beginning and thus
able to write on a clean slate, the Court in International Shoe took the
doctrine down to bedrock. It suggested (and later would say directly),
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution is the sole limitation on a state's power to subject an out-of-
state defendant to the personal jurisdiction of its courts.2, Due Process,
the Court explained, requires that a defendant "not present within the
territory of the forum . . . have certain minimum contacts with [the
forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.' '26 The demands of fair play
and substantial justice are met when a defendant's contacts are such that
it is "reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government," to
require the defendant to defend in that forum.27 "An 'estimate of the
inconveniences"' to the defendant "is relevant in this connection., 28 This
is the famous "minimum contacts" standard. 29
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."
Id.
25. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxite de Guinee, 456 U.S. at 694, 703 n.10
(1982) ("[The Due Process] Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction
requirement .... "). This will create difficulties later on when the Court is called upon to
justify the consideration of sovereignty concerns in its jurisdictional analysis, since the Due
Process Clause protects only the interests of persons and not those of states. See infra
notes 223-29 and accompanying text.
26. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
The "minimum contacts" standard has both a notice and a power dimension. A defendant
cannot be subjected to jurisdiction in a forum without reasonable notice that the action
has been brought, Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14
(1950), and sufficient contacts with the forum to make it reasonable for the forum to assert
power over the defendant, Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. International Shoe, along with most
of the other jurisdictional decisions in the history of the Court, is concerned principally
with the power dimension of the doctrine, and I will limit discussion in this Article to that
aspect as well.
27. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
28. Id. (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930)).
29. Another way to think of the relationships among the various concepts and terms
is this: due process equals fair play and substantial justice; fair play and substantial justice
equals reasonableness; reasonableness equals minimum contacts; and minimum contacts
equals everything that is to follow (in effect, defendant purposeful contacts weighed
against federal and state sovereignty interests). Each of the terms is a synonym for each of
the other terms at a different level of abstraction.
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At this level of abstraction, the concept of "minimum contacts, 30 is
hard to use, so the Court translated this synonym for constitutionally
sufficient contacts into more operational language, in the form of a two-
factor (contacts and nexus), four-permutation test. A defendant's
contacts with a state are sufficient to support jurisdiction when they are
either (1) "continuous and systematic" and "give rise to the liabilities
sued on,"" or (2) "so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit...
on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those
[contacts]."32 On the other hand, (3) "single or occasional acts" (as well
as those that are continuous and systematic but not substantial) that are
unconnected to the plaintiff's cause of action are not sufficient to confer
jurisdiction,33 unless (4) the "nature and quality and the circumstances of
their commission" make it fair to render an out-of-state defendant
amenable to suit.34 The first and fourth of these categories came to be
called the doctrine of specific jurisdiction, and the second the doctrine of
general jurisdiction, in the now generally accepted terminology of von
Mehren and Trautman.35 The third category remains one in which
36jurisdiction does not exist.
International Shoe's four-part schemata handled most jurisdictional
problems pretty well, and if the Court had continued to work with it,
tweaking and refining it when necessary, perhaps the history of the
personal jurisdiction doctrine would have been different; but this did not
happen. Some of the Court's language needed immediate elaboration, of
course. For example, it was not clear what it meant for a defendant's
connections with a forum to "give rise to" a plaintiff's cause of action
(the issue was complicated further when the Court, in the next breath,
seemed to use the less restrictive expression "connected with" as a
30. While it is the principal standard by which long-arm jurisdiction is judged,
"minimum contacts" is not the only personal jurisdiction standard. There also are so-
called single-factor tests that support jurisdiction in certain instances and excuse a plaintiff
from having to show that a defendant has "minimum contacts" with a state. Service of
process within a state (so-called transient or tag jurisdiction) is one, see Burnham v.
Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 612-16 (1990) (plurality opinion), and domicile is another,
see Meyer, 311 U.S. at 463. Certain kinds of "status" determinations (e.g., custody,
divorce, guardianship) also can be adjudicated by states responsible for creating the status
in the first instance, even if the parties no longer have any contacts with the state. See
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 201 (1977). I will limit discussion in this Article to
"minimum contacts" types of jurisdictional problems, and will not take up questions
involving such single-factor tests.
31. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
32. Id. at 318.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1136, 1143-45, 1147.
36. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.
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synonym for "give rise to").37 Did this "nexus" requirement, as it came
to be called, envision a "but for" or "proximate cause" relationship
between a defendant's activities in the forum and the plaintiff's claim?38
Did there have to be an overlap, in other words, between the facts
needed to prove the defendant's contacts and the facts needed to prove
the plaintiff's claim, or was it enough that the two sets of facts dealt with
the same general subject matter? In addition, the Court needed to
explain in greater detail the difference between "continuous and
systematic" contacts, which were enough to establish specific jurisdiction,
and "substantial" contacts which were needed to establish general
jurisdiction. Were substantial contacts just more numerous than
continuous and systematic ones, or were they of a different kind
altogether? The confusion over the differences between these two
concepts would grow exponentially over the years, and prove to be oneS 39
of the most intractable problems with the doctrine.
It also was not clear what the Court meant by its "nature and quality
and . . .circumstances ' 4° qualification on the category of single and
isolated contacts giving rise to the claim. Was this where the "estimate of
inconveniences" to the defendant made its way into the analysis, or was it
about something else altogether? And finally, where in this four-part
37. Id. at 317. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
425-28 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting), for an illustration of the problems this alternative
phrasing created. Professor Brilmayer's discussion of what it means to give rise to a claim
is still the best one available. See Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General
Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 736-41 (1988) [hereinafter Brilmayer, A General Look];
Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction,
1980 SUP. Cr. REV. 77, 80-88 [hereinafter Brilmayer, How Contacts Count]. For more
confused discussions, see Sarah R. Cebik, "A Riddle Wrapped in a Mystery Inside an
Enigma": General Personal Jurisdiction and Notions of Sovereignty, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 1, 6-7, 19-21, 27-28 (1998), and Twitchell, supra note 1.
38. See Yates v. Motivation Indus. Equip. Ltd., 38 Fed. Appx. 174, 178 n.6 (4th Cir.
2002) (describing the different nexus tests employed by different circuits); Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1085 (C.D. Cal.
2003) (describing how the Ninth Circuit's "but for" test for nexus is broader than those
adopted by other circuits, and how the test "must have some degree of proximate
causation to be considered for purposes of jurisdiction"); Rodriguez Salgado v. Les
Nouvelles Esthetiques, 218 F. Supp. 2d 203, 207 (D.P.R. 2002) (describing nexus
requirement in terms of proximate cause); Pearl Invs., LLC v. Standard 1/0, Inc., 224 F.
Supp. 2d 277, 282-83 (D. Me. 2002) (discussing the distinction in terms of "cause in fact"
and "legal cause"); EMI Music Mexico, S.A. de C.V. v. Rodriquez, 97 S.W.3d 847, 859
(Tex. App. 2003) ("[S]ome courts require that conduct within the state must be a
proximate cause for the plaintiff's injury, while others hold it sufficient if the conduct
within the state is a 'but for' cause of the plaintiff's injury." (citing Chew v. Dietrich, 143
F.3d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1998))).
39. B. Glenn George, In Search of General Jurisdiction, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1097, 1111
(1990).
40. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.
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schemata did the concerns of "our federal system of government," the
sovereignty interests of the Federal and State Governments caught up in
jurisdictional debates, get factored into the equation, and more
interestingly, what justified taking such interests into account in the first
place? Were they protected by the Due Process Clause, just as a
defendant's liberty and property interests were, notwithstanding that the
Due Process Clause refers only to the rights of persons and not states, or
did some other source of law justify their consideration?
It was not only what the Court in International Shoe left unsaid, but
what it said explicitly as well, that created confusion for lower court
judges and lawyers. For example, the assertion that the adequacy of a
defendant's contacts to support jurisdiction "cannot be simply [a]
mechanical or quantitative" matter, one of just "a little more or a little
less, ' '4 suggested that some sort of qualitative judgment was involved in
personal jurisdiction analysis, but what form that judgment should take
was left up in the air. Equally murky was the Court's indication that the
"extent [to which a defendant] exercises the privilege of conducting
activities within a state" is relevant to determining amenability to suit.
42
This seemed to make the defendant's state of mind a factor in the
jurisdictional calculus, but the exact nature of this "purposefulness"
requirement, as it has come to be known, was left undefined. Are
defendants responsible for all reasonably foreseeable consequences of
actions they set in motion, or just consequences they willfully intend and
personally direct? This decision (in effect) to exclude random,
fortuitous, and inadvertent defendant forum contacts from jurisdictional
analysis, as well as contacts produced by the actions of third parties not
acting as agents for the defendant, has turned out to be one of the most
important features of the "minimum contacts" test, and yet in
International Shoe there was little if any indication that this would be so.
While the Court would struggle with these and other such questions for
the next half-century, in a sense none of the questions have been
resolved fully, and the absence of adequate answers is one of the
principal reasons for the doctrine's present difficulties.
B) The Specific Jurisdiction Bookends: McGee and Hanson
After International Shoe, except for Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co.43 (still the Court's only major foray into the realm of general
jurisdiction)," the Court effectively left the "minimum contacts"
41. Id. at 319.
42. Id.
43. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
44. See discussion infra Part II.C.
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standard alone for over a decade.45 It was not until its 1957-1958 Term, in
McGee and Hanson, bookend cases that still define the outer limits of
specific jurisdiction, that the Court began to develop the standard. For
the most part, McGee and Hanson are "purposefulness" cases, Hanson
intentionally so and McGee by ratification, but they speak to many other
issues as well. In McGee the Court upheld a California state court's
assertion of extra-territorial jurisdiction over a Texas insurer based on
the company's action in sending a reinsurance certificate to McGee, a
16
California policy holder. Apart from the reinsurance certificate, which
the company sent after it had "assumed [the] insurance obligations" of an
Arizona insurer with whom McGee had a policy, the company conducted
no business in California.47 Finding jurisdiction, the Court (through
Justice Black) based its unanimous and short opinion on what might best
be described as a totality-of-the-circumstances view, and in fact, McGee
is the high-water mark for this particular view of long-arm jurisdiction.
Heralding a "clearly discernible [trend] toward expanding the
permissible scope of state jurisdiction over . . . nonresidents . . .
attributable to the fundamental transformation of our national economy
over the years, 48 Justice Black suggested that the major concern in
personal jurisdiction analysis should be whether the assertion of
jurisdiction would be inconvenient to the parties. 9 Since there was "no
contention that [International Life] did not have adequate notice of the
suit or sufficient time to prepare its defenses and appear, 50
inconvenience was not a concern in McGee, and since there was no
inconvenience, there was jurisdiction.5
McGee's sweeping language, particularly its statement about the
"fundamental transformation of our national economy,"
52 makes it a
45. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), is the lone
exception to this, id. at 311-14. Commonly thought of as a "notice" case, Mullane also is
one of the few cases to base part of its jurisdictional analysis on substantive law grounds.
See discussion infra note 248.
46. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957). This is not literally
correct. McGee was the beneficiary of an insurance policy issued to her son, Lowell
Franklin. Id. I describe her as the policy holder to avoid confusion with the case name,
and because she functioned in that role in the case. See id. This description of the case,
focusing on the Company's sending of a reinsurance certificate to Franklin in California,
comes from Hanson, 357 U.S. 235, at 251-52, rather than McGee itself, where the
purposefulness of sending the reinsurance certificate was not emphasized. See infra note
73.
47. McGee, 355 U.S. at 221-22.
48. Id. at 222.
49. Id. at 223-24.
50. Id. at 224.
51. See id. at 223-24.
52. Id. at 222.
2004]
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favorite of those who think state boundaries should play little or no role
in defining the contours of long-arm jurisdiction, but there is little reason
to believe that this view is widely held on the Supreme Court, or that
McGee itself has played any significant role in the development of the
personal jurisdiction doctrine over the years. The case appears to be
more of a throw-away opinion than a major doctrinal statement, and one
in which the difficult issues we now know divided the Court at the time
were temporarily put on hold to await the more controversial context of
Hanson, decided six months later. 3 Ultimately, McGee is probably best
explained as a "sovereignty" or "state interest" case, in which
California's interest in providing a means of redress for its citizens with
small claims against out-of-state insurance companies that they would
not pursue if they could not sue in California (because it would cost more
to litigate than they could win) turned a weak contacts case into one
strong enough to support jurisdiction. The Court mentions this reason in
its opinion, though it does not emphasize it.54 While there are those who
love it, McGee is not an important personal jurisdiction case, and unless
the idea of nationwide service of process comes into widespread favor,55
it never will be.56 Hanson, on the other hand, is a different story. 7
53. McGee is a four-page unanimous opinion. Id. at 221-24. Hanson has a twenty-
one page majority opinion and another eight pages of Justices Black and Douglas dissents.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 238-64 (1958).
54. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. It also was important that California's interest was the
procedural one of providing a forum for its citizens to litigate rather than the substantive
one of establishing terms of fair dealing between California citizens and out-of-state
insurers. Id. at 224. The latter interest is adequately protected by the State's ability to
pass laws regulating the insurance industry, but the former requires the ability to take
jurisdictional authority over out-of-state parties. It also was important that the State had
enacted a special jurisdictional statute for claims like McGee's, thereby acting to assert
this procedural interest. Id. at 221, 224.
55. But see Russell J. Weintraub, A Map out of the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth,
28 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 531,545-50 (1995).
[Tihe best way to stem the flood of litigation over personal jurisdiction is to
regard due process as requiring only that the forum have some rational basis for
wishing to decide the case ....
" " [W]e will have to reject once and for all the notion that state sovereignty
and state lines are important constants in the due process calculus.
Id. at 545, 548-49. There are limited instances in which nationwide service of process is
available. See, e.g., Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1315-16 (9th Cir.
1985) (discussing section 27 of the Security Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78, which provides
for nationwide service of process over corporations in antitrust actions in any district
"where[] the [corporation] may be found"). The Federal Interpleader Statute also
provides for service in any district in which "claimants reside or may be found." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2361 (2000).
56. This statement admits of one qualification. McGee's paraphrase of the
purposeful contacts standard, that the defendant have a "substantial connection" with the
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The defendant58 in Hanson had more extensive contacts with the forum
state than the defendant in McGee, but the contacts were of a different
sort, and the difference was critical. The defendant, the Wilmington
Trust Company, a Delaware corporation and trustee of a trust
instrument executed in Delaware by Dora Browning Donner, continued
to administer the trust jointly with Donner after she moved to Florida. 9
When Donner died, two of her daughters, also residents of Florida,
contested an inter vivos appointment of $400,000 she had made under
the trust to the children of a third daughter.60 The validity of the original
trust agreement was an issue in the will contest, and thus, in the Court's
eyes, the Trust Company was an indispensable party to the Florida suit.6
The jurisdictional issue arose when the Company objected to Florida
long-arm jurisdiction on the ground that it did not do or solicit business
in Florida.62 It acknowledged that it had numerous business contacts with
Donner over the years while she lived in Florida, but argued that those
contacts were not purposeful in the jurisdictional sense of the term, and
the Supreme Court agreed.63  The reason, said the Court, was that
Donner, rather than the Trust Company, was responsible for creating the
Company's contacts with Florida; the contacts did not result from a
purposeful act by the Company to do business in the State.6 In the
Court's words, there was "no instance in which the trustee performed any
acts in Florida that bear the same relationship to the [trust] agreement as
the [insurance] solicitation in McGee [bore to California]. 65  The
Company did not seek to exercise the privilege of doing business in
Florida, it simply followed Donner when she went there, so to speak.
66
Failing to sever a relationship with a prior customer in a new forum, it
state, has proved particularly popular. See, e.g., Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 875 (6th Cir.
2002); Hollis Petroleum LLC v. U.S. Rest. Props. Operating, L.P., No. 05-01-00781-CV,
2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 450, at *4 (Tex. App. Jan. 24, 2002).
57. See, e.g., Rose v. Firstar Bank, 819 A.2d 1247, 1252-54 (R.I. 2003) (rejecting
McGee and applying Hanson to a fact situation analogous to both cases).
58. This is not precise terminology. Hanson was actually two cases, one in Delaware
and one in Florida, both racing to get to the Supreme Court first, and the Denckla sisters
were plaintiffs in one and defendants in the other. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 240-
42 (1958). There also were two Delaware trust companies involved. None of this
procedural complexity is necessary for our purposes here.
59. Id. at 238-39.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 254.
62. Id. at 251-52.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 252.
66. Id.
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turned out, was not the same thing, at least not for jurisdictional
purposes, as soliciting new customers in that forum.
Hanson also reined in much of the sweeping language of McGee. It
was a mistake, the Court said, "to assume that this trend [toward
extending personal jurisdiction, highlighted in McGeeI herald[ed] the
eventual demise of all restrictions on the [extra-territorial power] of state
courts., 67 Rejecting inconvenience as the principal concern, the Court
pointed out that those restrictions were "more than a guarantee of
immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation"; they were "a
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective
States." 68  "However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign
tribunal," the Court added, "a defendant may not be called upon to do so
unless he has had the 'minimal contacts' with that State that are a
prerequisite to its exercise of power over him., 69 Hanson was the Court's
first strong, explicit reliance on the so-called defendant-veto view to
justify a jurisdictional decision. In this view, a defendant can literally
veto jurisdiction by structuring its operations to avoid doing business in a
state.7" It does not matter that it might have extensive business contacts
with the state (the Wilmington Trust Company had extensive business
contacts with Florida), or that the state might be a convenient place to
litigate (in many ways Florida was as convenient as Delaware for the
Wilmington Trust Company). As long as the defendant does not take
the initiative in making the connection with the state, it will not be forced
to litigate there. In a real sense, the defendant controls the reach of the
state's jurisdictional power.
McGee and Hanson reached results that are the opposite from what
one might have expected. The Wilmington Trust Company did extensive
business in Florida and could afford to litigate there, and yet it was not
subject to Florida jurisdiction." And the International Life Insurance
Company did almost no business in California and probably would have
lost money had it been forced to litigate there, and yet it was subject to
jurisdiction in California.72 The two decisions are not inconsistent of
67. Id. at 251.
68. Id.
69. Id. Because of its similarity to "minimum contacts," "minimal contacts" was an
unfortunate choice of words. "Minimum contacts" in International Shoe was a synonym
for "constitutionally sufficient contacts," not "a few" contacts, and the similarity of the
two expressions encourages a reader to miss the distinction. See Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). Imprecise usage like this gave later courts a basis
on which to ground their modifications (intentional or otherwise) of the doctrine.
70. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251-52.
71. Id.
72. See McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
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course (accepting Hanson's characterization of McGee)73  if the
purposefulness of a defendant's contacts with a forum is a critical feature
of the personal jurisdiction doctrine, and after McGee and Hanson it is
hard to argue that it is not. In retrospect, the two cases appear to be the
first post-International Shoe skirmish between the totality-of-the-
circumstances and defendant-veto views of personal jurisdiction, with the
defendant-veto view coming out the clear winner. (This will prove
prophetic of outcomes to come.) Having settled (if only temporarily)
this basic policy debate, the Court did not take up another major
14
personal jurisdiction case for more than twenty years, or until 1980,
73. In summarizing McGee, Hanson emphasizes the purposefulness of the insurance
company's connections with California as a central factor in the McGee decision, but in
the McGee opinion itself, this factor does not receive any particular emphasis. Compare
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251-52, with McGee, 355 U.S. at 223-24. By any objective standard
Hanson has to be the more important opinion. Unlike McGee, it reflects a full airing of
the Court's widely varying views on the due process issue, see supra note 53, states those
views more as a rule than a policy (also unlike McGee), comes later in time, and explicitly
rejects the McGee view, see Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251, as articulated by Justice Black in a
dissent, see id. at 258-59 (Black, J., dissenting). More importantly perhaps, the Court
seemed eager to use Hanson to announce a new jurisdictional standard. The due process
interests in the case were those of the Wilmington Trust Company, but the Trust
Company was not a party to the proceeding, and no other party had standing to raise its
interests. See id. at 241-42, 244-45. The Court finessed this problem by finding the
Company indispensable under its reading of Florida law, see id. at 245 & nn. 6-7, but the
Supreme Court of Florida, the ultimate authority on Florida law, "found it unnecessary to
determine whether" this was so, id. at 254. The Florida court's position seems more
sensible. The Trust Company had no interests of its own involved in the case. It simply
wanted to know to whom to distribute the proceeds of the trust. It was a stakeholder pure
and simple, and a stakeholder is not ordinarily an indispensable party. At a minimum, one
would have expected the Supreme Court to send the issue back to the Florida Supreme
Court for a definitive ruling on the question of Florida law, but the Court seemed more
interested in articulating a new due process standard than in resolving the case.
74. At one time, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), would have been considered
an exception to this statement, but time has not treated Shaffer well and the case has no
continuing major influence on the personal jurisdiction doctrine that I can discern. The
Court in Shaffer spoke in bold, sweeping, and authoritative terms, as if pronouncing for all
questions of long-arm jurisdiction, for all time, and academic symposia touting the
importance of the decision were rampant. See, e.g., Symposium on Shaffer v. Heitner, 45
BROOK. L. REV. 493 (1979); Symposium, The Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASII. U.
L.Q. 273; see also Earl M. Maltz, Reflections on a Landmark: Shaffer v. Heitner Viewed
from a Distance, 1986 BYU L. REV. 1043, 1043-44; Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner:
The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 34 (1978). But Shaffer's well-known
formulation of the standard, that "minimum contacts" requires a three-part "relationship
among the defendant, the forum, [and] the litigation," seemed to eliminate the category of
general jurisdiction, which requires only a two-part relationship between the defendant
and the forum. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204. And its statement that "all" assertions of long-
arm jurisdiction were governed by the "minimum contacts" standard seemed to eliminate
the so-called single-factor jurisdictional tests, such as transient and status jurisdiction. Id.
at 207-08. The Court later corrected these mistakes, explaining in Helicopteros that it did
not mean to do away with general jurisdiction, and making it clear in Burnham that at
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when it revisited the doctrine with enthusiasm in Woodson. Woodson
was the Court's first great, systematic restatement of the minimum
contacts standard, synthesizing all that had happened since International
Shoe, and with a few, minor, cosmetic changes, it still describes the
doctrine as it operates today.
C) General Jurisdiction: Perkins
Before moving on to Woodson, however, it is necessary to take a brief
step back to consider the doctrine of general jurisdiction, the second of
International Shoe's four contacts-nexus categories, and the one that has
turned out to be hardest to define. General jurisdiction permits a court
to hear any cause of action against a defendant, no matter what the type,
and no matter where it arises.75 This is the defining feature of the
doctrine, that a party can be sued for anything without the plaintiff
having to show a relationship between the claim and the forum.76 Only
the defendant's relationship with the forum is relevant.77 This much is
uncontroversial. But difficulties arise when one tries to describe what
type of contacts are needed to make general jurisdiction available.
International Shoe was a specific jurisdiction case, so it did not discuss
general jurisdiction at any length, but it made some things clear. For
example, the decision differentiated between the two types of
jurisdiction, concluding that specific jurisdiction is available when the
defendant has "continuous and systematic" contacts with a forum and
the contacts "give rise to the liabilities sued upon," 78 and general
jurisdiction is available only when the defendant's contacts are "so
substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit ... on causes of action
arising from dealings entirely distinct from those" contacts.79 The key
difference between these two types of jurisdiction, though it is not always
noticed,' ° is between "continuous and systematic" contacts on the one
least the single-factor test of transient jurisdiction was alive and well. Burnham v.
Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 620 (1990) (plurality opinion). Burnham also seemed to
limit Shaffer's holding to a statement of the due process standard for the attachment form
of quasi in rem jurisdiction, see id. at 620-21 (plurality opinion), but the Court's failure in
Burnham to agree on a majority rationale leaves all of its modifications of Shaffer in
limbo. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), also was decided in this twenty-year
period, and I take up its contributions to the doctrine in the next Section of the Article. It
retains some influence in certain esoteric parts of the doctrine, but is not a major case.
75. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
76. Id.
77. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980).
7M Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
79. Id. at 318.
80. Including by members of the Supreme Court, from all sides of the political
spectrum. For example, see Justice Rehnquist's opinions in Keeton and Calder, Justice
Brennan's in Burger King, and Justice White's in Helicopteros, each of which discusses the
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hand and "substantial" contacts on the other.8 ' But explaining the
difference between these two terms is where the real difficulties begin.
While there will be hard cases, the idea of "continuous and systematic"
contacts, by itself, is not difficult to understand. Contacts are continuous
and systematic when they occur at regular intervals, over an extended
period of time, and are organized according to some kind of plan or
design." Marketing goods or services to retail customers in a state
through a network of advertisers, distributors, sales agents, and retail
stores is a classic example." But how "substantial" contacts differ is not
as easy to explain. There is no sharp difference between the two
expressions linguistically, and in certain contexts they could be just
different ways of saying the same thing. The nature of the differences
must be found, I believe, in the underlying purposes the doctrine of
general jurisdiction seeks to advance. The most important such purpose
concepts of "continuous and systematic" contacts and "substantial" contacts as if they
were synonyms. Academic commentators make the mistake at least as majestically as the
Court, writing whole articles on the false premise that "continuous and systematic"
contacts are the same as "substantial" contacts for purposes of general jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Twitchell, supra note 1, at 184. Professor Twitchell criticizes the use of a "doing
business" standard (which, in context, was a synonym for "systematic and continuous"
contacts) for general jurisdiction, but only on policy and principle grounds. Id. at 203-04.
She never points out that the view also is based on a doctrinal mistake, and on a careless
reading of the International Shoe and Perkins cases. She mentions the concept of
"substantial" contacts, but doesn't seem to recognize that it has independent doctrinal
significance. See id. at 184. And while she shows in considerable detail that continuous
and systematic contacts cannot support general jurisdiction, she fails to point out that the
Supreme Court has never held that they can. Id. at 182-90. She seems unduly impressed
by the number of lower courts adopting this view. It is as if she thinks these decisions have
a kind of legitimacy by virtue of their number. The decisions are just doctrinal mistakes,
however, and arguing against them on policy and principle grounds alone actually
breathes a kind of life into them and gives them a legitimacy she otherwise wants to deny.
Id. at 174, 183-84.
Sarah Cebik makes a more exaggerated version of the same mistake. In addition to
getting the quantitative test for general jurisdiction contacts wrong, she adds Burger
King's "fairness factors" to the test, see Cebik, supra note 37, at 9-11, uses "minimum
contacts" as an ordinary language expression rather than as a term of art, see, e.g., id. at 9,
misdescribes the nature of the debate over the definition of nexus in the specific
jurisdiction doctrine, see, e.g., id. at 2, asserts that International Shoe rejected a
territoriality based view of personal jurisdiction when it replaced Pennoyer's framework
with the "minimum contacts" standard, and treats the "reasonably anticipate being haled
into court" language as if it stated an independent jurisdictional standard, id. at 17-18, all
of which are mistaken. Ironically, she criticizes the Court's elaboration of the personal
jurisdiction doctrine as incoherent, not realizing that she has introduced most of the
incoherence she finds.
81. Perkins repeats the distinction, using the same language, but not consistently, and
that will become the cause of some difficulty down the road. Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445-46 (1952).
82. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317-20.
83. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
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is to insure that there is at least one place where every individual
(including individual corporations) will be answerable to the legal claims
of others, and thus within the reach of law. 4 If there was no such default
location where someone could always be sued, a sufficiently clever party
could violate another's legal rights and remain free from legal recourse,
creating a world of rights without remedies.
On the other hand, parties should not be forced to defend in forums
where they will not be treated fairly. The Due Process Clause demands
as much. Since general jurisdiction presupposes the lack of a relationship
between the forum and the plaintiff's claim, it follows that it should be
available only in states where defendants are sufficiently present that it is
reasonable to expect that they will be treated fairly by local courts and
juries. The state of domicile is the most obvious example of such a forum
for an individual," and the state where it has its principal place of
business is the most obvious example for a corporation." In these and
equivalent places, defendants pay taxes, provide employment, perform
civic works, and otherwise behave as full citizens of the community.
They will be looked upon as "locals," or "insiders" in Professor
Brilmayer's terminology,8 by the state's judicial system, as part of the
state family, so to speak, and as a consequence, not be subject to the
types of prejudice typically directed at outsiders.89 It follows that it is not
unfair to force them to litigate there.90 Substantial 9' contacts should be
84. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
85. For an example of an attempt to do this, see Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v.
Taylor, 239 F. Supp. 913, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Taylor was a lawsuit against Elizabeth
Taylor for disruptions occurring during the filming of the movie Cleopatra, when Taylor
was living abroad and was a U.S. citizen but not the citizen of any state. Id.
86. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998)
("General jurisdiction exists when a defendant is domiciled in the forum state .... ); see
also Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940).
87. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
88. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 37, at 87.
89. There will be instances when this will not be true, of course. Companies can do
things that will give them reputations as bad citizens. But as a general matter, large
employers who contribute to the economic well-being of a state are looked upon as
insiders and will be protected as such, and doctrinal rules have to operate on
generalizations about such factual matters. Some courts express this idea as a "general
presence" in the state. See Aeroglobal Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Cirrus Indus., Inc., C. A.
No. 01C-08-089 (CHT), 2003 Del. Super. LEXIS 3, at *15 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2003)
("General jurisdiction is the finding of jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant based
on his general presence in the State ... ").
90. Professor Brilmayer discusses this idea in terms of the defendant's ability to
protect its interests within the state's political rather than judicial processes. Brilmayer,
How Contacts Count, supra note 37, at 87. See also Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and
Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1280 (1989), for an elaboration of her concept of
"political fairness." I find her argument persuasive, and mean only to add to it. Sarah
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seen, then, as the kind of contacts that give defendants the type of
presence in a state that will cause them to be regarded as state citizens.
92
While several Supreme Court decisions mention the doctrine of
general jurisdiction," and one discusses it at length, 4 Perkins is the only
case in which the Court used the doctrine to justify an assertion of
jurisdiction. The defendant in Perkins was a Philippine gold and silver
mining company "[whose] operations . .. were completely halted during
the occupation of the [Philippine] Islands by the Japanese" during the
Cebik argues the same point on the basis of state sovereignty interests, see Cebik, supra
note 37, at 12, but as we will see, a "fairness" (to the defendant) argument is easier to
ground in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the Due
Process Clause protects individual rather than state interests, see Ins. Corp. of Ir. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).
91. For other ways of translating the somewhat abstract concept of "substantial"
contacts into more specific, operational language, see Cebik, supra note 37, at 31-41, and
Twitchell, supra note 1, at 207-12.
92. Because it is an option of last resort, general jurisdiction should be limited in
availability, see Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1200 (4th Cir. 1993)
(concluding that "broad constructions of general jurisdiction should be generally
disfavored"), and the most sensible way to provide this limit is to restrict it to a
defendant's "home state" so to speak, that is, the state of domicile for an individual, and
the state of incorporation and state of principal place of business for a corporation, though
large, national, and multinational corporations can present special cases, see Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
("General jurisdiction . . . requires that defendant's contacts be of the sort that
'approximate physical presence."' (citation omitted)); see also Mary Twitchell, The Myth
of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 676 (1988). Once agreeing, Professor
Twitchell now has had second thoughts about this view. See Twitchell, supra note 1, at
205-12. Professor Stein has described the defendant's "home state" as the state the
defendant has adopted as its sovereign. See Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and
Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 758 (1987).
The "home state" view has been adopted by both the Hague Convention for jurisdiction
over foreign defendants, and the European Union Convention on Jurisdiction and
Enforcement of Judgments (the Brussels Convention). See Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters, Oct. 30, 1999, art. 4, available at http://hcch.e-
vision.nl/upload/wop/dmdrafte.pdf; Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, arts. 2, 53, 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1, reprinted in 29
I.L.M. 1413 (limiting general jurisdiction to defendant domicile and stating that
corporation's domicile is its "seat"). The American jurisdiction system, limited as it is by
due process constraints, assumes that claims ordinarily will be brought in states with which
the defendant has some kind of connection, however limited, and admits of exceptions
only in the face of a greater unfairness to the plaintiff presented when there is no such
state, and thus no place to sue.
93. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985); Calder v. Jones, 465
U.S. 783, 788 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779-80 (1984); Ins.
Corp. of Ir.. 456 U.S. at 694; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
291-92 (1980).
94. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-19 (1984).
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Second World War.95 The president of the company (who was also its
general manager and principal stockholder) returned to his home in
Ohio to carry on the "necessarily limited wartime activities of the
company., 96 While in Ohio, the president prepared correspondence,
drew and distributed salary checks, conducted directors' meetings,
purchased machinery, maintained bank accounts, and supervised the
rehabilitation of mining properties in the Philippines, all on behalf of the97
company. To the extent that the company continued to exist at all
during the war, it did so in the form of the president (and two
secretaries), located in Ohio.99 Perkins sued the company in Ohio state
court (after lawsuits in the Philippines, New York, and California had
proved unsuccessful), 99 for failure to pay dividends and issue stock
certificates she claimed were owed to her.'00 Her claims did not arise in
Ohio or have anything to do with the company's business activities
there.0 1 The company moved to quash service arguing that, as a foreign
corporation, it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Ohio on a cause
of action not arising there.'2 The Ohio Supreme Court agreed, 3 but the
U.S. Supreme Court did not. ' 0
In language that, in retrospect, may have been a little too casual, the
Court first explained that "if [a] corporation carries on . . . continuous
and systematic corporate activities" in a state, "those activities are
enough to... subject that corporation to proceedings in personam in that
state, at least insofar as the proceedings in personam seek to enforce
causes of action relating to those very activities or to other activities of
the corporation within the state."0 5  This was International Shoe's
principal test for specific jurisdiction, but as the Court quickly
acknowledged, it did not apply in Perkins.'06 The problem in Perkins,
said the Court, "takes us one step further."'"7 Because Perkins's cause of
action did not arise out of the mining company's activities in Ohio, she
must show that the company had "substantial" (not just "continuous and
95. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952).
96. Id. at 447-48.
97. Id. at 448.
98. Id. at 447-48.
99. Id. at 438 n.1.
100. Id. at 438-39.
101. Id. at 438.
102. See id. at 439.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 449.
105. Id. at 445-46.
106. See id. at 446.
107. Id.
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systematic") contacts with the State.O"0 As the Court put it, the task was
to "consider, in more detail, the issue of whether.., the business done in
Ohio by the . . . mining company was sufficiently substantial and of such
a nature as to permit Ohio to entertain a cause of action [that] arose from
activities entirely distinct from [the company's] activities in Ohio."'' 9 The
key term in this description of the difference between general and
specific jurisdiction is "substantial." The Court distinguished clearly
(and sensibly) between the type of contacts needed to support
jurisdiction over claims arising in Ohio and claims arising elsewhere, and
it used the terms "continuous and systematic" and "substantial," to
express this distinction. " Unfortunately, the Court did not use this
terminology as consistently as one would like, and this created problems
that I will describe shortly. But "substantial" contacts was the Court's
original way of describing the due process requirements for general
jurisdiction, and it is still the most sensible way to describe the
requirement.
The requirement of "substantial" contacts appears in that part of the
Perkins opinion describing the legal rule to be applied in the case.1"
Unfortunately, in two other less significant parts of the opinion, the
Court muddied the waters somewhat by describing the test for
jurisdiction over the mining company as requiring only "continuous and
systematic" contacts with the State of Ohio,"' and these references
created some mischief in the case law down the road. In the very first
paragraph of the opinion, for example, where it stated the question
presented by the case, the Court described the mining company as
"carrying on in Ohio a continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its
general business."".3 And similarly, at the very end of the opinion, in
summarizing the activities supporting jurisdiction, the Court described
the company's president as carrying on "in Ohio a continuous and
systematic supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of the
company.,114 In later opinions,"5 the Court has seemed to use this
"continuous and systematic" language (sometimes supported by a
citation to these peripheral parts of Perkins), to describe the due process
108. ld. at 446-47 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1945)).
109. Id. at 447.
110. Id. at 445-46.
111. Id. at 446.
112. Id. at 448.
113. Id. at 438.
114. Id. at 448.
115. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465
U.S. 783,786-87 (1984); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
414-16 (1984).
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standard for general jurisdiction, and many lower courts, both federal
and state, have followed suit." ' But to interpret the requirement of
"continuous and systematic" contacts to mean the same thing as
"substantial" contacts is just a mistake, no matter how frequently it is
made. International Shoe differentiated clearly between the two
categories of contacts, Perkins maintained the distinction, albeit
inarticulately, pointing out that the source of the distinction was
International Shoe,"7 and a careful reading of the case law as a whole
would see the distinction as still intact. General jurisdiction requires
substantial defendant contacts with the forum; continuous and systematic
contacts support only specific jurisdiction."" We will come back to this
topic shortly, but for the moment it is time to return to the Court's
development of the due process standard for specific jurisdiction.
D) The First Restatement: Woodson 19
Woodson continued the development of the specific jurisdiction test
begun in International Shoe and refined in McGee and Hanson. The
underlying story in Woodson is both tragic and horrific, and the
Robinsons-the real parties in interest,"O who did everything right and
still lost big-have as much reason to think the law's an ass as any
character in a Dickens novel. 21  Woodson is important doctrinally in
large measure because, like Hanson, it is one of the limited number of
Supreme Court cases to uphold a denial of extra-territorial jurisdiction,
and in so doing, to identify one end of the jurisdictional spectrum.1 22 It is
116. See infra note 473.
117. See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445-46.
118. See id. at 446, 448.
119. At one time many thought that Shaffer was the final word on the personal
jurisdiction standard, see supra note 74, but Woodson is a better source than Shaffer for an
authoritative restatement of the "minimum contacts" doctrine (and will be until Burger
King), because its animating policy of defendant-veto is still the preferred view, and its
two-part formulation of the standard (with some minor cosmetic changes) is still the way
the Court organizes the doctrine today.
120. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980). Charles
Woodson was the Oklahoma State District Court judge against whom two of the
defendants sought a writ of prohibition when their motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction was denied. Id. at 292.
121. See generally Charles W. Adams, Worldwide Volkswagen v. Woodson- The Rest
of the Story, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1122 (1993), for a nearly complete history of the case.
Adams describes what happened in the case up to the early 1990s. For the final chapters,
see Robinson v. Audi Aktiengesellschaft, 56 F.3d 1259, 1268 (10th Cir. 1995) (denying
Robinson's motion to set aside trial verdict on the grounds of fraud), and Robinson v.
Volkswagenwerk AG, 56 F.3d 1268, 1274 (10th Cir. 1995) (dismissing Robinson's fraud
claims against Volkswagen and its lawyers).
122. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 299.
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a confusing opinion, stating one test and applying another, and in some
ways it is more important for one of its dissenting opinions than for its
majority opinion (not a common phenomenon, even in an era when one-
liners from early Holmes dissents are a familiar part of popular idiom).
But it made major changes in the structure of the "minimum contacts"
standard, even if it did not do much to alter the standard's component
parts, and the new structure it put in place became the foundation for the
Court's final restatement of the doctrine in the Burger King case a short
five years later.12 For better and worse, Woodson is a landmark in the
personal jurisdiction field.
As configured in the Supreme Court, the case involved a products
liability claim brought by a New York purchaser of an Audi (Robinson)
against a New York State Audi dealer (Seaway) and Audi's northeast
regional distributor (World-Wide) 24  The Robinsons were hit from
behind while driving the car through Oklahoma in the process of moving
to Arizona."5 The Audi's gas tank ruptured in the accident, its doors
jammed, the gas ignited, and the car turned into an incinerator, severely
burning Mrs. Robinson and two of the Robinson children. No one
died, but over the next several years all of the burned family members on
more than one occasion probably wished that they had. Their injuries
were gruesome, and the recovery process was not that much better.
12
1
The Robinsons sued Audi and its importer (Volkswagen), in Oklahoma
state court on a design-defect theory, and added Seaway and World-
Wide as defendants to destroy complete diversity and prevent the case
from being removed to federal court. 29 This proved a fateful move when
Seaway and World-Wide took the case to the Supreme Court.1 30 The
case raised doctrinal problems that had been brewing for some time in
the lower federal and state courts, though most of the lawyers in the case
did not seem to recognize this,13' and thus gave the Court an opportunity
123. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 486 (1985).
124. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 288.
125. Id. Procedurally, the case was an appeal from the denial of a petition asking the
Oklahoma Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court judge from
allowing the case to proceed against Seaway and World-Wide after denying their motions
to dismiss. Id. at 289.
126. Id. at 288.
127. See Adams, supra note 121, at 1125-26.
128. See id.
129. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 288. Until they had relocated in Arizona, the Robinsons
were still citizens of New York. Id. at 287.
130. See id. at 288 n.3 (noting that Audi and Volkswagen did not contest jurisdiction
beyond the trial court).
131. Except for the youngest and most inexperienced lawyer in the case. See Adams,
supra note 121, at 1130, 1133. See id. at 1134-35, for a discussion of how the case almost
did not make it to the Supreme Court.
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to restore order to a field that was becoming increasingly fragmented. It
would turn out that the Court was not quite yet ready to do that.
In many ways, the Woodson decision was based on a reprise and re-
affirmation of the defendant-veto policy underlying Hanson."' The
Court characterized Seaway and World-Wide's contacts with Oklahoma
through the Audi automobile as foreseeable rather than purposeful,"'
and "'foreseeability alone,"' as the Court explained, "has never been a
sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process
Clause.', 134  It reached the same conclusion with respect to Seaway's
participation in a national network of Audi dealerships, some of which
were located in Oklahoma."' The Robinsons' suit was for products
liability, not breach of a dealer network agreement, so Seaway's
participation in the network was only collaterally related to the plaintiffs'
claim; it did not give rise to it. 136 As such, Seaway's activities failed to
132. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297 (explaining that the rationale underlying the minimum
contacts standard is to provide clear notice to a defendant of when it will be subject to suit
in a state so that it "can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring
insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great,
severing its connection with the State"). Woodson also repeated Hanson's objection to
the "transformation of the national economy" rationale used in McGee to justify the
totality-of-the-circumstances view. Id. at 294.
133. Id. at 295. The Court also discussed the foreseeability/purposefulness distinction
in terms of the so-called reasonable anticipation test, that is, whether a defendant "should
reasonably anticipate being haled into a court" in the forum state. Id. at 297. This test,
first introduced by Justice Marshall in Shaffer, is completely empty, as Justice Brennan
pointed out in his dissent, id. at 311 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting), and adds nothing to the
jurisdictional discussion. To answer the question of whether a defendant should
reasonably anticipate being hated into court, one must turn to some other test, and that
test, rather than the reasonable anticipation test, is the jurisdictional standard. The phrase
is just one of Shaffer's many infelicities, but unlike most of the others, the Court has not
repudiated it, and lower court judges seem to like it. See, e.g., Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step
Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 451 (3d Cir. 2003); Medinah Mining, Inc. v. Amunategui, 237 F.
Supp. 2d 1132, 1134 (D. Nev. 2002); Rodriguez Salgado v. Les Nouvelles Esthetiques, 218
F. Supp. 2d 203, 209 (D.P.R. 2002); Carrot Bunch, Inc. v. Computer Friends, Inc., 218 F.
Supp. 2d 820, 824 (N.D. Tex. 2002); Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F.
Supp. 2d 824, 834-35 (N.D. II1. 2000).
134. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 295. In doing so, the Court was responding to the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma, which used a foreseeability rationale to support its decision to find
jurisdiction. Id. at 290. Harkening back to Hanson, the Court pointed out that it was no
doubt foreseeable that Donner would move to Florida and execute a power of
appointment there, and yet that was not enough to establish jurisdiction. "IT]he
foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis," the Court said, "is not the mere
likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State[,] . . . [but that the]
corporation 'purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities [there]."' Id.
at 297 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)) (citations omitted).
135. Id. at 298-99.
136. Id.
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satisfy the nexus requirement of the specific jurisdiction doctrine.'37 In
effect, the Robinsons occupied the same status as the proverbial "third
party claiming some relationship with the defendant" who could not,
through its unilateral actions, create a contact between the defendants
and the forum.'38
The Court refined the purposefulness requirement further in a
discussion of the so-called stream-of-commerce theory of defendant
contacts. Borrowed from pollution and noxious substance cases in tort
law, the stream-of-commerce theory permits a state to take jurisdiction
over a defendant who, while not doing business directly in the state, does
so indirectly by placing its product into the "stream-of-commerce," to
have it come out of the stream and cause harm in the state.'39 The
paradigmatic case is the industrial component manufacturer who sells to
other manufacturers rather than retail customers.' 40 In a well-known
example, a valve manufacturer sold a valve to a boiler manufacturer in
another state that in turn incorporated the valve into a boiler sold to a
retail purchaser in yet a third state. 4' When the valve failed and the
boiler exploded, the injured person wanted to sue both the manufacturer
of the valve and the manufacturer of the boiler.4 4 But since the boiler
manufacturer was the only one who, in the words of the Court, made an
"effort[] ... to serve ... the market for its product in [the s]tate[],' 43 a
"contract" based jurisdictional standard such as "doing business," did not
help. Some standard based on a combination of both doing business and
producing a tortious effect in the state was needed, and that is where the
hybrid stream-of-commerce theory came in.'" The theory did not apply
137. Id. at 298.
138. Id. at 298-99.
139. Id. at 297-98. Stream-of-commerce is often an unnecessary doctrinal garnish on
an ordinary doing-business case. For an example, see Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N The
Water Publ'g, 327 F.3d 472, 476-80 (6th Cir. 2003).
140. Selling one's products to an independent company which, in turn, sells directly to
the public, is another form of indirect marketing in a state. See Braley v. Sportec Prod.
Co., No. Civ. 01-333-JD, 2002 WL 1676293, at *2 (D.N.H. July 16, 2002) (considering a
case of a defendant that "sells its products to independent companies and does not
supervise, control, or have advance notice of where those companies consequently market
[defendant's] products").
141. Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 762 (Il1. 1961).
142. Id.
143. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297.
144. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality
opinion). There is not yet a majority of the Court on record for a particular stream-of-
commerce view of "minimum contacts." Id. at 105. Justice O'Connor discussed the issue
in considerable detail in Asahi, and formulated an "effects-plus" version of the standard,
id. at 108-14 (plurality opinion), but her opinion did not command a majority of the Court,
id. at 105. Asahi would have been better discussed as a pure torts case. See infra notes
384-96 and accompanying text.
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in Woodson, however, because the Robinsons' Audi left the stream of
commerce at the site of its retail sale in Massena, New York.145 Once in
the hands of the Robinsons, the retail purchasers, the automobile was no
longer a commercial product, and thus whatever harm it produced in
Oklahoma could not be attributed to Seaway and World-Wide, who were
mere commercial conduits for the Audi, and not its manufacturer."'
More interesting than its discussion of the purposefulness and nexus
issues, however, was the Court's restructuring of the "minimum contacts"
standard inherited from International Shoe (and Hanson). Here, the
Court made a sizeable transformation in the standard as received,
altering International Shoe's statement of the doctrine (although mostly
just codifying changes already widely accepted) in major ways, and it is
these alterations that give Woodson its greatest significance. Woodson's
new formulation of the "minimum contacts" test is difficult to describe
because the opinion says one thing and does another, and both what it
says and what it does are needed for a complete understanding of its new
version of the test,147 so I will begin with what the opinion says.
After reaffirming its commitment to the idea of "minimum contacts,
the Court, in effect, divided the standard into two parts by discussing it in
terms of "two related, but distinguishable, functions.', 149 The first was the
familiar one of protecting "the defendant against the burdens of litigating
in a distant or inconvenient forum."'5 This was International Shoe's well-
known "estimate of the inconveniences" factor in other language.'5'
Following the Court's new terminology, think of this (for the moment at
145. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 298.
146. Id. The Court's discussion does not always maintain the distinction between
contract ("doing business") and tort ("effect" and "effects plus") based theories of long-
arm jurisdiction, a distinction that is routinely made in enumerated acts long-arm statutes.
See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) (McKinney 2001) ("transacts any business within the
state"); id. § 302 (a)(2) ("commits a tortious act within the state"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
75.4(3) (2003) (causing "injury to person or property ... within ... this State"); id. § 1-
75.4(5)(c) ("promis[ing] ... to deliver or receive within this State . .. goods .. .or other
things of value"). The "effects" test has also has been codified in the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1971). See also Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S.
84, 96 (1978); UNIF. INTERSTATE & INT'L PROCEDURE ACT § 1.03(1) (withdrawn 1977),
9B U.L.A 310 (1966) ("transacting any business in this state"); UNIF. INTERSTATE &
INT'L PROCEDURE ACT § 1.03(4) (withdrawn 1977), 9B U.L.A 310 ("causing tortious
injury in this state").
147. Combining the two in a single standard will be one of Burger King's principal
contributions to the doctrine.
148. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 291 ("A state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant only so long as there exist 'minimum contacts' between the
defendant and the forum State.").
149. Id. at 291-92.
150. Id. at 292.
151. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
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least) as the "inconvenience" half of the now-bifurcated "minimum
contacts" test.5 2 A defendant may not be subjected to extra-territorial
jurisdiction in a forum in which it would be unreasonably inconvenient
for him to defend.53 The second function of the "minimum contacts" test
was the somewhat new 1 4 one of considering the inconvenience to the
defendant "in light of other relevant factors," principally, a variety of
state sovereignty and federalism interests affected by the decision to take
or deny jurisdiction.' Think of this (also for the moment) as the "other
factors" half of the test.56 A defendant may not be forced to defend in a
forum, even when convenient, when state sovereignty and federalism
concerns all cut the other way.
The problem with this statement of the test, of course, is that it says
nothing about the role of defendant contacts with the forum-their
extent, whether they were purposefully made, their relationship to the
plaintiff's claim, who made them, how they were made, and so on-in
assessing the defendant's amenability to jurisdiction. The Court did not
ignore contacts altogether. The principal ground for its decision was the
conclusion that Seaway and World-Wide's contacts with Oklahoma
either were not purposeful (the automobile contact), or did not give rise
to the Robinsons' claim (the dealer network contact). 57  But its
reformulated "minimum contacts" standard, standing alone, did not
authorize the Court to take such purposefulness or nexus considerations
into account. Instead, the standard, read literally, limited analysis to a
determination of whether it would be inconvenient for Seaway and
World-Wide to litigate in Oklahoma, and whether the interests of
152. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292 ("The protection against inconvenient litigation is
typically described in terms of 'reasonableness' or 'fairness."'). After Burger King the
terminology and content of this part of the test will change, and it will become known as
the "contacts" half of the test.
153. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987); Woodson, 444
U.S. at 292.
154. Only as stated. The Court had taken such factors into consideration since
Pennoyer. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1877).
155. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292. The Court described these concerns as "the forum
state's interest in adjudicating the dispute," citing to McGee, "the plaintiff's interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief," citing to Kulko, "the interstate judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies," and "the shared
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies," again
citing to Kulko. Id. None of these concerns were new with Woodson. One can find
antecedents for each as far back as International Shoe. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 315, 317-19.
But Woodson codified them, and gave them a greater structural importance than they had
simply as the bases for individual prior decisions.
156. After Burger King this will become the "fairness factors" half of the test. Since
Woodson also uses the term "fairness," but in conjunction with the first half of the test and
not the second, one can begin to see the difficulties in keeping terminology straight.
157. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 298-99.
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Oklahoma and New York as states, individually and in combination, cut
the other way."" One might wonder why the Court thought of this as a
contacts test at all, though it is clear that at least the majority did.
Quoting from International Shoe, the Court said, "[T]he Due Process
Clause 'does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment
in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the
state has no contacts, ties, or relations.'" 5 9 In the Court's mind, contacts
was still first among equals of the elements that made up the minimum
contacts test.
Since it was clear from the decision that the Court did not mean to
eliminate the idea of contacts from the test, the Court's new version of
"minimum contacts" had another, equally serious, problem-one which
the Court did not explicitly resolve. The inconvenience considerations
and state interest factors listed by the Court as relevant to the
jurisdictional decision, while uncontroversial in themselves,' 6° were
difficult to combine into a single, integrated test. The Court's description
of these factors was more of a laundry list than an algorithm, in the sense
that it did not say how much of one type of consideration it would take to
outweigh how much of another. Like balancing tests generally, the
Court's reformulation lacked a metric for comparing and contrasting the
different (perhaps even incommensurable) parts of the standard, and
thus, also like balancing tests generally, it failed to constrain personal
jurisdictional analysis to any significant extent. The Court would fix this
problem, at least to a limited extent, five years later in Burger King, but
at the time of Woodson it remained a serious concern.161
Woodson also contained the first 162 explicit attempt by the Court to
justify the consideration of state sovereignty and federalism factors in
158. Id. at 295-99.
159. Id. at 294.
160. This is only partly true. The Court's right to rely on state interest factors in
making jurisdictional decisions is a hotly contested issue, and the Court itself cannot seem
to make up its mind about whether it is entitled to take them into account or not. See infra
notes 223-29 and accompanying text.
161. In Burger King the Court attempted to solve the problem by introducing the
concepts of "compelling case" and "lesser showing" standards for comparing one set of
factors with the other. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985); see also
infra notes 341-47 and accompanying text.
162. In the post-International Shoe world, that is. Pennoyer grounded the
consideration of state sovereignty concerns in jurisdictional analysis in public international
law, see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-33 (1877), but when International Shoe
replaced Pennoyer's public law standard with the "minimum contacts" test, this option no
longer was available. The Court revisited the issue several times over the next few years,
changing its mind (and position) each time.
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personal jurisdiction analysis.' 63 The problem, one will recall, is that the
Fourteenth Amendment is the sole limitation on the extra-territorial
jurisdictional power of the states.' 64 But the Fourteenth Amendment, by
its own terms, protects the liberty and property interests of "person[s],"
not the sovereignty interests of states. 165 How then is the Court justified
in taking sovereignty interests into account in a Fourteenth Amendment
analysis? What source of law supports this? In this first attempt at an
answer, the Court grounded the right to consider state interests on
"principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution."' 66 As
the Court explained, the "Framers also intended that the States retain
many essential attributes of sovereignty, including . . . the sovereign
power to try causes in their courts. ' , 167  These sovereignty interests, in
turn, implied a limitation on the sovereignty interests of all other states-
"a limitation [that was] express or implicit in both the original scheme of
the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment."' 8  As the Court
emphasized in a well-known "even if" paragraph:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no
inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the tribunals
of another State; . . . even if the forum State is the most
convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause,
acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes
act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.1
69
There was nothing new in this, according to the Court, since even
International Shoe had indicated that jurisdiction must be assessed "'in
the context of our federal system of government,"' so as to ensure "'the
163. The Court's timing in this regard suggests that it probably was responding to a
criticism of the use of sovereignty concerns in jurisdictional analysis in a well-known 1981
article in the Northwestern University Law Review. See Martin H. Redish, Due Process,
Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1112
(1981). The difficulty of justifying the use of sovereignty factors had been recognized for a
long time, but the Redish article made the objection too powerful to be ignored any
longer. In Insurance Corp. of Ireland, two years later, the Court would reverse itself and
agree with Redish's argument, but without mentioning his article. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v.
Compagnie des Bauxite de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982). Redish's argument was
not without its critics. See Allen R. Kamp, Beyond Minimum Contacts: The Supreme
Court's New Jurisdictional Theory, 15 GA. L. REV. 19, 38-39 (1980) (arguing that the Due
Process Clause justifies the consideration of state sovereignty concerns in a personal
jurisdiction analysis).
164. Ins. Corp. of fr., 456 US. at 702 n.10; Woodson, 444 U.S. at 287, 291.
165. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[n]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ... .
166. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 293.
167. Id.
168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. Id. at 294 (emphasis added).
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orderly administration of the laws.' ' , 70  But few had suspected such
innocent phrases to contain so much hidden meaning. An argument that
something is constitutionally authorized is difficult to evaluate under the
best of circumstances-constitutional law often seems more like religion
than law-but when it is not possible even to say whether the
authorization is express or implicit, the argument is particularly difficult
to assess.' This will not be the Court's last word on the subject,
however, so it is perhaps better to wait until the string has played out
before considering the argument.
Woodson is also important for one of its dissenting opinions. Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented separately, but Justice
Brennan's opinion took on added significance when, five years later, he
blended parts of it with the Woodson majority view to write the opinion
for the Court in Burger King.' Since Burger King is the Court's last
definitive statement of the personal jurisdiction doctrine, understanding
Brennan's particular take on the doctrine, as expressed in Woodson,
helps pave the way for a more complete understanding of the present
state of the doctrine, and helps to put the doctrine in richer context.
Justice Brennan argued for a totality-of-the-circumstances view of
extra-territorial jurisdiction because he believed, with Justice Black in
McGee, that jurisdictional rules had to adapt to the "'fundamental
transformation of our national economy.""" Finding it "outdated,"' 74 he
170. Id. at 293-94 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317, 319
(1945)). This excerpt is confusing. Read literally, it seems to say that state sovereignty
interests are superior to individual liberty interests in personal jurisdiction analysis, but
that is almost certainly not what the Court had in mind. In context, the reference to
"federalism" restrictions on state power was the Court's way of describing the need for
purposeful defendant forum contacts before jurisdiction could attach. The Court cited to
Hanson, a contacts opinion, for the proposition, and the excerpt was part of a paragraph in
which the principal point was that a state may not make a binding judgment in personam
against an individual with whom it has "no contacts, ties, or relations." Id. at 294.
Moreover, to the extent that the excerpt elevated state sovereignty interests over litigant
liberty interests it would have been modified by Insurance Corp. of Ireland's later
repudiation of the "instrument of interstate federalism" conception of due process. See
Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982)
("The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp....
must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the
Due Process Clause.... [T]he Clause ... makes no mention of federalism concerns.").
171. Cf Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958) ("An essential
characteristic of [the federal judicial] system is the manner in which ... it distributes trial
functions between judge and jury and, under the influence-if not the command-of the
Seventh Amendment, assigns the decisions of disputed questions of fact to the jury.").
172. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75, 480, 486 (1985).
173. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting McGee v. Int'l Life
Ins. Co, 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1980)).
174. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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would have "strip[ped] the defendant of.. . veto power over certain very
appropriate fora," because communication and travel over long distances
were no longer slow, and notions of state sovereignty were no longer
"impractical and exaggerated." '75  In "today's world," he continued, a
forum is appropriate if the "plaintiff can show that [it] has a sufficient
interest in the litigation [and] the defendant ... cannot show some real
injury to a constitutionally protected interest." '76  Minimum contacts
must exist, he argued, quoting his dissent in Shaffer, "among the parties,
the contested transaction, and the forum state,, 177 but these three
separate types of considerations exist in a kind of sliding scale
relationship with one another, so that as the significance of one
diminishes the significance of the others increase.7 1 In this "all things
considered" kind of analysis, a defendant's forum contacts are "merely
one way of giving content to the determination of fairness and
reasonableness ' '179 required by the Due Process Clause. If litigating in a
particular forum is not burdensome to a defendant, for example, fewer
contacts with that forum are needed to justify jurisdiction,18 and "the
interests of the State and other parties [to the] proceeding" are the type
of "other considerations" that could provide such justification. In
sharp contrast to International Shoe, Justice Brennan believed that
defendant forum contacts were not the most important, or perhaps even
a necessary, part of the "minimum contacts" standard.' 82 In Asahi the
175. Id. at 312 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
176. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Requiring a three-way relationship for minimum
contacts to exist seems to eliminate the category of general jurisdiction, which requires
only a two-way relationship (between defendant and forum), as well as several single-
factor jurisdictional tests (e.g, tag jurisdiction, status-adjudications, pure in rem, and the
like) which also require only a two-way relationship.
177. Id. at 310 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178- See id. at 300-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
180. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
182. Justice Brennan also would have found jurisdiction over Seaway and World-Wide
on a stream-of-commerce theory. !d. at 306-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Unlike the
majority, for whom the retail sale of the Audi brought the vehicle out of the stream of
commerce, Justice Brennan thought the sale purposefully injected the Audi into the
stream, and that it was still there when the Robinsons drove the car to Oklahoma. Id. at
306 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For him, the car did not come out of the stream, so to speak,
until the accident in Oklahoma. See id. at 306-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As he put it:
It is difficult to see why the Constitution should distinguish between a case
involving goods which reach a distant State through a chain of distribution and a
case involving goods which reach the same State because a consumer, using them
as the dealer knew the customer would, took them there. In each case the seller
purposefully injects the goods into the stream of commerce and those goods
predictably are used in the forum State.
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Court would adopt this view for purposes of denying jurisdiction,183 but
no decision of the Court has yet adopted it explicitly to uphold
jurisdiction.
E) The Mid-Course Refinements: Kulko v. Superior Court, Insurance
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxite de Guinee, Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., Calder v. Jones, and Helicopteros Nacionales de
Columbia, S. A. v. Hall
While the Court's restatement of the "minimum contacts" standard
was not to reach a kind of reflective equilibrium for another five years, in
Burger King, in the period immediately following Woodson the Court
made a number of what one might think of as "single-factor" ' 8' additions
to the standard, each of which made a distinctive contribution to the
Woodson restatement.18 1 In fact, it is not much of an exaggeration to say
that the cases decided during this five-year period are responsible for
most of the details of the modern personal jurisdiction standard, and that
the early 1980s was the most productive period in the history of the
Court for the personal jurisdiction doctrine, at least to date. Kulko v.
Superior Court,1 6 for example, explained what the Court meant by its
enigmatic reference in Woodson to the so-called "shared interest of the
several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies."
1'
This was one of the most unusual of Woodson's "other (sovereignty)
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Justice Brennan's influence on the
subsequent development of this issue has not been nearly as great as his influence on the
general structure of the "minimum contacts" test. The issue did not come up in Burger
King, and was not discussed again by the Supreme Court until the 1987 decision in Asahi,
where a plurality of the Court again rejected Justice Brennan's chattel-as-agent view.
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion).
183. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114,116.
184. By this I mean that each of these decisions contributed either a new concept to
the developing jurisdictional standard, or a new definition or illustration of a familiar
concept. I take the term from the expression "single-factor test," often used to describe a
category of jurisdictional standard not subject to a "mininmum contacts" analysis. These
include so-called transient or tag jurisdiction based on personal service of process while in
the state, and "status-determination" jurisdiction based on domicile, marriage, or the
appointment of a guardian or the like within the state.
185. See Scott M. Hagel, Civil Procedure--The Stream of Commerce Theory in
Minnesota: Does the Shoe Fit?, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 231, 235 n.31 (1998).
186. 436 U.S. 84 (1978). While Kulko pre-dates Woodson, and thus does not literally
occur in the period "intervening" between Woodson and Burger King, it is like the cases
from that period discussed in this Section in that it contributes a single distinctive idea to
the reconstituted "minimum contacts" test, and thus can fairly be lumped with that body
of cases. Shaffer, decided at about the same time as Kulko, was once thought to be the
Court's most important personal jurisdiction opinion, but time has not treated Shaffer
well. See supra note 74.
187. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292.
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factors" against which a defendant's contacts were to be measured in
determining the reasonableness of jurisdiction. Lower courts had
experienced a great deal of difficulty giving the idea a precise meaning,
and had applied it in a wide variety of not completely compatible ways. 8 '
While Kulko did not define the outer boundaries of the factor, it gave a
mainstream example of what it looked like. 9
In Kulko, a divorced mother of two living in California petitioned a
California state court to modify the custody and support provisions of a
New York separation agreement between her and her former husband
still living in New York.' 9 Initially, in accordance with the agreement,
the two children lived with their father during the school year and with
their mother during vacations. 9' About a year after the separation, the
older child asked to reverse this arrangement and her father agreed,
buying her a one-way plane ticket to California. 92 Three years later, the
younger child told his mother he wanted to reverse the arrangement as
well, and, unbeknownst to the father, the mother sent him a plane ticket
to come to California.'9 The father contested the jurisdiction of the
California state court over the mother's lawsuit, arguing that apart from
the children, he had no contacts, ties, or relations with the State of
California. 194  The trial court found jurisdiction,1 95 however, and the
California Supreme Court affirmed, basing its ruling on the "effects" (the
refusal to pay increased support after changing the children's custody
arrangements) produced by the father in the State; 196 but the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed.197
188. See, e.g., Great Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Banco Obrero de Ahorro y
Prestamos de P.R., 535 F.2d 331, 332 (5th Cir. 1976); Thompson v. Ecological Sci. Corp.,
421 F.2d 467, 469 (8th Cir. 1970).
189. Keeton also may be based, in part, on this factor. The shared policy in that case
may have been the interest of the several states embodied in the single publication rule for
libel. Like Hanson and Woodson, Kulko also denied jurisdiction and thus helps identify
one end of the spectrum of the personal jurisdiction doctrine. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 100-01.
190. id. at 87-88.
191. Id. at 87.
192. Id. at 87-88.
193. Id. at 88.
194. id. The couple had been married in California, during a three day trip through
the State, but the present action was to modify custody and support arrangements. Id. at
86-88. The couple was already divorced. Id. at 87-88.
195. Id. at 88.
196. Id. at 101.
197. Cf. In re the Parental Responsibilities of H.Z.G., 77 P.3d 848, 851-52 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2003) (finding general jurisdiction over Idaho father in Colorado paternity action for
"transacting business" in Colorado by sending mother a letter promising to make monthly
support payments), cert. denied, No. 03SC433, 2003 WL 22171476 (Colo. Sept. 22, 2003).
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The Supreme Court discussed the purposefulness of the father's
actions in permitting the children to move to California, and the extent to
which he had benefited from the protections of California law, but its
analysis of these issues was hurried and unsophisticated.1 98 The decision
seems most solidly grounded, not on the defendant's lack of purposeful
contacts with the forum as the Court said it was,'9 but instead on the
finding that the defendant's contacts with the forum were outweighed by
the concern of preserving "family harmony. , 20° To take jurisdiction, said
the Court, would be to "discourage parents from entering into
reasonable visitation agreements, 2 °1 and "would impose an unreasonable
burden on family relations."2 °2  While couched in the language of
purposefulness, this rationale was in fact based on a substantive concern
from the area of family law,'°3 a surprising move given the Court's
longstanding and clearly stated position that substantive law concerns are
198. For example, the Court does not differentiate between the different
circumstances of the two children moving to California, the first with the father's help, and
the second behind his back (with the help of the mother). Kulko, 436 U.S. at 87-88. The
first contact seems purposeful in any sense of the term, but the second seems more like a
Hanson or Woodson type of contact, in which the connection is brought about by the
unilateral actions of third parties (the child and the mother) claiming a relationship with
the defendant.
199. id. at 94 ("A father who agrees, in the interests of family harmony and his
children's preferences, to allow them to spend more time in California than was required
under a separation agreement can hardly be said to have 'purposefully availed himself' of
the 'benefits and protections' of California's laws." (citation omitted)). This seems to say
that the purposefulness of the father's actions in sending his children to California (or
permitting them to go), his principal contact with the state, turns on his motive for sending
them, rather than his intention in doing so (i.e., to preserve family harmony rather than
produce a tortious effect). But why couldn't the International Life Insurance Company
(in McGee) say something similar, that it reissued its policy to Lowell Franklin as a favor
because Franklin was a loyal policyholder and he would have difficulty finding substitute
insurance at his age, rather than because it wanted to exploit the market for its insurance
in the state. There was no evidence that it had issued any other policies in California.
Motive cannot be the basis for defining purposefulness, of course, because almost all
intentional forum contacts can be reconceptualized in terms of some positive substantive
motive.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 93.
202. Id. at 98.
203. The Court in Kulko did not take a position on the merits of the mother's
underlying custody and support claim, but that is not the only way substantive concerns
can come into the analysis. Id. at 97. Preserving family harmony is not a relevant
jurisdictional concern even under the "other factors" half of the Woodson test, since it is
not a procedural interest, and it has nothing to do with the issue of providing a forum for
citizens, particularly in light of California's participation in the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act. Id. at 98. Moreover, as the Court stated, "California [did]
not attempt[] to assert any particularized interest in trying such cases in its courts by, e.g.,
enacting a special jurisdictional statute." Id.
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irrelevant to jurisdictional analysis,20' and even more so considering that
the policy in question was used to modify a constitutional rule, but this
feature of Kulko has not had a lasting effect.
Kulko is most important for its discussion of California and New
York's "shared substantive social policy" of providing for the
modification of custody and support decrees through an interstate
compact. Recognizing "California's legitimate interest in ensuring the
support of [its] children resident[s] ... without unduly disrupting [their]
lives ,' 2°5 the Court indicated that the mother's proper course for
modifying her support decree would have been to file a petition under
201the State's Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.
That Act, to which New York also was a party, permitted the mother to
file a petition for modification in California and have the merits of her
claim adjudicated in California and New York without either she or her
former husband having to leave home.2 8 This interstate mechanism
would have been undercut if the California state court had taken
jurisdiction over Mr. Kulko 20 " California residents who wanted to
modify extra-territorial support decrees would simply circumvent the
Uniform Act, and take advantage of a home court, by suing directly in
California.2 ° To preserve the shared policy which underlay the Act,
therefore, the Court had to deny jurisdiction. This was an instance in
which a strong state sovereignty interest outweighed weak defendant
contacts with the forum. While Kulko has continuing validity for this
limited point, the decision has not otherwise been a major influence in
the development of the personal jurisdiction doctrine."'
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxite de Guinee
2
1
continued the discussion, begun in Woodson, of whether it was legitimate
204. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 780 n,12 (1984) ("[Wle reject
categorically the suggestion that invisible radiations from the First Amendment may
defeat jurisdiction otherwise proper under the Due Process Clause."). Mullane is another
example of substantive law concerns influencing the jurisdictional analysis. See infra note
248.
205. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 98.
206. Id. at 98-100.
207. This is true in effect, although not literally. New York was a party to the 1950
Act, and California was a party to the 1968 Act, but as the Court said, the ''two-state'
procedure[s]" for obtaining modifications in each of the Acts were similar. Id. at 99 n.14.
208. Id. n.13 (describing the procedure).
209. See id. n.14.
210. See id.
211. Perhaps the best evidence of this is the fact that Kulko is cited only perfunctorily
in Burnham, a nearly factually identical case, and the Supreme Court's most recent
discussion of the subject. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 626 (1990)
(plurality opinion).
212. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
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for a court to consider state sovereignty interests in the personal
jurisdiction analysis. Unlike most personal jurisdiction cases, the
procedural posture of Insurance Corp. of Ireland was a little unusual. "
The plaintiff, a Guinean mining company,215  sued its business
interruption insurers in Pennsylvania federal district court for failing to
pay on a policy.116  The excess-insurers, all of whom were foreign
nationals, filed an answer and moved for summary judgment, alleging,
inter alia, that the Pennsylvania court lacked personal jurisdiction over
them.217 What made the case unusual was that the defendants also
refused to respond to the plaintiff's discovery requests seeking evidence
of the defendants' connection with Pennsylvania needed to support the
argument for jurisdiction,28 arguing that they could not be compelled to
comply with discovery motions until they were subject to the jurisdiction
of the court."' Seemingly puzzled by this "chicken-and-egg" problem,
the Supreme Court upheld an appeals court finding of jurisdiction based
on one or more of four possible rationales, none of which worked
perfectly. 20 The lack-of-a-consensus rationale was not a serious concern,
213. Id. at 701-08.
214. But not unique. See Kluin v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., 56 P.3d 829, 832 (Kan.
2002), for a similar set of "refusal to comply with jurisdictional discovery" facts.
215. Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 696. The majority owner of the company was a
Pennsylvania mining company. Id.
216. Id. at 696-97.
217. Id. at 696.
218 Id. at 698-99.
219. ld. at 696.
220. As possible bases for the decision, the Court discussed: (1) Federal Rule
37(b)(2)(A) authority to order that facts in issue be taken as established when a party fails
to respond to a discovery request, id. at 707-09; (2) the failure to comply with a discovery
order as the equivalent of failing to file a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, and thus a waiver of
any objection to jurisdiction, id. at 703-05; (3) the filing of an answer and motion for
summary judgment as a submission or consent to the jurisdiction of the court, id. at 706-07;
and (4) the Hammond Packing presumption (from Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas,
212 U.S. 322 (1909)) authorizing a court to treat the suppression of evidence as an
admission against interest and permitting the court to find the allegations at issue to be
true, Ins. Corp. of Jr., 456 U.S. at 705. The problem with the first of these rationales is that
the Federal Rules, by their own terms, see FED. R. Civ. P. 82 ("[T]hese rules shall not be
construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts .... "), and
under the provisions of the Rules Enabling Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000) (stating that
the [federal] "rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right"), may be
used against parties over whom a court already has jurisdiction, but not to create
jurisdiction in their own right. The waiver and consent arguments were contrary to fact
since the defendants had made it clear with their motion for summary judgment that they
were not submitting voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the court. Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S.
at 706. And the Hammond Packing presumption applied only in situations in which the
court already had jurisdiction, and like Rule 37, could not be used to create jurisdiction in
the first instance. See id. at 705. The Court would have been better off relying on either
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however, given the idiosyncratic nature of the problem, the absence of
any real disagreement over how the case should come out, 2" and the
likelihood that the problem would not arise frequently in the future. The
defendants' argument was based more on wordplay than substance, and
was clever more than serious, and not many clients could be expected to
pay to make such arguments over and over again.2
In the course of resolving this sui generis problem, however, the Court
added to its ongoing discussion of the role of sovereignty factors in the
due process analysis. In a seeming aside in the opinion, the Court
acknowledged that the "[personal jurisdiction requirement] represents a
restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a
matter of individual liberty., 223 Admitting that it had taken the opposite
position in Woodson, the Court reversed course, stating that the
"restriction ... described in [Woodson] ... must be seen as ultimately a
function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process
Clause,, 224 because "the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism
concerns. ' '2  "Furthermore," the Court continued, "if the federalism
concept operated as an independent restriction on the sovereign power
of the court, it would not be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction
requirement: Individual actions cannot change the powers of
sovereignty, 226 and yet individuals can waive their due process right not
to submit to the jurisdiction of a court.227 This concession did not settle
the issue, of course; in fact, it made it more complicated, since the Court
then needed to explain how sovereignty concerns (e.g., "the forum state's
interest in adjudicating the dispute") could be part of the individual
liberty interest of litigants. It did not take up this question, however, and
with good reason, since there was no obvious answer to it, or at least
2281
none that has occurred to the Court since Pennoyer. While not a
matter of large practical import -the Court has always taken sovereignty
the presumption that facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint are true when not rebutted,
or the argument that it had jurisdiction to decide jurisdiction.
221. The defendants argued, in effect, that they should be able to avoid the law by
violating it. Id. at 706-07. Whatever its reason, it is clear that a court cannot accept this
argument and continue to function as a court.
222. See id.
223. Id. at 702.
224. Id. at 703 n.10. In Woodson the Court had described the requirement as
"reflect[ing] an element of federalism and ... state sovereignty." Id. at 702 n.10.
225. Id. at 703 n.10.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 703.
228. In Pennoyer the Court justified the consideration of sovereignty interests by
grounding its decision on an analogy to international law as well as the Due Process
Clause. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-33 (1877).
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concerns into account in personal jurisdiction analysis, it makes sense to
do so, and it appears that it always will-the debate over how to justify
doing this continues to swirl. 9 The Court will come back to this question
a number of times over the years, but never really put it to rest.
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine230 and Calder v. Jones,2' libel actions
decided on the same day, also added new dimensions to different parts of
the "minimum contacts" standard. Keeton, like Kulko, was a
"sovereignty interests" case. Kathy Keeton, the live-in girlfriend of Bob
Guccione, publisher of Penthouse Magazine, at the time of the lawsuit,
sued Larry Flynt and Hustler Magazine for publishing crude sexual
caricatures of her.232 She filed the case in New Hampshire federal district
court because New Hampshire was the only state in which the statute of
limitations had not run on her claim.233 Both lower courts denied
jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the "sale of
some 10,000 to 15,000 copies of Hustler Magazine in [the] State each
month" established the defendants' "minimum contacts" with New
Hampshire.2 43 Limited solely to Keeton's New Hampshire libel claim,
this decision was not controversial. Hustler Magazine sold magazines on
a continuous and systematic basis in New Hampshire, and those
235magazines gave rise to Keeton's libel claim. Even under International
Shoe's original four-part schemata, this presented a straightforward and
relatively easy case of specific jurisdiction under the first of International
229. See generally Paul D. Carrington & James A. Martin, Substantive Interests and the
Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 227 (1967); John N. Drobak, The Federalism
Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1046-66 (1983); Terry S. Kogan, A
Neo-federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 257, 269 (1990) (arguing
that the key to state court jurisdiction is "the meaning of interstate federalism"); Harold.
S. Lewis, Jr., The "Forum State Interest" Factor in Personal Jurisdiction Adjudication:
Home-Court Horses Hauling Constitutional Carts, 33 MERCER L. REV. 769 (1982);
Margaret G. Stewart, A New Litany of Personal Jurisdiction, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 5, t8-19
(1989) (recognizing state sovereignty concerns in the determination of personal
jurisdiction is "mandated by history"); James Weinstein, The Early American Origins of
Territoriality in Judicial Jurisdiction, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1. 60 (1992) ("[T]he measure of
the legitimacy of a state's assertion of authority over an individual should reflect [a state's]
territoriality."). The classic discussion, of course, and the one to sound the alarm in a way
that could not be ignored, was Martin Redish's 1981 article in the Northwestern University
Law Review. See Redish, supra note 163, at 1120-37.
230. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
231. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
232. See Fred Barbash, Court Hands Media Defeat on Libel Law, WASH. POST, Mar.
21,1984, at A2.
233. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 773. Keeton sued first in Ohio, but her claims were dismissed
as time-barred. Id. at 772 n.1.
234. Id. at 772-774.
235. Id. at 779-81.
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Shoe's four categories."' But the case was complicated by a peculiar
feature of the substantive law of libel.
Under the so-called single publication rule, Keeton was permitted
to recover in New Hampshire for all of the damage done to her
reputation in every state in which Hustler was sold.239  The rule was
designed to "reduce[] the potential[ly] serious drain of libel cases on
judicial resources, 240 but one of its secondary effects in Keeton's case
was to give the New Hampshire district court jurisdiction over forty-nine
libel claims having no connection with the State of New Hampshire,
241claims the court otherwise could not have heard . It was as if the single
publication rule had created a special species of general jurisdiction
specifically for libel claims, 42  despite the fact, as the Court has
consistently said, that state substantive law provisions cannot be used to
modify constitutionally based jurisdictional rules.243 The Court finessed
236. Id. at 774.
[R]egular monthly sales of thousands of magazines cannot by any stretch of the
imagination be characterized as random, isolated, or fortuitous. It is, therefore,
unquestionable that New Hampshire jurisdiction over a complaint based on
those contacts would ordinarily satisfy the requirement of the Due Process
Clause that a State's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant be predicated on "minimum contacts" between the defendant and the
State.
Id.
237. The single publication rule states that
[a]s to any single publication, (a) only one action for damages can be maintained;
(b) all damages suffered in all jurisdictions can be recovered in the one action;
and (c) a judgment for or against the plaintiff upon the merits of any action for
damages bars any other action for damages between the same parties in all
jurisdictions.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A(4) (1977).
238. "Required" is more accurate, since the failure to raise the claims would bar
Keeton from litigating them in any future proceeding. See id.
239. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774.
240. Id. at 777.
241. See id. at 773. Think, for example, of Keeton suing Hustler in New Hampshire for
a libel that took place only in Utah. Absent personal service on, or general jurisdiction
over Hustler in the New Hampshire, there would be no basis on which the New
Hampshire court could take jurisdiction, since the magazines distributed in New
Hampshire would not have given rise to Keeton's claim in Utah.
242. This is not really a general jurisdiction rule, of course, since the defining feature
of general jurisdiction is the right to bring any type of claim against a defendant, no matter
where it arises, not the right to bring a specific type of claim, no matter where it arises. See
von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1136. Maybe it would be better to refer to
what the Court created as a doctrine of "restricted general jurisdiction."
243. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780 n.12 ("[W]e reject categorically the suggestion that
invisible radiations from the First Amendment may defeat jurisdiction otherwise proper
under the Due Process Clause."); see also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1984)
(describing how taking substantive law considerations into account in a jurisdictional
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this problem, as it had in Kulko, by turning to another of the sovereignty
factors in Woodson's statement of the "minimum contacts" test. It was
fair, said the Court, "to compel [Hustler] to defend . . . in New
Hampshire [for] damages [caused by] all copies of the [magazine], even
though only a small portion of those copies were distributed in New
Hampshire, 244 because "New Hampshire ... has a substantial interest in
cooperating with other States, through the 'single publication rule,' to
provide a forum for efficiently litigating all issues and damages claims
arising out of a libel in a unitary proceeding.,1 45 Restated in Woodson
terms, the Court said, in effect, that "the interstate judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, 2 46 and
the shared states' interest in their substantive social policies,
compensated for Hustler's lack of purposeful contacts with New
Hampshire (in the non-New Hampshire libel cases), and were sufficient.... 241
in themselves to establish jurisdiction.
What is strange about this conclusion is that it authorized jurisdiction
in a situation where the defendants had not just weak contacts with the
state, but no contacts at all. With the possible exception of Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,2'8 this is the only time in the history
analysis would "needlessly complicate an already imprecise inquiry"). Like Kulko and
Mullane, Keeton seemed to say one thing and do another with respect to this issue. For a
more extensive discussion of Keeton and Calder, and the relationship between the First
Amendment and the personal jurisdiction doctrine, see Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Procedure
in Public Person Defamation Cases: The Impact of the First Amendment, 66 TEX. L. REV.
215,257-71 (1987).
244. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 775.
245. Id. at 777. The Court also might have relied on the "shared interest[s] of the
several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies," World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980), since, as the Court points out,
"[t]he great majority of the States ... follow the 'single publication rule,"' Keeton, 465
U.S. at 777 n.8.
246. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292.
247. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 776-77.
248. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Mullane involved a petition in New York Surrogate Court
for the settlement of common trust funds, many of the claimants to which had no
connection with the State of New York, and some of whom did not even know they were
claimants. Id. at 309-10. The principal issue in the case concerned the type of due process
notice due the fund claimants, but in the course of resolving that issue the Supreme Court
also took up the question of the State's power to adjudicate the rights of claimants who
had no contact with New York, and who had not submitted to the authority of the
Surrogate Court. Id. at 307-12. Mullane was decided after International Shoe, so the
Court should have used the "minimum contacts" standard to resolve this jurisdictional
question, but it did not. Instead, it grounded its decision on the state substantive law
interest of creating and administering common trust funds. Id. at 313. The Court said, in
effect, that it was legitimate for a state to permit the combination of small trusts into larger
economic units to encourage the more efficient use of capital and allow the donors and
testators of small and moderately sized trusts to use the services of corporate fiduciaries.
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of the Court, so far as I can tell, that sovereignty interests have been held
sufficient in themselves to establish jurisdiction in the absence of
defendant contacts with the forum, or put another way, the only time the
Court has found "minimum contacts" to exist in the absence of actual
contacts. Justices Brennan and Stevens have taken the position over the
years that the contacts test is a severable part of the personal jurisdiction
standard,2 49 and that sovereignty interests alone can establish jurisdiction
even in the absence of contacts, but so far as I know the Court has never
acted explicitly on that view. Keeton has not proved doctrinally
troublesome, however, since lower courts do not cite to this feature of
the opinion with any frequency. Calder, on the other hand, has proved to
be a can of worms.
The Calder lawsuit grew out of an alleged libel of Shirley Jones, a
once popular but now largely forgotten movie and television
personality,251  in an article published in The National Enquirer• 252
magazine. Jones sued the Florida-based magazine, along with the
253
writer and editor of the article, in California state court.. Only the
writer and editor (the defendants) contested jurisdiction, arguing that
they did all of their work in Florida and had no control over, or economic
stake in, the distribution of the magazine in California.254 The trial court
Id. at 307-09. This interest, said the Court, "is so insistent and rooted in custom as to
establish beyond doubt the right of [the State's] courts to determine the interests of all
claimants, resident or nonresident," id. at 313, and a determination of this sort can be
made "only if interests or claims of individuals who are outside of the State can somehow
be determined. A construction of the Due Process Clause which would place impossible
or impractical obstacles in the way could not be justified." id. at 313-14. Mullane's
discussion of this personal jurisdiction question is often overlooked because the decision's
principal focus is on the question of notice, but Mullane is the first major Supreme Court
case to ground a personal jurisdiction decision on substantive law concerns. Id.
249. Justice Brennan says this in his dissent in Woodson. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 300
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Surely International Shoe contemplated that the significance of
the contacts necessary to support jurisdiction would diminish if some other consideration
helped establish that jurisdiction would be fair and reasonable."). And Justice Stevens
says it in his concurring opinion in Asahi. Asahi v. Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102, 121 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("An
examination of minimum contacts is not always necessary to determine whether a state
court's assertion of personal jurisdiction is constitutional.").
250. Mullane and Keeton did not use this rationale directly. The Court has used
sovereignty concerns to defeat jurisdiction even in the presence of defendant contacts. See
supra notes 223-29, and accompanying text.
251. Jones was Marian the Librarian in the movie The Music Man, and the mother in
the television show The Partridge Family. I mention this because most law students ask.
Presumably the readers of this Article are an older crowd and remember Shirley Jones.
252. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 785 (1984).
253. Id. at 784-85.
254. Id. at 789. The defendants analogized themselves to welders who make a boiler
which explodes in another state. Id.
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denied jurisdiction, saying that it would have a "'chilling effect' on
reporters and editors [who would have] to appear in remote jurisdictions
to answer for the content of articles upon which they worked. 255 The
California Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the defendants
"intended to, and did, cause tortious injury ... in California. ' 256 And the
U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, relying on what it described as an
"effects" test, but what probably is more accurately described as a new
conception of "purposeful contacts., 257  It is this new conception of
purposefulness that makes Calder important.
The "effects" test for long-arm jurisdiction first came into widespread
use in the 1950s as a kind of tort-law alternative to the contract-law-
based "doing business" standard.258  It was designed to deal with the
jurisdictional problem created when an out-of-state defendant caused
harm in a state not as a consequence of a commercial transaction.9 The
test was different for single-state torts, those begun and completed in the
same state, than it was for multi-state torts, those in which an event set in
motion in one state caused harm in another.2 6 Multi-state torts, because
they represented less of a contact with the forum, were regulated by a
more demanding "effects plus" standard, which required a plaintiff to
255. Id. at 786. Before Calder some courts had suggested that the First Amendment
imposed significant limitations on the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction when defendants'
rights of expression might be compromised. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365
F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 1966). Keeton and Calder rejected this argument. Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 n.12 (1984); Calder, 465 U.S. at 790-91.
256. Calder, 465 U.S. at 787. The court mistakenly believed that "continuous and
systematic" contacts with California were sufficient to establish general jurisdiction over
the defendants in the State, but did not base the decision on this conclusion because it also
found that neither defendant had continuous and systematic contacts. Id.
257. Calder has some strange language on the subject of contacts generally. For
example, it adopted Shaffer's problematic formulation of the "minimum contacts"
standard, as requiring a three-way relationship between the defendant, the claim, and the
forum, id. at 788, a phrasing the Court would later repudiate in Burnham, see supra note
74. It also said that plaintiff contacts with a forum "may be so manifold as to permit
jurisdiction when it would not exist in their absence," Calder, 465 U.S. at 788, but did not
explain how this statement can be reconciled with the statement in Keeton that plaintiff
contacts with a forum are relevant only insofar as they "enhance [the] defendant's contacts
with the forum" because of the defendant's "relationship with the plaintiff," id. at 780.
Justice Rehnquist wrote both the Keeton, id. at 774, and Calder opinions, 465 U.S. at 784.
258. See, e.g., Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 209 N.E.2d
68, 72 (N.Y. 1965).
259. Multi-state pollution cases are a common example. See Gray Am. Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (It. 1961).
260. The "single-state/multi-state" distinction is now typically made in so-called
enumerated acts long-arm statutes, but at the time of International Shoe there was
considerable debate over whether such a distinction was needed. Compare Barnes &
Reinecke, 209 N.E.2d at 77-80, with Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 762-66 (1965) (illustrating the
debate between Illinois and New York courts on the issue).
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show not just that the defendant had produced a tortious effect in the
state, but also that the defendant had one or more of the "plus"
characteristics thought to make it fair to subject a party to jurisdiction.26 '
Generally, "plus" factors tried to separate large commercial actors who
did business across state lines and who reasonably could expect to be
sued in other states, from local, mom-and-pop enterprises operating
262
completely within single states, who could not. The most common
"plus" factors, for example, asked if the defendant "derive[d] substantial
revenue from interstate commerce," or "derive[d] substantial revenue
from [other] goods or services used or consumed... [with]in the state."
26 3
The libel in Calder was a multi-state tort, begun in Florida where the
article was written, and completed in California (and in every other
state) where the article was published and the harm suffered, 264 but this
notwithstanding, it would have made little sense for the Court to discuss
jurisdiction over the Calder defendants in traditional "effects-plus"
terms. The defendants did not derive revenue from interstate commerce,
for example, or from goods and services consumed in California, because
they were not engaged in interstate commerce-they were employees of
a business engaged in interstate commerce.16' And while they produced a
tortious effect in California to be sure, the determination of whether that
effect was enough to subject them to jurisdiction of necessity had to be
based on some type of "plus" factor other than the nature and size of
their business.266 They did not have a business.
The Court concluded that it was fair to subject the defendants to
jurisdiction in California because they wrote a story "drawn from
California sources," about the "California activities of a California
resident," that "impugned [that person's] professionalism" and harmed
267
her career and reputation in California. In sum, the Court said
"California [was] the focal point both of the story and of the harm
suffered. Jurisdiction over [the defendants was] therefore proper . . .
261. Barnes & Reinecke, 209 N.E.2d at 72.
262. See Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
263. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(i)-(ii) (McKinney 2001).
264. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 784, 788-89 (1984).
265. Id. at 785-86.
266. Calder fit into the fourth of the original International Shoe categories, a case of
single and isolated contacts giving rise to the claim. Under International Shoe, this meant
that the defendants would be subject to California jurisdiction if the "nature[,] quality and
the circumstances of [the contacts'] commission" made it fair to force them to defend
there. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318. Given the variety of meanings
lower courts have given Calder, the Court might have been better off discussing the case in
these original terms rather than fashioning a new "targeting" rule.
267. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-89.
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based on the 'effects' of their Florida conduct in California."268  In
language that has since come to be identified with Calder, the Court
explained that the defendants were "not charged with mere untargeted
negligence. Rather, their intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were
expressly aimed at California... [T]hey knew [their article] would have
a potentially devastating impact upon [Jones]. And they knew that the
brunt of that injury would be felt ... in [California]. 2 9
In developing this so-called targeting test, a kind of super-
purposefulness requirement if you will, the Court did not create a
completely new kind of standard. In fact, in one sense, "targeting" was
just a variation of the familiar "effects-plus" standard. It required both a
tortious effect within the state and some additional factor, here an extra
measure of purposefulness, to show that it was fair to take jurisdiction
over the defendants.270 The difficulty with the test, however, is that it has
proved difficult to give the concept of targeting a precise meaning. How,
for example, does a "targeting" test differ from the "foreseeability"
standard found wanting in Woodson? The defendants in Calder, as the
Court said, "knew" that their article, if libelous, would harm Jones in
California,2 1 but the same could be said of Seaway and World-Wide, the
defendants in Woodson, who knew that their automobile, if defective,
could cause harm to the Robinsons wherever the Robinsons took it.272
The principal difference between the two cases seems to be more the
difference between harm caused by an automobile and harm caused by a
magazine article, than it does the difference in the respective defendants'
states of mind. Seaway and World-Wide did not set out to harm the
Robinsons, of course, but the same could be said of the defendants in
Calder, at least in the legal sense, and to the extent that is not true, it is
relevant to the issue of liability and not to jurisdiction.
268. Id. at 789 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
297-98 (1980)). The Court cited to Woodson as authority for this conclusion, but a
reference to Woodson in this context is difficult to understand. Woodson denied
jurisdiction, so the case does not stand for any particular rule articulating what it would
take to establish jurisdiction, and it was limited to the question of whether Seaway and
World-Wide were doing business in Oklahoma. See Woodson, 444 U.S. at 299. It did not
involve an "effects" based jurisdictional test. Finally, the particular pages referred to in
Woodson discuss the stream-of-commerce version of "minimum contacts," id. at 297-98,
but stream-of-commerce theory is a contract-law based version of the jurisdictional
standard, and Calder involved a tort, Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
269. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90.
270. Id. at 789.
271. Id. at 789-90.
272. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297.
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While the Court did not define targeting explicitly in Calder, it did talk
about it,273 and when it did so it used the language of foreseeability rather
than the language of purposefulness.274 It described the defendants'
states of mind as "knowing" where the harm would be felt rather than as
"wantonly, willfully, or maliciously" seeking to harm Jones in
California.275 And this description fit the facts. There was no indication
that the defendants searched the United States to learn where Jones
lived, and then tailored an article particularly to that market. 276 They
wrote an article about Jones, and she just happened to live in California.
The Court's failure to provide clearer guidance about what it means to
"target" someone presumably was not for a lack of capacity to do so.
When it has wanted to describe the difference between purposefulness
and foreseeability in the past it has been able to. In Asahi, for example,
Justice O'Connor described in considerable detail the factors needed to
27
turn foreseeable stream-of-commerce contacts into purposeful ones,
and yet, in Calder the Court did not do this. The introduction of a
"targeting" conception of purposeful contacts has proved particularly
troublesome in the lower federal and state courts where it has become a
popular but malleable standard, given all kinds of different meanings as
271
situations require.
273. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
274. Id. at 789-90.
275. Id. The Court also describes "targeting" as "expressly aiming" tortious actions at
the forum, but it is hard to see how this clarifies the concept. See id.
276. Id. at 785-86 & n.4.
277. Asahi v. Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112-13 (1987) (plurality
opinion).
278. See United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 624 n.7 (1st Cir. 2001)
("[W]e note that several circuits do not appear to agree as to how to read Calder."). The
best summaries of the different interpretations are in Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d
2, 8-10 & 8 n.1 (Cal. 2002) (describing the various understandings of targeting expressed
by the different circuits), and Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 533-34 (Minn. 2002)
(describing how "the 'effects test' approved in Calder" has been applied in the various
circuits). Griffis is a particularly good example of the difficulty of coming up with a non-
circular definition of targeting. See id. at 533 (noting other courts' determinations that (1)
targeting requires "'something more"' than merely producing an effect in the forum, (2)
the something more requirement is satisfied by "'express[ly] aiming' at the defendant in
the forum, and (3) the "expressly aiming" requirement is satisfied by "'targeting a known
forum resident,"' so that targeting, in effect, is defined as expressly aiming, and expressly
aiming is defined as targeting (citations omitted)); see also Imo Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG,
155 F.3d 254, 265-66 (3d Cir. 1998) (describing a three-pronged test for targeting that
reduces to "expressly aim[ing] ... tortious conduct at the forum"). Some courts see
targeting as simply an "in-state effects" or "foreseeability" standard, see, e.g., Janmark,
Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997) (concluding that jurisdiction was proper
because "the injury and thus the tort occurred in Illinois"); Carrot Bunch Co. v. Computer
Friends, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 820, 826 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (concluding that jurisdiction was
proper because defendant registered, used, and maintained infringing domain names "with
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Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 79 is the closest the
Court has come to clearing up an ambiguity, introduced in International
Shoe, in the definition of the nexus requirement of specific jurisdiction,
and also is the Court's second most important (after Perkins) general
jurisdiction decision.280 Helicopteros was a wrongful death action brought
by the survivors and personal representatives (plaintiffs) of four
employees of a Peruvian construction company28t killed in a helicopter
2112crash while working on an oil pipeline in Peru. The plaintiffs sued the
Texas-based joint venture building the pipeline (WSH), 2 3 its Peruvian
alter ego (Consorcio), the manufacturer of the helicopter (Bell), also
based in Texas, and the Colombian transportation company whose pilot
was flying the helicopter when it crashed (Helicol), all in Texas state
the knowledge that his actions would likely injure [plaintiff] in Texas"); Ahadi v. Ahadi,
61 S.W.3d 714, 720 (Tex. App. 2001) ("[W]hen a nonresident defendant sends false
information into a state, .. . there is a foreseeable ... injury to the resident at its domicile.
Therefore ... it must reasonably anticipate being haled into court there to answer for its
actions."), but most define it to require "something more" than mere awareness that one's
intentional acts will cause harm in the forum state, see, e.g., Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467,
473, 476 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that targeting involves a consideration of the "geographic
focus" of a libelous article, not just the location of the harm inflicted); Panavision Int'l,
L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (9th Cir. 1998) (describing a three-part test and
concluding that "there must be 'something more' [than posting on a website] to
demonstrate that the defendant has directed his activity toward the forum" (quoting
Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1998)); Imo, 155 F.3d at 265-66
(describing a three-pronged analysis for the application of Calder targeting); Euromarket
Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 2d 824, 837 (N.D. Ill. 2000) ("Simply
registering a domain name for a website is not sufficient to create jurisdiction without
'something else."' (citations omitted)); Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 534-35 ("[S]omething more
than defendant's knowledge that the plaintiff is a resident of the forum and will feel the
effects of the tortious conduct there must be necessary to satisfy the [Calder] test."); see
also Richard Garnett, Dow Jones & Company v. Grutnick: An Adequate Response to
Transnational Internet Defamation?, 4 U. MELBOURNE J. INT'L LAW 196 (2003), available
at http://ssrn.comlabstract=473041 (advocating a targeting rule for locating jurisdiction in
international Internet defamation cases).
279. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
280. The Court also uses von Mehren and Trautman's "specific" and "general"
jurisdiction terminology for the first time in Helicopteros, making it clear that it was now
doctrinal language. Id. at 414-15 & nn. 8-9. Like Kulko, Woodson, and Insurance Corp. of
Ireland before it, Helicopteros is another in the series of cases that cuts back on the
totality-of-the-circumstances view of McGee in favor of a defendant-veto view of Hanson.
281. Id. at 409-10. The company, Consorcio, was created solely for the purpose of
allowing Williams-Sedco-Horn (WSH), an American joint venture, to enter into a contract
with Petro-Peru, the Peruvian state-owned oil company, to construct a pipeline from the
interior of Peru to the Pacific Ocean. Id. at 410.
282. Id.
283. According to the Court, "[t]he participants in the joint venture were Williams
International Sudamericana, Ltd., a Delaware corporation; Sedco Construction
Corporation, a Texas corporation; and Horn International, Inc., a Texas corporation." Id.
at 410 n.1.
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court.2m Not surprisingly, only Helicol contested jurisdiction. 2"' The trial
2816
court denied Helicol's motion to dismissY, the intermediate appeals
287
court reversed, and the Texas Supreme Court did both, first affirming
the appeals court decision and then, seven months later, reversing it (and
itself) . 8  The U.S. Supreme Court broke the tie, so to speak,289 also by
reversing, holding that Helicol was not subject to personal jurisdiction in
Texas.298
The case in the Supreme Court was pretty much over when the
respondents (plaintiffs at trial) conceded that their "claims against
Helicol did not 'arise out of,' and [were] not related to, Helicol's
activities in Texas."' 9' This concession meant that specific jurisdiction
was unavailable over Helicol in Texas, and that the plaintiffs would have
to establish general jurisdiction if they wanted to keep the case in the
212
State. But to support general jurisdiction they would have to show that
Helicol had substantial contacts with Texas, and this was nearly
impossible to do for a company that was incorporated, and had its
principal place of business, in Colombia, South America.9  The
Helicopteros decision is not important for the difficulty of the issues
involved, therefore, or the specific outcome reached, but instead for its
considered non-application of the doctrine of general jurisdiction. It is
only the second Supreme Court case decided on the basis of that
doctrine, and unlike Perkins, this time the Court denied jurisdiction.
294
Before reaching the general jurisdiction question, however, the Court
took up the preliminary question of how to define nexus.
One will recall that the Court created a problem for the doctrine of
specific jurisdiction when, in International Shoe, it described the nexus
requirement in more than one way. 95 These multiple definitions proved
confusing over the years and Justice Brennan wanted to use Helicopteros
to clear up the confusion, 296 but the rest of the Court chose to "assert no
284. Id. at 409-12.
285. Id. at 412.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 412-13.
289. The four opinions in the case were evenly split.
290. Id. at 418-19.
291. Id. at 415.
292. See id. at 414-16.
293. Id. at 409.
294. Compare id. at 418-89, with Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,
438 (1952).
295. See supra pp. 58-59.
296. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 424-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The basic debate was
over whether a "but for" relationship between the defendant's contacts and the plaintiff's
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'view' with respect to that issue."2 9 International Shoe had held that a
defendant's continuous and systematic activity in a state must "give rise
to the liabilities sued on 2 98 for specific jurisdiction to be present. There
must be some substantive overlap, or nexus, in other words, between the
facts needed to prove the defendant's contacts with the forum and the
facts needed to prove the plaintiff's claim. 299 Unfortunately, in describing
the same requirement later in the opinion, the Court twice paraphrased
rather than repeated its "give rise to" (or "arise out of")
3°° language, 301
using the expressions "connected with"3' 2 and "related to, 30 3 instead, and
as Justice Brennan pointed out in his Helicopteros dissent, these new
phrasings were "substantial[ly] differen[t]" from the "'give rise' to"
formulation. 3 4 The new phrasings seemed to create a less demanding,
alternative test for nexus, one requiring only some sort of "significant[]
relat[ionship]" between the defendant's forum contacts and the plaintiff's
claim.30 ' The difference was critical in Helicopteros where the plaintiffs'
claim "arose" in Peru (not Texas) where the helicopter was negligently
claim was enough to satisfy the nexus requirement, or whether a "proximate cause"
relationship was needed instead. In Woodson, the Court had seemed to reject a "but for"
definition of nexus, see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 298-99
(stating that financial benefit resulting from the use of defendant automobile dealer's car
in Oklahoma creates only a collateral relation with the State because it has only a "but
for" relationship with plaintiff's claim, and as such is "far too attenuated" a contact to
support jurisdiction), but not so clearly as to put the issue to rest.
297. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 n.10.
We do not address the validity or consequences of such a distinction because the
issue has not been presented in this case. Respondents have made no argument
that their cause of action either arose out of or is related to Helicol's contacts
with the State of Texas. Absent any briefing on the issue, we decline to reach the
questions (1) whether the terms "arising out of" and "related to" describe
different connections between a cause of action and a defendant's contacts with a
forum, and (2) what sort of tie between a cause of action and a defendant's
contacts with a forum is necessary to a determination that either connection
exists.
Id.
298. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,317 (1945).
299. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 37, at 80-88.
300. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319-21.
301. "Give rise to" or "arise out of," appear three times in the opinion, id. at 319, 320,
321, while the "connected with," id. at 317, and "related to," id. at 318, paraphrases appear
once each.
302. Id. at 317. Because it was describing the absence of jurisdiction, the Court's
actual term was "unconnected with." Id.
303. Id. at 318. Again, the Court's actual term was "unrelated to." Id.
304. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 424-26
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 425 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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piloted,306 but also was "related to" Helicol's contacts with Texas, since
the company purchased and serviced its helicopters in the State, and sent
its pilots there for training. On a "but for" understanding of nexus,
therefore, jurisdiction was available in Texas, but on a "proximate cause"
understanding, it was not. Fortunately for the Court, the plaintiffs'
concession that their claims neither arose out of, nor were related to, the
defendants' contacts with Texas spared it the task of having to choose
between the two standards (if in fact they were two standards), and
permitted it to leave the issue for another (still to come) day.3°M But this
result left lower court confusion on the topic unabated.
The more important part of Helicopteros, the Court's discussion of
general jurisdiction, began with a familiar but understandable mistake.
"[W]hen the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign
corporation's activities in the forum State," said the Court, "due process
is not offended by a State's subjecting the corporation to its in personam
jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the State and the
foreign corporation."3  This is a tautology, of course, for it says only that
contacts are "sufficient" for general jurisdiction when they are
"sufficient" for general jurisdiction. In explaining when contacts are
sufficient, however, the Court relied on Perkins and its discussion of the
Benguet Mining Company's activities in Ohio during the Second World
306. Id. at 409-10.
307. Id. at 411. The helicopter maintenance and pilot training in Texas did not provide
the needed nexus between the defendants' contacts and the plaintiffs' (Helicol) claims
since the plaintiffs' claims were for negligent piloting, not negligent maintenance or
training. Id. at 412. If present, the latter claims would have been against Bell rather than
Helicol, and the Texas court already had jurisdiction over Bell. See id. at 414.
308. Id. at 415. The Court described the plaintiffs (through counsel), as having
"concede[d]" this point, id., but it might be more accurate to say that the plaintiffs never
saw it. They failed to make a "related to" nexus argument, or even mention the "arise out
of/related to" distinction, anywhere in the four page argument section of their brief on the
merits, see Brief of Respondents at 16-20, Helicopteros (No. 82-1127), notwithstanding
that the defendants' brief (filed a month earlier because defendants were the petitioners in
the Supreme Court) discussed the issue in detail and argued for an "arise out of"
definition of nexus, see Brief for Petitioner at 11-12, Helicopteros (No. 82-1127). The
plaintiffs made only a general jurisdiction argument, and one based on the probably non-
existent (Shaffer notwithstanding) doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity, see Brief of
Respondents at 16-20, Helicopteros (No. 82-1127), but not much else. And in oral
argument, after Justice Brennan suggested to defendants' counsel that "related" contacts
might satisfy the nexus requirement, counsel for the plaintiffs failed to pick up on this cue
and argue the point. See Oral Arguments at 3, Helicopteros (No. 82-1127). In a sense,
failing to argue a point is one way of conceding it, but to the extent that the Court meant
to suggest that plaintiffs' counsel made a conscious and considered judgment to concede
the nexus-definition issue, that suggestion is probably an overstatement. Counsel seemed
not to be aware of the fact that there was an issue to concede.
309. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 (emphasis added) (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)).
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War 10 Unfortunately, the Court quoted the wrong language from
Perkins. "The exercise of general jurisdiction . . . was 'reasonable and
just' (in Perkins), said the Court, because "the foreign corporation...
'ha[d] been carrying on in Ohio a continuous and systematic, but limited,
part of its general business.""'3 " The Court's choice of this "continuous
and systematic" rather than "substantial" contacts language from Perkins
conflated two separate and distinct tests. Perkins had described
"continuous and systematic" in-state activity as the test for specific
jurisdiction, and "substantial" in-state activity as the test for general
jurisdiction, and yet the Helicopteros Court's casual reading of the
opinion effaced this distinction."'2 The misreading was harmless in
Helicopteros itself, since the Court also concluded, improbably one might
add, that the company's considerable helicopter business in Texas was
not sufficiently "continuous and systematic" to support jurisdiction,
but the effect on the case law generally has not been as sanguine. Lower
courts (and even the Supreme Court, in Burger King) routinely quote
Helicopteros for the proposition that general jurisdiction requires only
"continuous and systematic" in-state activity, find this requirement
satisfied by some form of doing business in the state, and then routinely
take general jurisdiction over corporations carrying on any minimal
314
amount of commercial activity in the state. This is a mistake not only
for reasons of policy and principle, as Mary Twitchell argues,315 but also
because it gets the doctrinal standard wrong.
F) The Second Restatement: Burger King
After the foregoing series of mid-course corrections, the Court
revisited the personal jurisdiction doctrine one more time in Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz,3'1 6 to make what, until the present, is its most
comprehensive and sophisticated statement of the "minimum contacts"
standard. Coming at the end of the line, Burger King was able to
incorporate the distinctive ideas of each of the foregoing cases into a new
synthesis, and also to resolve some of the issues left open by Woodson.
310. Id. at 414-15.
311. Id. at 415.
312. See infra Part II.C.
313. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416, 418-19.
314. Guangzhou Ocean Shipping Co. v. Gulf & Orient Steamship Line, CIVIL
ACTION NO. 97-3918 SECTION: E/3, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16162, at *8 (E.D. La. Oct.
9, 1998); Arnold v. Cedar Point, Inc., No. 5:93:CV:49, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13038, at *4
(W.D. Mich. July 30, 1993); Capizzano v. Walt Disney Co., 826 F. Supp. 53, 55 (D.R.I.
1993).
315. See Twitchell, supra note 1, passim (describing the policy and principle objections
to the use of a "doing business" standard for general jurisdiction).
316. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
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The Burger King Corporation sued one of its Michigan franchisees in
federal district court in Florida, alleging a breach of the franchise
agreement and infringement of Burger King's trademark occasioned by
the defendants' continued operation as a Burger King restaurant. 7 The
decision itself ultimately rested on a kind of 800-pound gorilla argument,
that the defendants could not reap the benefits of a long-term affiliation
with an organization as all encompassing and powerful as Burger King,
which they knew to be headquartered in Florida,"8 "submit[ting] to the
national organization's exacting regulation of virtually every conceivable
aspect of their operations, '319 and at the same time claim that they had no
purposeful contacts with Florida for purposes of a lawsuit arising out of
that affiliation. Put in old-fashioned terms, the defendants were "doing
business" on a continuing basis in Florida, not as restaurateurs, but as
franchisees, and Burger King's lawsuit was for breach of the franchise
agreement, not for selling bad hamburgers.32 There was not much
disagreement over this issue among the members of the Court.321  Only
Justices Stevens and White thought the defendants' contacts were not
extensive enough to support jurisdiction.322
Doctrinally, however, Burger King is a good deal more interesting.
The decision not only made a major restatement of the prevailing version
of the "minimum contacts" test inherited from Woodson, but added
some new, significant elements of its own. Like Woodson, Burger King
saw "minimum contacts" as a two-part test, but rather than use the
Woodson categories of "inconvenience to the defendant" and "other
(i.e., state interest) factors," the Court made the first half of the test an
inquiry into the nature of the defendant's contacts with the forum, the
actual basis of the Woodson decision, 32' and moved inconvenience to the
defendant into the second "other factors" half of the test,324 along with
the state and federal sovereignty factors discussed in Woodson (in Burger
317. Id. at 468-69.
318. Id. at 480-81.
319. Id. at 465.
320. Id. at 468-69.
321. Only the issue of defendant forum-contacts received extensive discussion in the
opinion. The Court's treatment of state interest concerns was disposed of with the cryptic
and double-negatively phrase, "We cannot conclude that Florida had no 'legitimate
interest in holding [Rudzewicz] answerable on a claim related to' the contacts he had
established in that State." Id. at 482-83 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
322. Id. at 487-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
323. Id. at 474-75.
324. Id. at 476-77. The Court uses the term "burden on" the defendant, id. at 477
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)), rather
than "inconvenience" to the defendant, but the two expressions are used interchangeably
throughout the personal jurisdiction case law, see, e.g., Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510
U.S. 443, 450 (1994).
Catholic University Law Review
King, these will come to be called the "fairness factors"). 3 25 In other
words, Burger King reconstituted the test to include both what Woodson
said and what it did, and rearranged the various parts of the test to be
more in accord with their logical relationships.
In addition to these structural changes, Burger King also added to the
substantive content of the standard, sometimes helpfully and sometimes
not. Without self-consciously saying it was doing so, the opinion
subdivided the idea of defendant contacts into its quantitative and
qualitative dimensions." Quantitatively, the Court said, contacts could
be either "single or occasional," "significant," or enough to "create a
substantial connection with the forum," or a "continuing obligation[]"
with its residents. 7 All but the "substantial connection" language (taken
from McGee) was uncontroversial, so perhaps it is not surprising that
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, relied on the "substantial
connection" language to support jurisdiction over the Burger King
defendants. 32  The use of the term "substantial" in this context is
confusing principally because "substantial" is the same adjective used in
International Shoe to describe the kind of contacts needed to establish
general jurisdiction,329 and since Burger King involved only a question of
specific jurisdiction,330 there was no need to ask whether the defendants'
contacts with Florida were "substantial" in the International
Shoe/Perkins sense of the term. In using the term, the Court encouraged
lower courts to think of "substantial" contacts as interchangeable with
331
"continuous and systematic" contacts, much as Helicopteros had done,
and in so doing, continued the process that eventually would rob the idea
of substantial contacts of any precise meaning and in turn lead to the
demise of the doctrine of general jurisdiction.332
In addition to their quantitative dimension, a defendant's contacts with
a forum also had to meet certain qualitative requirements. When a
325. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77; see, e.g., Brockman v. Kravic, 779 N.E.2d 1250,
1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002): Builder Mart of Am. v. First Union Corp., 563 S.E.2d 352, 355
(S.C. 2002) (describing fairness factors as "fairness prong"). The First Circuit calls them
"gestalt factors." Jet Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., 298 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2002).
326. Not everyone picks up on this. See, e.g., Rodriguez Salgado v. Les Nouvelles
Esthetiques, 218 F. Supp. 2d 203, 209 (D.P.R. 2002) (mixing quantitative and qualitative
dimensions of defendant forum contacts together).
327. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 & n.18, 476.
328. Id. at 475, 479; see also id. at 487 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
329. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317-18 (1945).
330. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 464. Following Helicopteros, Burger King uses the
terms "specific" and "general" jurisdiction, see id. at 473 n.15, and gives Perkins as its
example of general jurisdiction, id. at 473 n.1 5.
331. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984).
332. The "substantial connection" test is now the most popular way to express the
contacts requirement of the specific jurisdiction doctrine. See supra note 56.
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question of specific jurisdiction is involved, said the Court, a defendant's
contacts must give rise to the plaintiff's claim (the nexus requirement),
be purposeful rather than foreseeable,333 not be "'random,' 'fortuitous,'
or 'attenuated,', 334 and not be the result of the "'unilateral activity of
another party"' who claims some relationship with the defendant.
35
They also must result in the defendant realizing "'the benefits and
protections of the forum[] [state's] laws."3 ' To the extent there are
differences among these various phrasings, the requirements were
intended to be cumulative. Here, Burger King did not so much change
the International Shoe/Woodson standard as summarize it. Each of the
above qualifications was a familiar and uncontroversial one, and just
another way of expressing some aspect of the idea of purposeful
connection with the forum, the central idea in the defendant-veto view.
On Burger King's restatement, once both the quantitative and qualitative
requirements of the contacts test are met, so that "a defendant [has]
purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum State,, 3 7 a
court then must consider the strength of those contacts in light of the
state sovereignty interest and federalism factors identified in Woodson.338
Here again, the Court added a new feature to the test.
Burger King is the first opinion in which the Court tried to express the
idea of "minimum contacts" as a single, integrated standard. Recall that
Woodson's version of "minimum contacts" failed to provide a rule for
comparing factors from the first half of the test with factors from the
second half.3 9 It did not say, for example, how strong a forum state's
interest in providing effective relief for its citizens had to be in order to
offset the inconvenience to the defendant of having to defend in the
forum.340 Burger King was the first to provide a preliminary metric for
making this comparison. According to the Court, when a plaintiff makes
333. The Court acknowledged that in the unusual case this purposefulness could be
manifest through a stream-of-commerce, or be of a "targeted" or "deliberate" nature, in
which fewer direct defendant forum contacts would be necessary. Burger King, 471 U.S.
at 472-77.
334. Id. at 475 (citation omitted).
335. Id. (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 417).
336. Id. at 476.
337. Id. This is an incorrect use of the term "minimum contacts" of course. As coined
by International Shoe, the term was a synonym for "constitutionally sufficient contacts,"
not "minimal contacts," or "some" contacts, or even "purposeful" contacts, or any other
variation on the idea of defendant connections with a forum. "Minimum contacts" was
the label placed on a defendant's contacts case after all of the analysis (including fairness
factors) was done and the defendant either had met the constitutional standard or he had
not. The expression was a term of art and not an ordinary language expression.
338. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 148-61.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 148-61.
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a weaker showing of defendant contacts "than would otherwise be
required, 34' (what the Court called a "lesser showing of minimum
contacts,, 34 2 an incoherent expression if taken literally)3 43 state interest
and federalism factors may be used to bolster those weak contacts to
permit them to support forum-court jurisdiction.3 " Conversely, when a
defendant who "purposefully has directed his activities at forum
residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case
that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction
unreasonable., 345  While far from perfect, these "lesser showing" and
"compelling case" rules gave courts a beginning set of tools for
comparing defendant contacts with sovereignty concerns to determine
whether to take or deny jurisdiction. For example, if a defendant has
weak contacts with a forum, but all other considerations support.... 346
jurisdiction (think of McGee), then a court may take jurisdiction. On
the other hand, if a defendant has extensive purposeful connections with
a forum (think of Asahi), but all other considerations cut against
jurisdiction (also Asahi), a court may not take jurisdiction. State interest
factors can buttress or defeat a jurisdictional claim, in other words, by
strengthening a weak contacts case or weakening a strong one, but it is
doubtful that they can establish jurisdiction in their own right. 47 While
not an algorithm, this "lesser showing-compelling case" rubric refined
the idea of "minimum contacts" received from Woodson, and moved the
development of the standard to a higher level.
Other parts of the Court's discussion also may have added features to
the test, though the Court's casual use of language, and the role of this
341. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (1984).
342. Id.
343. See supra note 337. What the Burger King Court could have had in mind by a
"lesser showing of minimum (in the sense of "constitutionally sufficient") contacts" is
anyone's guess. If contacts are sufficient to establish jurisdiction, that is the end of the
story, and whether they are lesser or greater is beside the point. There are not degrees of
constitutional sufficiency, the contacts are either sufficient to establish jurisdiction
constitutionally, or they are not. The Court probably meant to say "weak" (rather than
"lesser") showing of defendant "contacts" (or connections) with the forum (rather than
"minimum contacts"), and that is how I shall interpret the term.
344. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
345. Id.; see also id. at 477-78 ("[M]inimum requirements inherent in the concept of
'fair play and substantial justice' may defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even if the
defendant has purposefully engaged in forum activities.").
346. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221-24 (1957).
347. Even Justice Stevens's concurrence in Asahi, which goes as far as any opinion in
separating the contacts and sovereignty halves of the test and making each a free-standing
standard in its own right, still requires some limited form of defendant contacts with the
forum. Id. at 121-22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). No
one on the Court seems willing to do away altogether with the requirement of contacts, at
least not explicitly. Keeton and Mullane do it in fact, but not explicitly.
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language in the opinion as a whole, make this more difficult to
determine. For example, the Court suggested that federalism concerns
triggered by a jurisdictional dispute "usually may be accommodated
through means short of finding jurisdiction unconstitutional. 348  As
examples, it mentioned the use of choice-of-law rules to accommodate
clashes between the "substantive social policies" of different states, and
change-of-venue rules to soften the inconvenience to defendants of
having to litigate in distant forums. 49 Taken literally, this seemed to
create a presumption in favor of extra-territorial jurisdiction, which a
defendant had to overcome with a "contacts-fairness" argument if
jurisdiction was to be denied, or looked at another way, to add a "duty to
accommodate" federalism concerns as a third step in the jurisdictional
analysis.50  But given the fact that this presumption/duty language
appeared only once in the opinion,351 that it does not appear elsewhere in
the personal jurisdiction case law, and that the Court did not use it in
352deciding the case, it is hard to be certain how seriously the Court
intended it to be taken. Lower courts do not use the language with any
frequency.
Similarly, the Court may have intended to announce a comparative
inconvenience test, rather than one focused exclusively on inconvenience
to the defendant, in defining the degree of burden needed to satisfy the
reasonableness standard in the second half of the "minimum contacts"
standard. The Court's language-that jurisdictional rules may not be
employed to make litigation "'so gravely difficult and inconvenient' that
a party unfairly is at a 'severe disadvantage' in comparison to his
opponent "33 -seemed to state a comparative inconvenience test. But
since the Due Process Clause is commonly thought to protect only the
defendant's liberty and property interests-the plaintiff's interests are
protected by the right to choose the forum3 4-it also is hard to know how
literally the Court intended this "in comparison" language to be taken.
355
Other parts of the opinion, those suggesting that jurisdictional rules are
348. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
349. Id. For an example of this duty to accommodate in operation, see Spherion Corp.
v. Cincinnati Fin. Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1057 (N.D. II1. 2002), which used the
transfer rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to avoid deciding the jurisdictional issue.
350. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 487.
353. Id. (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.. 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972)).
354. E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
355. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478. A few lower courts use the language. E.g., Miller v.
SMS Schloemann-Siemag, Inc., No. CIV.A.2:00-0896, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2394, at *18
(S.D. W. Va. Feb. 21, 2003); Bellino v. Simon, No. ClV.A.99-2208, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18081, at *24 (E.D. La. Nov. 22, 1999).
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different for different types of litigants,356 for example, might reinforce
the idea of such a differential standard. Jurisdictional rules, the Court
said, may not be used against "'out-of-state consumers to collect
payments due on modest personal purchases""'35 when to do so would
"render litigation 'so gravely difficult and inconvenient that [a party] will
for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court,'"" and the
commercial actor will "unfairly [be able] to obtain [a] default
judgment[]."359 (L.L. Bean may not sue me in Freeport if I fail to pay for
a pair of socks.) On the other hand, "the Due Process Clause allows
flexibility in ensuring that commercial actors are not effectively
'judgment proof' for the consequences of obligations they voluntarily
assume in other States.",360 (I may sue L.L. Bean in Baltimore if the socks
are torn.)361  This "default judgment-judgment proof" double-standard
for "out-of-state consumers" on the one hand, and "commercial actors"
on the other, if that is what it is, is not based on differences in the parties'
"net wealth," said the Court,362 but on what would be fair given the163
parties' respective connections with, and dealings in, the forum, though
it is hard to see how anything other than net wealth could be the defining
ingredient of the rule. 64
The foregoing peculiarities notwithstanding, Burger King is perhaps
best known for its exhaustive summary of the personal jurisdiction case
law, and for its synthesis of the concepts and terminology of the several
356. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 486.
357. Id. at 485 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Macshara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1515 (11th Cir.
1984), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
(1985)).
358. Id. at 486 (alteration in original) (quoting MIS Bremen, 407 U.S. at 18).
359. Id.
360. Id. (citing McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).
361. L.L. Bean would replace the socks, of course, and the issue would not come up in
real life.
362. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 483 n.25.
363. Id. at 487.
364. Burger King also weighs in on the side of Insurance Corp. of Ireland in the debate
over the right of a court to take state sovereignty interests into account in a due process
analysis. See id. at 477. The problem arises, one will recall, because the Due Process
Clause by its own terms protects the interests of persons, not states, and the Clause is the
only limitation on the extra-territorial jurisdictional power of the states. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. Woodson stated the protection of sovereignty interests was "express or
implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment,"
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980), while Insurance
Corp. of Ireland stated that it had to be "a function of the individual liberty interest
preserved by the Due Process Clause [because the Clause made] no mention of federalism
concerns." Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 793 n.10
(1982). Quoting Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Burger King adopts the latter view. Burger
King, 471 U.S. at 472 n.13.
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generations of jurisdictional thinking into a single, relatively
comprehensive test. Comprehensiveness can be cumbersome, and at
times the opinion has a kind of dictated-but-not-read quality about it. In
recounting the various parts of the test, for example, the Court often
describes key concepts more than once, stringing together several
different statements of the same point taken from different cases over
the history of the doctrine for no ostensible purpose other than
seemingly to include every possible way of putting a point.365 The
discussion also often loops back on itself, taking up issues that were
disposed of earlier,366 so that it sometimes looks a little like the memos of
several law clerks stuck together, end-to-end. But all is not downside in
the Court's attempt to be inclusive and comprehensive. Single-factor
tests excepted, there is little to be found anywhere in the case law that is
not included in Burger King in one form or another. It is as complete
and logically organized a statement and history of the "minimum
contacts" standard as one can find in the Supreme Court case law, and
read carefully, a compendium of just about everything one needs to
know to resolve a jurisdictional dispute. Justice Brennan adds an
idiosyncratic twist every now and then, but usually in the form of a
questionable description of authority more than a misrepresentation of a
doctrinal rule.367  For the most part, Burger King is a trustworthyrepository of the due process standard.
G) A Postscript: Asahi and Burnham
Two California decisions, Asahi and Burnham v. Superior Court,
368
complete the list of important contributors to the modern "minimum
contacts" standard. Asahi is generally thought of as an attempt to refine
the purposefulness requirement of the specific jurisdiction doctrine,
particularly as it applies to commercial actors doing business indirectly in
a state,369 and Burnham as identifying a major "single-factor test"
365. Burger King, 470 U.S. at 474-76 (describing the "purposefulness" requirement in
three different ways).
366. Id. at 474, 476 (reintroducing foreseeability topic after having read it out of
discussion earlier).
367. See Justice Brennan's overstatement of Helicopteros, id. at 472, his attempt to
revive McGee, id. at 474, his one-sided view of Kulko, id. at 473-74, his attempts to water
down the defendant veto idea by equating "significant contacts" and contacts that create a
"substantial connection" with the forum with purposeful contacts, id. at 475-76, and his
attempt to reintroduce the idea of foreseeable contacts as sometimes the same as
purposeful ones, after having just acknowledged that Woodson made the two mutually
exclusive, id. at 475 n.18.
368. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
369. E.g., Weintraub, supra note 55, at 538-40.
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qualification on the reach of the "minimum contacts" test generally.370
But each case also says more and less than it seems.
Asahi involved the problem of jurisdiction over a component
manufacturer, someone who, by definition, does not do business directly
in a state, but whose products make their way into the state incorporated
into the products of other manufacturers.37' The case presented the
difficult question of whether a tort or contract-based contacts standard
was more appropriate for assessing the availability of jurisdiction in such
cases.372  The Asahi Metal Company, a Japanese corporation, made
valves for motorcycle tires.373 It sold one of its valves to Cheng Shin
Rubber Company, a Taiwanese corporation, which in turn incorporated
the valve into a motorcycle tire it manufactured.374 The tire was then
added to a motorcycle purchased by Gary Zurcher.373 The tire exploded
while Zurcher was riding the bike, injuring him, and ultimately causing
him to file a products liability action against Cheng Shin (and others).3 76
Cheng Shin, in turn, cross-complained for indemnity against Asahi.377
Zurcher settled all of his claims against the defendants, leaving only the
indemnity claim between Cheng Shin and Asahi for the court to decide.
3
18
The trial court denied Asahi's motion to quash service for lack of
personal jurisdiction,379 the California Court of Appeal reversed ,3 the
California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal,381 and to
complete the straight, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the California
Supreme Court.""
At first glance, Asahi looks like a garden-variety stream-of-commerce
case, and the lower courts discussed it in those terms.383 This was not
surprising since stream-of-commerce was one of the most popular rubrics
at the time for resolving the special jurisdictional problem presented by
the component manufacturer defendant who markets indirectly in a
370. E.g., id. at 551-52.
371. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 106, 108 (1980) (plurality
opinion).
372. See id. at 114-15.
373. Id. at 106.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 105-06.
377. Id. at 106.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 106-07.
380. Id. at 107. It did this in effect. Literally, it granted a writ of mandate ordering the
trial court to quash service. Id.
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state. Seen in this light, the key issue in the case, and the one on which
the Court split down the middle, was "whether the mere awareness on
the part of a foreign defendant that the components it manufactured,
sold, and delivered outside the United States would reach the forum
State in the stream of commerce constitutes 'minimum contacts' between
the defendant and the forum State."384 Put in more familiar terms, the
issue was whether a component manufacturer's forum-contacts must be
purposeful for jurisdiction to attach, or whether merely foreseeable
contacts are enough. 5 Justices O'Connor and Brennan, each speaking
for themselves and three other justices, reached opposite conclusions on
this issue,"" and while Justice Brennan seemed to have the better of the
argument (he at least gave reasons for his view),-3 7 each side was equally
adamant. Justice Stevens, writing separately, expressed perhaps the most
sophisticated position, arguing that the "line . . . between 'mere
awareness' that a component will find its way into the forum State and
'purposeful availment' of the forum's market," often does not exist.3 8 If
"the volume, the value, and the hazardous character of the components"
are great enough, said Justice Stevens, a defendant would be hard put to
deny that it had purposefully exploited the market for its product in the
state, even if it had done nothing directly in the state to sell the
product.3 89  One ought to be able to prove purposefulness
circumstantially, in other words, in situations where defendants try to
384. Id. at 105. The Court also repeated the "substantial connection" language of
Burger King to describe the test for specific jurisdiction, thereby perpetuating the
confusion this particular use of "substantial" causes in distinguishing specific jurisdiction
from general jurisdiction. Id. at 112 (plurality opinion).
385. Compare id. (plurality opinion), with World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-97 (1980).
386. Asahi. 480 U.S. at 108-13 (plurality opinion); id. at 116-17 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
387. Id. at 116-17 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
As long as a participant in [the stream of commerce] is aware that the final
product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there
cannot come as a surprise. Nor will the litigation present a burden for which
there is no corresponding benefit. A defendant who has placed goods in the
stream of commerce benefits economically from the retail sale of the final
product in the forum State, and indirectly benefits from the State's laws that
regulate and facilitate commercial activity.
Id. (Brennan. J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Compare Justice
O'Connor's reason for reaching the opposite conclusion. Id. at 112 (plurality opinion)
("We now find [the purposefulness] position to be consonant with the requirements of due
process.").
388, Id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
389. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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have it both ways by doing business in a state, but professing not to.
39
0
The Court has not yet resolved this purposefulness/foreseeability debate
for stream-of-commerce contacts, and lower courts pretty much just
choose sides.3 91
Looked at in another way, however, Asahi is perhaps not a stream-of-
commerce case after all. Asahi's valve was a commercial product to be
sure, but Asahi sold the valve to a tire manufacturer in Taiwan, not a
retail valve purchaser in California, and arguably the valve came out of
the stream of commerce, much like the Audi automobile in Woodson, at
the point of that sale. On this view, once the valve was on the motorcycle
tire it was a potentially dangerous instrumentality more than a
commercial product (for purposes of suing Asahi), and when it caused
harm, the harm was more in the nature of a tort than a breach of
contract.39 Since the valve was manufactured in Japan and caused harm
in California, in jurisdictional terms the claim against Asahi was for a
multi-state tort, and the traditional "minimum contacts" standard for a
multi-state tort is the "effects plus" standard.3 93 Rather than ask whether
Asahi purposefully marketed its valve in California through a stream of
commerce (a doing-business question), therefore, the Court perhaps
would have been better off asking if it had produced a tortious effect in
the State, and if so, whether it also satisfied one of the "plus" factors
typically used in "effects-plus" tests to separate interstate commercial
actors from local, intrastate businesses.9 Had the Court used such a test,
390. For an example of the converse of this, proving non-purposefulness
circumstantially through a paucity of business activity in the forum, see Rodriguez Salgado
v. Les Nouvelles Esthetiques, 218 F. Supp. 2d 203, 209 (D.P.R 2002) (stating that
"infinitesimal sales-figures are not enough to constitute the requisite 'minimum contacts').
See also Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85, 91 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Just as widespread
circulation of a publication indicates deliberate action, thin distribution may indicate a
lack of purposeful contact.").
391. For a list of cases choosing sides, see Bridgeport Music, Inc, v. Still N The Water
Publ'g, 327 F.3d 472, 479 (6th Cir. 2003).
392. In this sense, the case was closer to Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 762 (Il. 1961), than Burger King. Woodson and Keeton also
were cases in which the plaintiff's claim was based in tort and the Court's discussion of
defendant's contact was framed in contract (i.e., doing business) terms. In Keeton this
made sense, since the defendant's sale of magazines gave rise to a libel, but in Woodson it
did not, since the defendants' sale of an automobile gave rise to a breach of warranty more
than a product liability claim (at least against the defendants contesting jurisdiction).
393. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
394. Recall that the most common "plus" factors were "derive substantial revenue
from interstate commerce," and "derive revenue from other goods and services consumed
in the state." The California long-arm statute was not an "enumerated acts" statute,
however, and thus did not list specific plus factors Asahi would have to satisfy. Instead, it
authorized the exercise of jurisdiction "on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution
of this state or of the United States." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2004). As a
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it almost certainly would have found Asahi subject to jurisdiction in
California, since the company was a major multi-national corporation,
and would have satisfied any of the most commonly used "plus"
factors.3 95 While it is true that the Court looked to a set of quasi "plus"
factors in applying the stream-of-commerce standard, it was a different
and more difficult-to-satisfy set of factors than that required for a multi-
state tort.396 This is an instance, then, in which the failure to keep tort
and contract based formulations of the "minimum contacts" standard
separate not only added to the confusion in the doctrine generally, but
also may have changed the outcome in a particular case.
In the end, however, Asahi is almost certainly more of a "fairness
factors" case than a contacts one. All of the justices but one397 agreed
that it would have been unfair to make a Japanese company defend
against an indemnity claim of a Taiwanese company in a California state
court,3 98 and it was on this basis that the Court decided the case.39 Going
through Woodson's list of "other factors" against which a defendant's
contacts must be weighed, the Court concluded that "these factors . . .
clearly reveal[] the unreasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction over
Asahi, even apart from the question of the placement of goods in the
stream of commerce. ' 4 ° Put in Burger King language, the Court said, in
effect, that Asahi had made a "compelling case that the presence of some
consequence, it would have been appropriate to use any of the standard plus factors
already determined to be constitutionally acceptable.
395. See Weintraub, supra note 55, at 550-51 (arguing that Asahi "would have come
out differently" if an effects-based torts standard of personal jurisdiction had been used).
396. The "additional conduct" required to show that Asahi's contact with California
was purposeful included
designing the product [i.e., the valve] for the market in the forum State,
advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advice
to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor
who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion). It
is not surprising that Asahi did not satisfy any of these factors since it was principally a
component manufacturer and its clients were other manufacturers and distributors, not
retail purchasers.
397. Justice Scalia would have held that the lack of purposeful stream-of-commerce
contacts, by itself, was enough to defeat jurisdiction, Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112-13, and that it
was not necessary to consider any of the sovereignty factors in the second half of the
Burger King test, id, at 105.
398. Id. at 115 (noting that it was not clear what law governed the indemnity action).
California law might have governed, but apart from this possibility, there was nothing in
the case that had anything to do with California. Id.
399. Id. at 116. Eight justices agreed with part II-B of the opinion expressing this
conclusion. Id. at 105. No more than four justices agreed with any other part of the
opinion. See id.
400. Id. at 114.
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other considerations ...render[ed] jurisdiction unreasonable."40 1 The
implications of this conclusion are substantial. Among other things, it
means that a defendant's forum contacts do not need to be considered in
making the decision to deny personal jurisdiction."' A court may deny
jurisdiction on the basis of sovereignty and convenience factors alone.4 3
The Court treated the contacts and fairness-factors halves of the
"minimum contacts" standard as two separate tests in other words, and
not as a single, two-part test, at least for purposes of denying
jurisdiction.40 Justice Stevens was the most explicit in this regard. "An
examination of minimum contacts," he said, "is not always necessary to
determine whether a state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction is
constitutional., 40 5  A majority of the Court has never said this, though
Justice Stevens thought Justice Brennan's rendition of the "minimum
contacts" standard in Burger King supported this view.i While Asahi's
influence has been limited mostly to stream-of-commerce cases, its
potential implications are more far-reaching. The absence of a majority
opinion is the only thing that keeps it from being a major doctrinal
decision.
Burnham is an important case, not so much for what it adds to the
"minimum contacts" standard-it was about "transient" or what also is
401. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
402. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116.
403. See id. at 113-14.
404. See id.
405. Id. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-78). This is another example of failing to treat the "minimum
contacts" expression as a term of art. Understood as a synonym for constitutionally
sufficient contacts, which is how International Shoe used the term, it would be incoherent
to say, as Justice Stevens in effect does, that examining the constitutional sufficiency of the
defendant's contacts is not always necessary in determining whether the assertion of
jurisdiction over the defendant is constitutional. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). What he probably meant to say is that an examination of the
defendant's connections with the forum is not always necessary in determining whether
the assertion of jurisdiction is constitutional. In his concurrence in the judgment in
Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Justice Powell predicted that the fairness factors half of the
minimum contacts standard eventually would become a free-standing test in its own right,
and that a defendant's forum contacts would become an optional feature of the standard.
See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 713-14 (1982)
(Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). The prediction has come true, at least for Justice
Stevens, and also probably for Justice Brennan.
406. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). (Justice Stevens gives a "See Burger King" citation for his statement). Justice
Brennan first expressed the view in his concurrence in Keeton, where he argued that state
interest concerns were not part of the due process analysis needed to determine personal
jurisdiction. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 782 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
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called "tag" jurisdiction417-but for how it summarizes that standard and
describes its relationship to "single-factor" jurisdictional tests. Factually,
the case looked a lot like Kulko, with divorce rather than child support
the principal issue in dispute.4 8 The Burnhams were married in West
Virginia and lived together in New Jersey for ten years before deciding
to separate. 9  Mrs. Burnham moved to California with the couple's two
children where, it was agreed, she would file for divorce on the ground of
irreconcilable differences. 4'0 At some point, Mr. Burnham changed his
mind about the California proceeding and filed a divorce action of his
own in New Jersey, alleging that Mrs. Burnham had deserted him.4 l1
Unable to convince Mr. Burnham to abide by their agreement, Mrs.
Burnham filed her own divorce action in California. She served Mr.
Burnham with process while he was in California on a business trip, after
he returned their oldest child to her following a weekend trip to San
Francisco.413 Mr. Burnham contested jurisdiction, arguing that "his only
contacts with California were a few short visits to the State for the
purposes of conducting business and visiting his children, ' '41 4 and that
411none of these contacts had given rise to Mrs. Burnham's divorce claim.
But the trial court denied his motion to quash, and the state appellate
court denied mandamus relief.
416 The Supreme Court affirmed.
417
The Court could have sustained jurisdiction over Mr. Burnham on a
number of different grounds4-all of the justices agreed that jurisdiction
407. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610-12 (1990) (plurality opinion).
"Tag" or "transient" jurisdiction is produced by personally serving ("tagging") the
defendant in the forum state. Id. (plurality opinion).
408. Id at 607-08.
409. Id. at 607.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 607-08. The agreement provided that Mrs. Burnham would file on the
ground of irreconcilable differences, but Mr. Burnham preempted this by filing on the
ground of desertion. Id. at 607. The New Jersey proceeding went nowhere since Mr.
Burnham never attempted to serve Mrs. Burnham with process. Id.




417. Id. at 628.
418. Justice Brennan thought Mr. Burnham's connections with California were
sufficient to support specific jurisdiction on traditional "continuous and systematic"
contacts grounds. See id. at 636-39 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Perhaps
Mr. Burnham's continuing relationship with Mrs. Burnham and their children in
California was like the franchisee's relationship with Burger King in Florida, and his
participation in the children's decision to move to the state a form of purposefully
connecting with it. The marriage relationship is at least as consuming as the one between
franchisee and franchisor. Or, perhaps the agreement to have Mrs. Burnham file the
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was available _-including a "minimum contacts" analysis, but instead it
chose the simplest and most controversial rationale. It held that personal
service on Mr. Burnham in California made it unnecessary to examine
the extent of his contacts with the State, or the relationship of those
contacts to Mrs. Burnham's divorce action. 40 "The short of the matter,"
said Justice Scalia speaking for the Court, "is that jurisdiction based on
physical presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the
continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due process
standard of 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.',
421
This conclusion was controversial principally because the Court had said
several years earlier, in Shaffer, that "all assertions of state-court
jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in
International Shoe and its progeny, ' '4 2 and this seemed to require a
divorce action in California was a waiver of Mr. Burnham's due process rights and a
submission to the jurisdiction of the California court. A colleague of mine, and an
experienced parent, suggests that sending a child to a state is roughly equivalent to
shipping a defective product or dangerous instrumentality into the state, and thus might
support jurisdiction on an "effects-plus" rationale similar to the one used in Gray. He was
not serious.
419. Id. at 628, 640. It is not that clear why all of the justices thought the case was
easy. Why is it fair, for example, to permit a California court to dissolve a West Virginia
and New Jersey marriage, and determine custody and support obligations, perhaps in
accordance with its own very different laws on the subject (depending upon how it
resolves the choice of laws questions involved), when neither of the parties bargained for
that in entering the marriage? Fairness is not a concern for Justice Scalia when the
defendant is served in the state, id. at 639 n.14 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment),
but why none of the other justices were troubled by these issues is confusing. Perhaps
they were upset at Mr. Burnham for reneging on his agreement to let Mrs. Burnham file in
California, or perhaps they thought he had no one but himself to blame for getting served
in California, since there was no evidence that he had been induced into the State by force
or fraud. See id. at 608.
420. Id. at 619 (plurality opinion).
421. Id. (plurality opinion).
422. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977). There are other concerns one might
have about justifying a rule principally on the basis of tradition without any concern for
whether it is fair in contemporary terms. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 621 (plurality opinion)
("[Tag jurisdiction's] validation is its pedigree."). Tradition is just another time period's
definition of fairness, for example, not a timeless notion handed down from on high, and
there is no more reason to fossilize another era's policy judgment in a jurisdictional
standard than there is in any other area of the law. Even "traditional notions," as the
Court acknowledges, "can be ... offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are
no longer justified." Id. 621-22 (plurality opinion). Moreover, if Shaffer could reject the
traditional distinction between quasi in rem and in personam jurisdiction, id. at 621
(plurality opinion), for example, (and Burnham makes it clear that this much of Shaffer is
still good law), id. (plurality opinion), why could Burnham not reject the traditional
distinction between "tag" and "minimum contacts" jurisdiction? If the answer is that
tradition is an objective standard of legitimacy, and fairness is a subjective one, what
evidence is there that this is so? A conception of fairness used to justify a judicial decision
must be found in the due process case law, not the personal preferences of the individual
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"minimum contacts" analysis for "all" types of jurisdictional issues. But
the plurality opinion for the Court in Burnham disagreed. Relying on a
close reading of Shaffer, and an extended examination of the English and
American origins of the personal jurisdiction doctrine, it limited Shaffer's
particular holding to what used to be called the "attachment" version of
quasi in rem jurisdiction,42 ' and concluded that Shaffer's more general
language announced a rule for "jurisdiction over an absent defendant,"
424not a defendant physically present in the forum. Shaffer, like
International Shoe, Justice Scalia asserted, was a rule for novel (i.e., post
Due Process Clause) forms of jurisdiction, not traditional ones.
42 5
While Burnham is a "minimum contacts" case in only an indirect
sense, its summary of that standard repeated some familiar mistakes. For
example, while professing to "express no view[]" on the matter, it
described the "special rule" for general jurisdiction as requiring only
"continuous and systematic" rather than "substantial" contacts with a
forum. 4 6  It based this description on International Shoe, which
admittedly used both terms but not as synonyms, rather than on Perkins,
but the mistake is the same no matter the source.427 The mistake was
harmless in Burnham itself, since the decision rested on Mr. Burnham's
being "tagged" in California, and not on his contacts with the State, 42' but
as the last major Supreme Court pronouncement on the matter,
Burnham is a favorite citation for lower courts looking for a statement of
the personal (specific and general) jurisdiction standard, and it does not
421help that it continues to get half of that standard wrong.
justices, and arguments about the content of a tradition are hardly easy or uncontroversial.
Burnham itself is proof of this. The Court's opinion is also fuzzy on how it would handle
the force and fraud objections to a tag rule.
423. Id. (plurality opinion). Pennoyer is the classic example of an "attachment"
version of a quasi in rem action. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Ownership of
property in such an action is not the explicit issue in dispute. The property involved (e.g.,
Neff's land in Oregon), is simply an asset against which a prevailing plaintiff hopes to
collect, and a link through which the plaintiff hopes to establish the defendant's contacts
with the forum state. In a pure quasi in rem action, the parties are fighting directly over
competing ownership claims to property.
424. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 620 (plurality opinion).
425. Id. at 621 (plurality opinion).
426. Id. at 610 n.1 (plurality opinion).
427. Id. (plurality opinion).
428. Id. at 628 (plurality opinion).
429. Id. (plurality opinion). Burnham also raises the possibility that the doctrine of
general jurisdiction might apply "only to corporations, which have never fitted
comfortably in a jurisdictional regime based primarily upon 'de facto power over the
defendant's person,"' but "express[es] no views on [this] matter[]." Id. at 610 n.1 (plurality
opinion) (citation omitted).
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It is also surprising that Burnham did not make more use of Kulko.
The two cases were close factually and implicated many of the same
policy concerns, yet there is only one "cf." reference to Kulko in the
Burnham opinion, and it was used simply to illustrate a factual point
rather than support a legal conclusion. 30 Mr. Kulko had more extensive
contacts with California than Mr. Burnham, and yet he was not subject to
jurisdiction in the State because the Court was not willing to construe the
"minimum contacts" standard so as to "discourage parents from entering
into reasonable visitation agreements., 43' When Mr. Burnham, acting as
a good father, visited one of his children, however, the result was
different. 32 Why the same concern for "family harmony" did not play a
similar role in his case was not explained. The Court may have been
trying to signal, by omission, that substantive law policies cannot be used
to shape the content of jurisdictional rules. This had always been its
espoused view until Mullane, Keeton, and Kulko suggested otherwise,433
and perhaps the Court was returning to traditional values in more than
one way.
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Burnham contains what is
perhaps the most aggressive statement of the totality-of-the-
circumstances test for "minimum contacts" jurisdiction to be found
anywhere in the case law. Building on Justice Black's "transformation of
our national economy" opinion in McGee,434 his own "foreseeable
contacts" dissent in Woodson,43 5 and his hybrid opinion for the Court in
436Burger King, Justice Brennan blended together an odd mixture of
arguments based on "tradition," "reasonable expectations," "benefits
and protections of [the] laws," and "lack of inconvenience," to conclude
that "as a rule the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant
based on his voluntary presence in the forum will satisfy the
requirements of due process. ,43 He did not disagree that California had
jurisdiction over Mr. Burnham, he objected only to what he
characterized as Justice Scalia's view that "traditional rules of jurisdiction
[were], ipso facto, forever constitutional., 438 He thought an inquiry into
430. Id. at 626 (plurality opinion).
431. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93 (1978).
432. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 608, 628.
433. With the possible exception of Mullane. See supra note 248.
434. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
435. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299-302 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
436. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
437. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 637-39 (Brennan, J,, concurring in the judgment).
438. Id. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Brennan engages
Justice Scalia in the history debate. challenging the idea that the transient jurisdiction rule
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the fairness of taking jurisdiction was always necessary, even when
traditional rules were involved.439
In many ways, Justice Brennan's opinion consisted of adding up zeros
to get one. For example, he argued that Mr. Burnham should have
expected to be subject to jurisdiction in California if he was served there,
because that is "our common understanding now, [of what is reasonable,]
fortified by a century of judicial practice." 0 "If I visit another State," he
continued, "I knowingly assume some risk that the State will exercise its
power over my property or my person while there."' ' The strength of
this argument, however, is the traditional rule, based on "a century of
judicial practice .... that jurisdiction is often a function of geography,"' 4
as Justice Brennan put it, and not the fact that a defendant should expect
such a rule to be enforced." 3 "Justice Brennan's long journey is a circular
one," said Justice Scalia, "leaving him, at the end of the day, in complete
reliance upon the very factor he sought to avoid: The existence of a
continuing tradition is not enough, fairness also must be considered;
fairness exists here because there is a continuing tradition.""4 Ironically,
it was Justice Brennan himself who first pointed out the circularity of the
"reasonable expectations" argument in his Woodson dissent.4'
The argument based on the benefits and protections of California law
is equally unavailing. In the three days he was in California prior to
being served, Mr. Burnham traveled on California's "roads and
waterways," had his "health and safety .. .guaranteed by the State's
police, fire, and emergency medical services[,] ... enjoy[ed] the fruits of
the State's economy," and had the "right of access to [the State's]
courts." 46  With these benefits, Justice Brennan argued, came the
corollary burden of having to answer to a claim by a California citizen in
a California court."7 Apart from the fact, as Justice Scalia pointed out,
was strongly implanted in our jurisprudence at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 633-35 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
439. Id. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
440. Id. at 637 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
441. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 218 (1977)).
442. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
443. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
444. Id. at 625 (plurality opinion).
445. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 311 n.18 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court suggests that [it is critical that the defendant should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum] but [this] reasoning begs the
question. A defendant cannot know if his actions will subject him to jurisdiction in
another State until we have declared what the law of jurisdiction is.").
446. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 637-38 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
447. Id. at 637-39 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
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that three days worth of such benefits seems "powerfully inadequate to
establish ... that it is 'fair' for California to decree the ownership of all
Mr. Burnham's worldly goods acquired during the [ten] years of his
marriage, and the custody over his children,",448 the benefits and
protections in question had nothing to do with Mrs. Burnham's divorce
claim, and this was a crucial omission.449 The expression "benefits and
protections of the law" is not a free-standing test. It comes originally
from the specific jurisdiction requirement that a defendant "purposefully
avail[] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws., 450  It is
purposeful activity in the state that is the key jurisdictional feature in this
statement of the test, not the benefits and protections of the state's law,
and the relevant benefits and protections are only those flowing from
that purposeful in-state activity. People who never enter a state can
benefit from the protection of its laws, and yet that is not a basis for the
state taking jurisdiction over them. Any other rule would create a new,
all-encompassing category of general jurisdiction based on forum-
provided benefits and protections, and in the process would make the
doctrine of specific jurisdiction obsolete.
Justice Brennan's final argument also harkened back to McGee. The
potential burdens on a transient defendant such as Mr. Burnham are
slight, he argued, because "'[m]odern transportation and
communications have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to
defend himself' in a State outside his place of residence., 451 The fact that
Mr. Burnham had journeyed to California at least once before, said
Justice Brennan, also was "an indication that suit in the forum likely
would not be prohibitively inconvenient.",412  The problem with this
argument, of course, as Justice Scalia pointed out, is that it justifies
"jurisdiction over everyone, whether or not he ever comes to
California." '453 It would extend the reach of a state's extra-territorial
jurisdictional to the point where it would be almost limitless. On Justice
Brennan's view, it is hard to know what kind of claim Mr. Burnham
448. Id. at 623 (plurality opinion).
449. Id. at 607-08 (plurality opinion).
450. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
451. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 638 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (quoting McGee v. Int'l Life
Ins. Co, 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957))).
452. Id. at 638-39 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
453. Id. at 624 (plurality opinion).
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could not be sued on in California, or who could not be sued in
California.454
H) The Errors Collected and Augmented
Burnham brings to an end the string of Supreme Court cases
principally responsible for defining the content of the modern personal
jurisdiction doctrine, and like Dorothy and her companions, the doctrine
has now come a long way from Kansas (or Missouri). What started as an
uncomplicated two-factor, four-permutation test, designed to deal with
the relatively simple telephone-and-automobile-connected world of the
1950s, has grown exponentially into an elaborate, multi-factor, pseudo
algorithmic, balancing test, designed to deal with the electronically linked
world of the twenty-first century. Unfortunately, the development of the
doctrine has not always been linear, cumulative, consistent, or clear. In
now more than half a century, the Court's efforts through different
authors55 to adjust the doctrine to changing times, circumstances, and
views has produced as many contradictions, dead-ends, opacities, and
mistakes as it has intellectual breakthroughs and doctrinal epiphanies.
And lower court judges have compounded the problem by taking
advantage of the doors left open by the Court to add additional layers of
confusion of their own.
The difficulties with the doctrine are now well-known. By using the
two terms interchangeably and indiscriminately, the Court has muddied
International Shoe's relatively clear distinction between "continuous and
systematic" contacts needed for specific jurisdiction, and "substantial"
contacts needed for general jurisdiction,456 thereby undercutting, if not
454. Interestingly, Justice Brennan does not discuss the role of state sovereignty
concerns in the decision to take jurisdiction. West Virginia, where the Burnhams were
married, and New Jersey, where they acquired their joint property, id. at 607, would seem
to have some interest in the case, particularly given the fact that they do not have a system
of community property, unlike California.
455. The Court seems to have had difficulty over the years finding a Justice whose way
of expressing the personal jurisdiction standard represents a consensus view. Even during
the activist period of the early 1980s, when the makeup of the Court did not change from
one term to the next, no Justice wrote two personal jurisdiction opinions in a row (with the
exception of Justice Rehnquist, who wrote Keeton and Calder, since the two cases were
argued and decided together), and few wrote more than one at all. It was as if no one ever
passed the audition for getting the standard right. Shifting the opinion -writing assignment
around like this created a little bit of a "pride-of-authorship" problem, however, in the
sense that each Justice, paraphrasing the received standard in her or his own way, changed
it ever so slightly in the process, and introduced a layer of ambiguity or imprecision that
lower court judges exploited to loosen the standard even further. The overall cycle is a
variation on the telephone game problem.
456. The Court has even failed to use the term "minimum contacts" in a consistent
fashion, sometimes substituting "minimal" for "minimum," for example, so as to require
2004]
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destroying, the idea of "substantial" contacts as a separate and distinct
jurisdictional standard (e.g., McGee, Keeton, Calder, Helicopteros, and
Burger King). This, in turn, has so watered down the corollary doctrine
of "general" jurisdiction that it is now often easier to satisfy its
requirements than it is to satisfy the requirements of what was intended
to be the less restrictive rule of specific jurisdiction.4 5 7 The Court also has
stated the "purposefulness" requirement for defendant forum contacts in
such a wide variety of ways (e.g., "stream-of-commerce" in Woodson and
Asahi;4s8 targeting, "intentionally direct[ing]," "expressly aim[ing]," and
"causing the effects" in Calder;19 "reasonably anticipate being haled into
court" in Woodson;46 and exercise the "privilege of conducting activities"
in Hanson 4 6 1 ), that there is now a purposefulness argument for just about
every situation, and what was once the bulwark of the defendant-veto
view of personal jurisdiction is now more often than not just a minor
obstacle in the path of a totality-of-the-circumstances argument. By
using these various formulations of purposefulness interchangeably, the
Court also has failed to maintain the historical distinction between
contract ("doing business") and tort ("effects," "effects plus") based
versions of the "minimum contacts" standard, a distinction codified in
the long-arm statutes of many states, and this in turn has createdunnecessary interpretive difficulties for courts applying those statutes.
only a few contacts with the forum, rather than constitutionally sufficient contacts. E.g.,
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
457. For a brief time, it even looked like the Court wanted to eliminate general
jurisdiction explicitly, as when Shaffer described the "minimum contacts" standard as
requiring a three-part relationship among the defendant, the claim, and the forum.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977). Subsequent opinions of the Court used this
formulation of the test, although in situations where only specific jurisdiction was
involved, and it wasn't until Burnham that the Court explained that it had meant no such
thing. Burnham, 495 U.S. 619-20 (plurality opinion).
458. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality
opinion); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980).
459. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 787, 789-90 (1984).
460. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297.
461. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
462. For examples of such statutes, see supra note 146. Some courts also do a good job
of maintaining the distinction. E.g., Jet Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., 298 F.3d 1,
10 (1st Cir. 2002) ("Ordinarily, the personal jurisdiction analysis for tort claims differs
from that for contract claims."); Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips Fund, Inc., 196
F.3d 284, 289 (1st Cir. 1999) (describing the differences); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen,
141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that "application of the purposeful availment
prong differs depending on whether the underlying claim is a tort or contract claim"
(citing Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995))); Graduate Mgmt.
Admission Council v. Raju, 241 F. Supp. 2d 589, 594 (E.D. Va. 2003) (discussing doing
business contacts separately from contacts caused by directing tortious activity toward the
forum). Others do not. E.g., Medinah Mining, Inc. v. Amunategui, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1132,
"Defendant Veto" or "Totality of the Circumstances "?
In addition, by suggesting that the "minimum contacts" test is not as
strict for individual consumers suing large corporations over modest
personal purchases as it is for corporations suing consumers in return, the
Court has introduced (and denied that it has introduced at the same
time) the possibility of a wealth-based double-standard into due process
analysis, and wealth-based double-standards are difficult to reconcile
with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 4 3 Such
standards also license result-oriented lower court judges to take a Robin-
Hood perspective on jurisdictional questions and to "do the right thing"
no matter the cost in doctrinal clarity or predictability, though so far, few
lower courts seem to have exercised this option.46 Further, by refusing to
resolve (in Helicopteros) the "arise out of/related to" debate over the
meaning of the nexus requirement in the doctrine of specific jurisdiction,
the Court has left lower courts free to pick and choose between the two
definitions, producing a pattern of uneven and inconsistent results from
state to state. In one sense, it is not even clear that a contacts
requirement remains a part of the due process standard at all. The Court
has suggested, and sometimes said explicitly, that defendant forum
contacts and state sovereignty interests are independent and separate
jurisdictional standards, each capable of authorizing or denying
jurisdiction in its own right (e.g., Asahi, Keeton, Mullane). And yet, at
other times, it has described these different types of considerations as
two halves of a single test, both of which are necessary for a complete
"minimum contacts" analysis (e.g., Woodson, Kulko, Burger King).
Again, lower courts left free to choose, do so unevenly.46 Compounding
this problem is the difficulty of explaining how a constitutional analysis
grounded in the Due Process Clause can authorize the consideration of
1135-36 (D. Nev. 2002) (discussing Internet defamation claim based on a combination of
doing business and effects-plus ("something more") standards).
463. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 454, 457 (1940) (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
464. But see CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1268 (6th Cir. 1996) (basing
decision on the fact that plaintiff did not bring "suit in Ohio 'to collect a small amount of
user fees from a Texas resident who, while seated at his computer terminal, became a
member of the CompuServe network.' [Plaintiff was] an entrepreneur who purposefully
employed CompuServe to market his computer software product."); Zippo Mfg. Co. v.
Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1125 (W.D. Pa. 1997) ("When a consumer logs
onto a server in a foreign jurisdiction he is engaging in a fundamentally different type of
contact than an entity that is using the Internet to sell or market products or services to
residents of foreign jurisdictions.").
465. See, e.g., Jeffers v. Wal-Mart Stores, 152 F. Supp. 2d 913, 923-24 (S.D. W. Va.
2001) (stating that fair play considerations "cannot ... make up for a nearly complete lack
of purposeful contact" (citing Brown v. Geha-Werke GmbH, 69 F. Supp. 2d 770, 778 (D.
S.C. 1999); Regent Lighting Corp. v. Am. Lighting Concept, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 705, 712-
13 (M.D. N.C. 1997))).
2004]
122 Catholic University Law Review (Vol. 54:53
state sovereignty interests at all. The Court has tried to explain how this
is justified several different times, only to repudiate each explanation the
next time it revisits the issue (e.g., Pennoyer, International Shoe,
Woodson, Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Burger King).4 6
Moreover, the Court's decision to drop (or just stop using)
International Shoe's "nature and quality and ... circumstances, 467 rubric
for analyzing specific jurisdiction cases involving single and isolated
contacts giving rise to the claim has created a conceptual rift between
International Shoe and later single-contact cases (e.g., Woodson), making
it that much easier for lower courts to stretch (and shrink) this category
of specific jurisdiction well beyond its original shape. The failure to
retain International Shoe's language also has denied the Court what
might have been a better analytical framework for evaluating fairness
and justice considerations in single-contact cases.46  In addition, in
describing the type of inconvenience relevant to the reasonableness
determination in the "other (or fairness) factors" half of the "minimum
contacts" test, the Court has said one thing and done another, both
restricting such analysis to defendant inconvenience, while at the same
time saying that the comparative inconvenience of both plaintiff and
defendant may be taken into account (Burger King).469 And finally, while
insisting that questions of substantive law should be kept separate from
questions of jurisdictional power, the Court has used substantive law
policies to modify jurisdictional rules when it wanted to, and ignored
them when it did not want to, without acknowledging that it was doing
this (Mullane, Keeton, Kulko), again both confusing lower court judges
and implicitly authorizing them to freelance in the same way on their
own.
466. The Court's confused views on this topic have not proved as troublesome to lower
courts. Most lower courts miss this legitimacy problem altogether, and those that see it
seem more concerned about the practical political consequences of their decisions than
concerns of doctrinal integrity.
467. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
468. For examples of self-described purposefulness cases that might have been better
discussed in terms of the nature, quality, and circumstances of the defendant's forum
contacts, see Rodriguez Salgado v. Les Nouvelles Esthetiques, 218 F. Supp. 2d 203, 208
(D.P.R. 2002), and SGIAir Holding II LLC v. Novartis Int'l, AG, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1195,
1202 (D. Colo. 2002). For cascs that do a "nature, quality, and circumstances" analysis in
effect, but do not call it that, see Quality Pork International v. Rupari Food Servs., Inc.,
675 N.W.2d 642, 649-51 (Neb. 2004), and Wenger Tree Service v. Royal Truck &
Equipment, Inc., 853 So.2d 888, 896 (Ala. 2002). For cases calling it that, see Lang v.
Capital Resource Investment, 102 S.W.3d 861, 865-66 (Tex. 2003), and Plant Mechanical
Services, Inc. v. Drivecon Corp., No. CIV. A. 01-0993, 2001 WL 1002413, at *2 (E.D. La.
Aug. 23, 2001).
469. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 483-84 (1985).
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The "minimum contacts" standard is a constitutional doctrine, and one
of the strengths of a constitutional doctrine is its ability to adapt to
changing conditions and views, the laments of textualist interpreters
(both old and new)47 to the contrary notwithstanding. This is even more
the case when the doctrine is grounded in an idea as malleable and
context-specific as that of "fair play and substantial justice. 4 71  So a
certain amount of change in the content of the "minimum contacts"
standard could have been expected (and even welcomed) over time, and
if all the Court had done was keep the standard current there would be
little if anything to get excited about. But the problems with the Court's
development of the standard run well beyond those built into the process
of trying to stay doctrinally up to date. The Court's personal jurisdiction
decisions over the past half-century have been characterized more by a
lack of analytical discipline than a ready willingness to change with the
times. The inconsistencies, contradictions, and confusions introduced
into the doctrine are often not so much the unavoidable consequences of
inevitable change as the results of poor research, careless analysis, pride
of authorship, and competing agendas. The Court has not done a good
job, as an institution, of seeing to it that the doctrine has grown in
coherent and consistent ways, and this pattern has not been lost on lower
court judges charged with implementing the Court's vision.
Like children imitating the mannerisms of their parents, lower court
judges "don't take after strangers., 47 2 Often, they mimic and sometimes
even improve upon the Court's errors, sometimes in exaggerated fashion,
to create their own peculiar forms of doctrinal incoherence. For
example, the overwhelming preponderance of lower federal and state
courts adopt Helicopteros's "continuous and systematic" phrasing of the
contacts requirement for general jurisdiction, rather than the
470. William Eskridge is usually given credit for identifying the difference between
new and old forms of the textualist interpretive method, focusing principally on the
different role each approach accords enactment-history materials in the determination of
constitutional and legislative intent. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L. REV. 621,626-56 (1990).
471. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
472. 1 heard Wordsworth's dictum expressed this way at a little league baseball game,
when the son of a particularly irascible coach threw a tantrum after striking out. The
person sitting next to me on the bleachers leaned over and said very matter-of-factly,
"You know, they don't take after strangers." For the original, see WILLIAM
WORDSWORTH, My Heart Leaps Up When I Behold, in WILLIAM WORDSWORTH: THE
MAJOR WORKS 246 (Stephen Gill ed. 2000) ("My heart leaps up when I behold A
Rainbow in the sky: So was it when my life began; So is it now I am a Man; So be it when I
shall grow old, Or let me die! The Child is Father of the Man; I could wish my days to be
Bound each to each by natural piety." (emphasis added)). The dictum is only partly
correct, of course. See WILLARD GAYLIN, HATRED 158 (2003) (explaining how children
identify with and model their behavior after both parents and "other idealized figures").
2004]
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"substantial" contacts test first articulated in International Shoe, and
repeated in Perkins."' "Continuous and systematic" contacts need only
be regular, however, not substantial, so it is not surprising that lower
courts often find general jurisdiction present when a defendant has
engaged in just about any kind of regular business in a state, no matter
how minimal. 4 The ultimate effect of this misunderstanding is to make
the mainstream tests for specific jurisdiction ("doing business") the
principal test for general jurisdiction as well, and to permit plaintiffs to
sue defendants who do any kind of business in a state on any claim,
whether connected to that business or not.
In one sense, of course, this is an understandable mistake. 75
Helicopteros was a general jurisdiction case; it used the adjectives
"continuous and systematic" to describe the type of contacts required for
general jurisdiction, and it is the latest in time of the Court's major
473. E.g., Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 873 (6th Cir. 2002) ("General jurisdiction is
proper only where 'a defendant's contacts with the forum state are of such a continuous
and systematic nature that the state may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant
even if the action is unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the state."' (citation
omitted)); Adams v. Riverview Healthcare Ass'n, No. A3-02-135, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4253, at *5 (D.N.D. Mar. 17, 2003); Hunter v. Mendoza, 197 F. Supp. 2d 964, 969 (N.D.
Ohio 2002); Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 807 (Tex. 2002)
("General jurisdiction is present when a defendant's contacts with a forum are 'continuous
and systematic .... " (citation omitted)).
474. E.g., Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(finding general jurisdiction based on brokerage services offered over the Internet in
forum state); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 95-96 (2d Cir. 2000)
(finding general jurisdiction based on maintenance of Investor Relations office in forum
state); Mich. Nat'l Bank v. Quality Dinette Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 466 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding
general jurisdiction based on mail-order solicitations and sales in forum state); Cresswell v.
Walt Disney Prods., 677 F. Supp. 284,286-87 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (finding general jurisdiction
based on advertising in forum state, sending representatives to encourage forum-state
citizens to visit Disney World, conveying honorary Disney World citizenship on Mayor of
Philadelphia, broadcasting the Disney Channel in forum state, providing a toll-free
number for forum state residents to call, and visiting a forum-state junior college to recruit
employees); In re the Parental Responsibilities of H.Z.G., 77 P.3d 848, 851-52 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2003) (finding general jurisdiction in paternity action based on letter to forum state
promising to make monthly support payments), cert. denied, No. 03SC433, 2003 WL
22171476 (Colo. Sept. 22, 2003); Adams v. Harrah's Md, Heights Corp., 789 N.E.2d 436,
440 (I11. App. Ct. 2003) (finding general jurisdiction based on casino advertising in the
forum state); Ahadi v. Ahadi, 61 S.W.3d 714, 721 (Tex. App. 2001) (finding general
jurisdiction based on providing twenty-three loan guarantees in the forum state). Courts
are not the only ones to make this mistake. See Twitchell, supra note 92. But see Bird, 289
F.3d at 873-74 (maintaining a website "not in any way 'substantial' contacts and cannot
support general jurisdiction); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir. 2002).
475. See Twitchell, supra note 1, at 173-79 (describing how commentators extract a
"doing business" standard from Supreme Court case law on general jurisdiction).
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discussions of general jurisdiction. 76 But a careful reading of the decision
also reveals that the defendant helicopter company had continuous and
systematic business contacts with Texas in the ordinary sense of those
terms, and yet those contacts were not enough for the Texas court to
take general jurisdiction over it. Something more than merely "doing
business" in a state is needed if a company is to be required to defend
there against a claim arising in another state or country. This
notwithstanding, many lower courts now treat Helicopteros as authority
for the proposition that doing business in a state is enough to support
general jurisdiction.477
Related to this error, since it affects the frequency with which lower
courts turn to the general jurisdiction doctrine,478 is the practice of
defining the "nexus" requirement of specific jurisdiction in either "arise
out of" or "related to" terms. Many lower courts treat these alternative
definitions as equally acceptable, and act as if they are free to choose
476. Burger King, Asahi, and Burnham post-date Helicopteros and repeat its
description of the general jurisdiction standard, but they do not add anything to it.
477. See, e.g., Gorman, F.3d at 509-10. But see, e.g., Bird, 289 F.3d at 874 (stating that
doing business with state residents "does not permit general jurisdiction"); Behagen v.
Amateur Basketball Ass'n of the United States, 744 F.2d 731, 733 (10th Cir. 1984)
("Colorado courts have applied Perkins in holding that when a defendant has substantial,
continuous contacts with the forum state, 'jurisdiction may be found even when the cause
of action does not arise out of the forum related activity."' (quoting Waterval v. Dist.
Court, 620 P.2d 5, 9 (Colo. 1980))); EMI Music Mex. v. Rodriguez, S.A., 97 S.W.3d 847,
855 (Tex. App. 2003) ("General jurisdiction requires a showing of substantial activities by
the nonresident defendant in Texas, a more demanding minimum contacts analysis than
for specific jurisdiction."); Magic House AB v. Shelton Beverage L.P., 99 S.W.3d 903, 909
(Tex. App. 2003) ("[Tihe minimum contacts analysis for general jurisdiction ... demands
a showing of substantial activities in the forum state."); Blair Inv. Banking Corp. v.
Reardon, 97 S.W.3d 269, 275 (Tex. App. 2002) ("The minimum-contacts analysis for
general jurisdiction is more demanding than for specific jurisdiction and requires a
showing that the defendant conducted substantial activities within the forum."). Still other
courts use a hybrid test, combining both the "continuous and systematic" and
"substantial" contacts requirements into a single standard. E.g., ESAB Group, Inc. v.
Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 623 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he threshold level of minimum
contacts to confer general jurisdiction is significantly higher than for specific
jurisdiction."); Spherion Corp. v. Cincinnati Fin. Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1055 (N.D.
Ill. 2002) ("If defendant's contacts with the forum state are sufficiently 'substantial[,] . . .
continuous and systematic,' personal jurisdiction may exist for a cause of action unrelated
to those contacts." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Leventhal v. Harrelson, 723
So. 2d 566, 569 (Ala. 1998) ("General jurisdiction applies where a defendant's activities in
the forum state are 'substantial' or 'continuous and systematic,' regardless of whether
those activities gave rise to the lawsuit.").
478. Courts routinely discuss both general and specific jurisdiction in all cases, as if
they were "paired in the voting." Perhaps this is because lawyers routinely argue for both
types of jurisdiction, whether warranted or not.
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between them without having to justify the choice.479 Some courts seem
to think Helicopteros stands for this proposition, probably because it
used both expressions to describe the idea of nexus,4 ° notwithstanding
that the question of how to define nexus was explicitly taken out of that
411case by the parties. Other courts seem to prefer the freedom to define
nexus in more than one way because they like having the flexibility to
take jurisdiction in circumstances where they think it would be wise to do
so, and to decline it when they think it would not, and a "related to"
standard has more play in the joints than its "arise out of" alternative.
Whatever the reason, interpreting International Shoe as articulating two
479. See, e.g., Bird, 289 F.3d at 875 (stating that the nexus requirement "'does not
require that the cause of action formally "arise from" defendant's contacts with the forum;
rather, this criterion requires only "that the cause of action, of whatever type, have a
substantial connection with the defendant's in-state activities ..... (quoting Third Nat'l Bank
in Nashville v. WEDGE Group, Inc., 882 F.2d 1087, 1091 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting S. Mach.
Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 384 n.27 (1968)))); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v.
Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998) ("We must determine if the plaintiff . . .
would not have been injured 'but for' the defendant['s] . . . conduct directed toward
[plaintiff] in California"); Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1389 (1st Cir. 1995) ("[Tlhe
relatedness requirement is not met merely because a plaintiff's cause of action arose out of
the general relationship between the parties; rather, the action must directly arise out of
the specific contacts between the defendant and the forum state."); Adams v. Riverview
Healthcare Ass'n, No. A3-02-135, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4253, at *8-9 (D.N.D. Mar. 17,
2003) ("providing healthcare to patients in North Dakota [which did not] commence until
after [plaintiff's] termination" from defendant company was "not related to or connected
with [plaintiff's] cause of action" for wrongful termination); Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning
LLC, No. CIV.02-791 (PAM/RLE), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17516, at *3-4 (D. Minn. Sept.
4, 2002) (holding that claim for copyright infringement of test-preparation course
materials related to advertising and selling seats to test-preparation course in forum state,
even though course never given); Plant Mech. Servs., Inc. v. Drivecon Corp., No.
CIV.A.01-0993, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13671, at *11 (E.D. La. Aug. 23, 2001) (holding
that "place of contractual performance" is where claim for breach of contract arises); Lang
v. Capital Res. Inv., 102 S.W.3d 861, 866 (Tex. App. 2003) (concluding that a claim by
company investor against director and employee for breach of fiduciary duty in managing
company did not "arise from" and was not "directly related to" company's sales of
securities to forum residents); Magic House, 99 S.W.3d at 910 (stating that a cause of
action for fraudulent transfer of assets "has nothing to do with the quality of the
beverage[]" sales connecting defendant to the state); EMI Music, 97 S.W.3d at 859
(describing the "split in the federal circuit courts on the standard to be applied in
determining if a tort claim 'relates' to the defendant's contacts within a state[,]" and
adopting the "substantial connection" standard).
480. E.g., Carrot Bunch Co. v. Computer Friends, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 820, 824 (N.D.
Tex. 2002) ("[S]pecific jurisdiction... permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant only when the nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum
state arise from, or are directly related to, the cause of action." (citing Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984))).
481. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 n.10. If the Court thought nexus required only a
"related to" relationship between claim and contacts Helicopteros should have been
decided differently, the parties' error in not arguing the issue notwithstanding, and yet
there is no indication in the opinion that the Court was dissatisfied with the outcome.
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equally acceptable definitions of nexus is an implausible reading of the
case on both linguistic and policy grounds. Linguistically, if the Court
meant to require only a "related to" relationship between the
defendant's forum-contacts and the plaintiff's claim, there would have
been no need for it to use the expression "arise out of"-"arise out of" is
simply a lesser included category of "related to"-and presumably
everything said in the opinion was intended to be given effect.482 But
more importantly, requiring only "some significant relationship"
between the defendant's contacts and the plaintiff's claim undercuts the
defendant-veto policy that historically has been the animating force
behind the "minimum contacts" standard. It is much harder for a
defendant, particularly a corporate defendant of any size and with more
than one kind of product or service, to avoid contact of any kind with a
forum, than it is for it to avoid doing a particular kind of business there,
and yet under a "related to" conception of nexus only the first option is
available if the defendant wants to exercise its veto right. It almost
seems as if lower courts do not believe the Supreme Court when it
repeatedly reasserts the primacy of the defendant's right to control the
jurisdictional issue, or if they do believe the Court, they do not accept its
decision.4
Most lower courts also repeat the Court's post-International Shoe habit
of not using the term "minimum contacts" as a term of art, regularly
finding "minimum contacts" present (or absent), before completing their
484jurisdictional analysis. Such a conclusion would have been a
482. In a statutory context this admonition comes from what is commonly referred to
as the "Surplusage" canon. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 833 (3d ed. 2001) (illustrating "The Rule to Avoid
Surplusage"); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 266-68 (2000) (describing "The Rule Against Surplusage").
483. Combining an expansive definition of both nexus and general jurisdiction, many
lower courts treat specific jurisdiction as a doctrine for dealing with only single-contact
cases, and reserve general jurisdiction for cases involving multiple contacts of any
frequency and regularity. See, e.g., Brockman v. Kravic, 779 N.E.2d 1250, 1256-57 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2002) ("[Tlhe defendant's isolated contacts with a state that are not enough to
establish general personal jurisdiction may be sufficient to allow jurisdiction over any
incidents related to those contacts."). The effect of this decision is to move the
jurisdiction/no-jurisdiction line on the contacts spectrum (defined by no contacts at one
end and substantial contacts at the other), an order of magnitude in the direction of the
taking-jurisdiction end of the spectrum, and cause an exponential and unrecognized
expansion in the scope of the jurisdictional power of courts.
484. See, e.g., Interlease Aviation Investors II (ALOHA) L.L.C. v, Vanguard Airlines,
Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 898, 911 (N.D. I11. 2003) (finding that the defendants "have
established minimum contacts with Illinois" before considering the effect of the "fairness"
considerations); Adams, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4253, at *4-5 ("Even if the defendant has
purposefully established the necessary 'minimum contacts' within the forum state,
consideration of 'fair play and substantial justice' may nevertheless defeat the
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contradiction in terms under International Shoe's original formulation of
the due process standard, where "minimum contacts" was a synonym for
"constitutionally sufficient contacts" to take jurisdiction. Under
International Shoe, when a court had "minimum contacts" it had
jurisdiction at the same time, and not before. When modern courts
purport to weigh a defendant's "minimum contacts" against the
sovereignty, efficiency, and convenience factors in the second half of the
"minimum contacts" test, in fact they are weighing a defendant's
"purposeful contacts" against such factors.18 6 "Minimum contacts" exist
only after a court has found purposeful contacts not outweighed by
fairness considerations. 4 '87 The failure to use "minimum contacts" as a
term of art is as widespread a mistake as is the practice of mis-describing
the general jurisdiction and nexus standards in the fashion illustrated
above, perhaps even more widespread, but because it does not result in
as many strange outcomes its consequences are not as harmful. The
problem is more one of a lack of doctrinal integrity than ill-advised
results.
Lower court paraphrases of Burger King's two-part statement of the
''minimum contacts" standard also often undo the clear and logical
ordering that statement imposed upon what had become a pretty
confused doctrinal world. Now, there are dozens of idiosyncratic
formulations of the "minimum contacts" standard, all of which re-
arrange, subtract from, and add to the elements listed in Burger King,
mixing and matching considerations of contacts, sovereignty, efficiency,
and convenience in what often seems to be a random and haphazard
reasonableness of jurisdiction."); Carrot Bunch, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 824 (stating that two
conditions needed for personal jurisdiction are "minimum contacts" and "fair play and
substantial justice"); Bassett v. Sinterloy Corp., No. 01C3141, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15178, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2002) ("Because minimum contacts with Illinois have
been established, the court addresses whether exercising jurisdiction over [the defendant]
is reasonable and does not violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.");
Braley v. Sportec Prods. Co., No. CIV.A.01-333-JD, 2002 WL 1676293, at *5 (D.N.H. July
16, 2002) (finding that "[plaintiffs] have met their burden of showing that [defendant] has
sufficient minimum contacts with New Hampshire" before considering the
"reasonableness of jurisdiction"); Plant Mech. Servs., Inc. v. Drivecon Corp., No. CIV.A.
01-0993, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13671, at *4-5 (E.D. La. Aug. 23, 2001) ("The exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant satisfies due process when (1) the
defendant has . .. establish[ed] 'minimum contacts' with that state; and (2) exercising
personal jurisdiction over the defendant does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."' (citations omitted)); EMI Music, 97 S.W.3d at 855 ("Upon
finding that the nonresident defendant purposefully established minimum contacts with
the forum state, we must then determine if the exercise of in personam jurisdiction
comports with fair-play and substantial justice.").
485. See discussion supra note 69.
486. See discussion supra note 468.
487. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-78 (1985).
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manner. These modifications vary in their levels of error, of course.
Some are fundamentally mistaken, some are incomprehensible, and
some are just silly, but all of them create doctrinal nightmares for lawyers
charged with the task of arguing jurisdictional issues to courts bound not
only by what the Supreme Court has said on the subject, but by what
local circuit and appeals courts have said as well. When operative legal
standards compete in this way, court decisions become more difficult to
predict, the costs of legal argument increase, and client uncertainties
multiply. And the legal system as a whole, which at the best of times is a
difficult to understand regime of rules and policies, becomes truly
incomprehensible.
In the way that a half-inch misalignment of a golf grip can produce a
fifty-yard change in location down the fairway, lower courts running with
the Supreme Court's errors have produced extreme doctrinal
consequences from small, initial mistakes. And lawyers manipulating the
imprecision and confusion in the Court's varying formulations of the
doctrine have made jurisdictional arguments they must have known
made no sense (i.e., any reasonable person would have known they made
no sense),4 8 billed clients (who could not know any better) for making
488. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322-24 (9th Cir. 1998)
(describing seven-factor reasonableness test of Burger King); Waitt v. Speed Control, Inc.,
212 F. Supp. 2d 950, 956 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (describing five-factor test for "minimum
contacts" leaving out sovereignty and state interest considerations); Brockman v. Kravic,
779 N.E.2d 1250, 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
Factors to consider when evaluating the defendant's contacts with the forum
[are]: (1) whether the claim arises from the defendant's forum contacts; (2) the
overall contacts of the defendant or its agent with the forum state; (3) the
foreseeability of being haled into court in that state; (4) who initiated the
contacts; and (5) whether the defendant expected or encouraged contacts with
the state.
Id. Builder Mart of Am., Inc., v. First Union Corp., 563 S.E.2d 352, 355 (S.C. Ct. App.
2002) (describing personal jurisdiction as "subject to a two-step analysis: (1) the power
prong and (2) the fairness prong"); Ahadi v. Ahadi, 61 S.W.3d 714, 721 (Tex. App. 2001)
(requiring a fairness factors analysis in a general jurisdiction case).
489. See, e.g., Waitt, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 957 (arguing for general jurisdiction over third-
party defendant lawyer based on the lawyer's single trip to the forum); Litman v. Walt
Disney World Co., No. CIV.A.01-CV-3891, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5115, at *8-9 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 26, 2002) (arguing that Pennsylvania promotional activities of companies related to
defendant were a sufficient basis for Pennsylvania jurisdiction over a negligence claim
against an employee of the defendant for injuries caused in an automobile accident in
Florida); In re Williams, 264 B.R. 234, 241 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2001) (arguing for general
jurisdiction over defendants based on its "correspondence sent... via post and fax" to
plaintiff in forum); see also Hunter v. Mendoza, 197 F. Supp. 2d 964, 971 (N.D. Ohio 2002)
(arguing that the "exercise of personal jurisdiction . . . over one defendant . . .
automatically confer[s jurisdiction] over all defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367,
through supplemental jurisdiction"). This latter concept, commonly referred to as
"pendent personal jurisdiction," is popular among the circuits. See, e.g., Action
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these arguments, forced courts to waste valuable judicial time and
resources responding, and in the process reinforced the cynicism about
the nature and purposes of law and legal practice that is widespread
among lawyers, judges, and citizens generally.
If these and other such consequences are to be avoided, the Supreme
Court must begin to be more scrupulous about, and give more attention
to, the manner in which it defines the personal jurisdiction doctrine. It
must use doctrinal language more consistently, hold the meaning of
concepts constant over time, work with and refine received conceptual
frameworks rather than routinely jettison them for pride of authorship
reasons, describe prior cases accurately when relying on them as
precedent, clarify rather than repeat ambiguous or misleading principles,
and maintain doctrinal continuity by finding preferred formats (and
authors) for expressing the due process standard and staying with those
formats (and authors). The Court must also be willing to monitor and
revisit the doctrine on a regular basis to let lower courts know when they
have gone off track. A constitutional doctrine grounded in fair play and
substantial justice is not self-explanatory, or self-executing. In fact,
because it deals with matters of morality and politics in context-specific
fashion, it is more susceptible than most doctrines to changing views
about how it should be understood and expressed, and if it is to have a
consistent and coherent meaning over time the Court will need to attend
to it regularly. The present time is an instance in which some attention is
needed.
III. MINIMUM CONTACTS AND THE INTERNET: "Now THAT THE
AUTOMOBILE AND TELEPHONE HAVE GIVEN WAY TO THE INTERNET
SERVICE PROVIDER AND PEER-TO-PEER SHARING" 4"
A new and growing body of personal jurisdiction case law
characterized principally by Internet-based forum contacts (through
websites, chat rooms, newsgroups, and the like) does not fit easily into
Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 2004) (latest
court adopting the doctrine); United States v. Botefuhr, 309 F.3d 1263, 1273 (10th Cir.
2002) (noting that "every circuit court of appeals to address the question [has] upheld the
application of pendent personal jurisdiction"). The Supreme Court has yet to approve of
it.
490. Cf Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945).
[N]ow that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of
summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."
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the doctrinal categories inherited from the International Shoe-Burger
King line of decisions, and provides the Court with both a reason and an
491
opportunity to reconstitute the "minimum contacts" standard. In the
virtual world there are all kinds of nonstandard ways of "doing
business, ' 492 "producing tortious effects,, 493 and "exercising the privilege
of conducting activity" 94 in a state, as well as multiple notions of what it
means to put a product into a "stream of commerce," or "target" (or
"expressly aim at") an individual with defamatory or libelous
491. For some courts, Internet jurisdiction cases seem to present the prospect of a
"brave new world" into which only the most innovative and intrepid dare venture. See,
e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
("The Internet makes it possible to conduct business throughout the world entirely from a
desktop. With this global revolution looming on the horizon, the development of the law
concerning the permissible scope of personal jurisdiction based on Internet use is in its
infant stages."). The court in Zippo based this view on the well-known claim that "[a]s
technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between States, the need for
jurisdiction has undergone a similar increase." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958)). Strangely, it took this language from Hanson
rather than McGee, where the language first appeared. Hanson did not uphold
jurisdiction, and immediately following the above quotation it went on to say that
it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all
restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. Those restrictions are
more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They
are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251 (citation omitted). Apparently, the Zippo court was in a bind. It
preferred the sentiments of McGee, but the authority value of Hanson, and so it quoted
Hanson (selectively) quoting McGee.
492. See, e.g., Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 450 (3d Cir. 2003)
(noting a Spanish wcbsite not set up to process U.S. addresses); Graduate Mgmt.
Admissions Council v. Raju, 241 F. Supp. 2d 589, 591 (E.D. Va. 2003) (selling practice
questions for the Graduate Management Admissions Test through an India-based Internet
website, by having customers order the questions from an offshore email address provided
online, transfer payment to Western Union, and receive delivery at a requested address);
A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901-08 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(distributing file-sharing software via an Internet website that allows parties in different
states to log-on to the Napster system and share MP3 music files directly in a peer-to-peer
network with users in other states also logged on to the system); Euromarket Designs, Inc.
v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 2d 824, 829 (N.D. Il. 2000) (describing Irish retailer
with an interactive website stating "Goods Sold Only in the Republic of Ireland," but that
permitted purchaser to list U.S. address as a shipping and billing address).
493. See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 713 (4th
Cir. 2002) (discussing Internet service provider enabling website owner to post
photographs on the Internet allegedly in violation of photograph owner's copyright);
Panavision Int'l, 141 F.3d at 1321-22 (registering company trademarks as domain names as
part of a scheme to force the companies to purchase the domain names); Pavlovich v.
Superior Court, 58 P.3d 2, 10-13 (Cal. 2002) (posting source code for de-encryption
software on website accessible in the forum state); Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 530
(Minn. 2002) (describing libel during an online newsgroup conversation).
494. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
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comments. 9 5 And in cyberspace the relevant geographical boundaries,
both for commercial and non-commercial purposes, are as often those
between nation-states as those between states of the Union.496  While
aware of the problem, lower courts have not had much success in
adapting the "minimum contacts" standard to these different conditions
of the new electronic order.497 In fact, the dominant pattern in the case
law at the present time resembles the pattern dominant during the period
between Hanson and Woodson, when the Supreme Court approached
the subject of personal jurisdiction from one doctrinal perspective
(defendant-veto), and most lower federal and state courts approached it
from another (totality-of-the-circumstances). If the response in
Woodson is indicative of things to come, it should not be long before the
Court intervenes once again to re-impose doctrinal order and, if it
follows its past practice, construct a defendant-veto version of the
"minimum contacts" that takes into account the changed context of
cyberspace.
Whether it makes sense for the Court to reconstitute "minimum
contacts" in the same way it did in Woodson is not so clear, however,
since it is more difficult to give effective meaning to the idea of
defendant-veto in a virtual world than in a physical one. In the latter,
one had only to avoid making contracts, renting offices, hiring
employees, maintaining inventory, advertising, shipping dangerous
products, and other such activities in a forum state for jurisdiction not to
attach. Defendants controlled these choices since the technology used in
the pre-Internet world to extend one's reach into other states-the
telephone, automobile, railroad, airplane, and the like-could be pointed
in single directions, so to speak, and did not automatically go everywhere
495. See, e.g., Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the posting of a
news article on a journalism website as sufficient for jurisdiction); Pavlovich, 58 P.3d at 11-
13 (finding posting of source code for program to circumvent video encryption technology
on website not sufficient for jurisdiction); see also Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315
F.3d 256, 262-63 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding the posting of a general news story about Virginia
prison conditions on paper's website not sufficient for jurisdiction); Panavision Int'l, 141
F.3d at 1321-22 (registering plaintiff's trademarks as Internet domain names to extort
money not sufficient for jurisdiction); Medinah Mining, Inc. v. Amunategui, 237 F. Supp.
2d 1132, 1138 (D. Nev. 2002) (posting defamatory comments on ragingbull.com, an
interactive website reporting financial news and maintaining information on publicly
traded companies insufficient for jurisdiction); Pavlovich, 53 P.3d at 8 n.1.
496. See, e.g., Raju, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 597 (finding jurisdiction over a foreign national
with U.S. contacts enough to satisfy the Due Process Clause, even though foreign national
did not have sufficient contacts with any particular state).
497. Veronica M. Sanchez, Taking a Byte out of Minimum Contacts: A Reasonable
Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace Trademark Disputes, 46 UCLA L. REV.
1671, 1673-74 (1999).
[Vol. 54:53
20041 "Defendant Veto" or "Totality of the Circumstances"? 133
at the same time. 49' But the Internet is not organized geographically
along the lines of sovereign states, and it is easier to control the level of
access to it than the location from which such access is obtained. 499 The
policy of defendant-veto may be somewhat of an anachronism, therefore,
in a world where simultaneous connection with all parts of the globe,
known and unknown. intended and unintended, is almost instantaneous,
and the more flexible "totality-of-the-circumstances" standard might be
better adapted to determining when jurisdiction should attach. On the
other hand, an open-ended and discretionary jurisdictional standard like
"totality of the circumstances" lends itself to manipulation and abuse,
often becoming no more than the embodiment of an individual judge's
subjective notions of what it means to be fair and just, and if the Court
decides to modify the personal jurisdiction standard to accommodate the
Internet-contacts cases, it must do so in a manner that avoids this "rule-
of-law" criticism.
Lower federal and state courts have recognized the need for an
updated version of the "minimum contacts" standard for some time, and
a few have taken turns at trying to produce one, but the most popular
revision (by an overwhelming margin),5 the so-called sliding scale test
from Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.,°1 falls well short
of the standards for finished work. Zippo was a tort action based
principally on trademark infringement. 5 2  The case was brought in
Pennsylvania federal district court by the Zippo Manufacturing
Company (Zippo), a Pennsylvania-based maker of a well-known line of
tobacco lighters, against Zippo Dot Corn (Dot Com), a California-based
operator of an Internet news service. 0 3 Zippo objected to Dot Coin's use
of the term Zippo on its several domain names, its website, and in the
498. Note, No Bad Puns: A Different Approach to the Problem of Personal Jurisdiction
and the Internet, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1821, 1828 (2003).
499. But see Internet Jurisdiction Fears Affecting Global Business Strategy, Experts Say,
72 U.S.L.W. 2614, 2614 (April 13, 2004) [hereinafter Internet Jurisdiction Fears] (finding
that sixty-nine percent of North American respondents to a survey on the use of
technological tools to influence jurisdictional outcomes use techniques to block access to
users hailing from specific geographical locations).
500. For a sample of cases following Zippo, see ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service
Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707. 713 (4th Cir. 2002), Mink v. AAAA Development, LLC,
190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999), Carrot Bunch Co. v. Computer Friends, Inc., 218 F. Supp.
2d 820, 824-25 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
501. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
502. Id. at 1121. The plaintiff also pleaded dilution and false designation claims under
the Federal Trademark Act, and state claims under the Pennsylvania trademark act. See
id. at 1121.
503. Id. Subscribers to the news service were able to post and receive messages to and
from other subscribers through the various newsgroups made accessible on the company's
website. Id.
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headings of the messages posted to its various newsgroups'04 Dot Com
had 3,000 subscribers in Pennsylvania (out of 140,000 total subscribers),
and agreements with seven Pennsylvania Internet service providers to
provide these subscribers with access to its news services.50 ' Apart from
these contacts, however, it had no other connections with Pennsylvania.!"
Finding the "traditional framework 50 7  for analyzing personal
jurisdiction questions inadequate, the court concluded that the
availability of jurisdiction based exclusively on Internet contacts should
be "directly proportionate to the nature and quality of [the] commercial
activity that an entity conducts over the Internet."5°8  According to
Zippo, a defendant's forum contacts exist on a "sliding scale," or"4spectrum."'°9




507. The court's description of this framework was reasonably accurate. While it
made the familiar mistake of describing general jurisdiction in terms of "systematic and
continuous" contacts, id. at 1122 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 (1984)), its "three-pronged test" for specific jurisdiction tracked
familiar ground, see id. at 1122-23. Strangely though, it also seemed to imply that only
specific jurisdiction was part of the "minimum contacts" standard. See id. at 1122 ("In the
absence of general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction permits a court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant . . . where the 'relationship between the
defendant and the forum falls within the "minimum contacts" framework' of International
Shoe... and its progeny." (citation omitted)).
508. Id. at 1124. At first glance this might seem to be a form of International Shoe's
"nature, quality, and circumstances" test for evaluating single and isolated contacts giving
rise to the claim, see supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text, but the court in Zippo did
not use it this way, see Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
509. Use of the expression "sliding scale" in this context does not fit easily within
either the historical or contemporary meanings of the term. Typically, a sliding scale is a
"scale or standard ... which rises or falls in proportion to, or conversely to, the rise or fall
of some other standard." 15 THE OXFORD ENGLISHI DICTIONARY 702 (2d ed. 1998). In
other words, the expression describes the movement of one variable up or down on a scale
in relation to some other variable outside the scale. But in the Zippo court's use of the
term, the relevant "other" variable (defendant contacts with a state) is the same as the
variable represented on the scale. There is only one variable involved, in other words, and
that is the extent of the defendant's connection with the state. In reality then, the Zippo
court created a "level of interactivity," or "spectrum" test, more than a "sliding scale" test,
but given the open-endedness and lack of algorithm in such a standard, it probably is more
accurate to say that it simply came up with a new paraphrase of the "totality of the
circumstances" test. Looked at in this way, however, the "sliding scale" test is just another
in a long line of devices used surreptitiously by courts to subvert the defendant veto view
of personal jurisdiction under the guise of enforcing it. (That the court would use the test
in a tort action, where a defendant's level of commercial activity in the state would seem
to be beside the point, is more evidence of that fact.) There is nothing new in a "sliding
scale" test, therefore, just as there is nothing new in Internet-based, "doing-business"
contacts with a forum. Commercial dealing over the Internet is not different in any
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At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant
clearly does business over the Internet. [Here] personal
jurisdiction is proper. At the opposite end are situations where
a defendant has simply posted information on [a passive]
Internet Web site[, and here there are] not grounds for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction.10
In the all-important middle category, "where a user [is able to]
exchange information [(i.e., 'interact')] with [a] host computer[,] the
exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that
occurs on the Web site." '  If the interactivity is great enough,
jurisdiction attaches. 5 2 Applying this, in effect, "level of commercial
activity"'51 3 test to the facts before it, the court concluded that "Dot Coin
[did] more than create an interactive Web site through which it
exchang[ed] information with Pennsylvania residents . . . [Instead it]
conduct[ed] ... electronic commerce with Pennsylvania residents [so as
to] constitute[] the purposeful availment of doing business in
Pennsylvania," and thus was subject to jurisdiction in the State.1
significant respect from telemarketing generally, and it does not require a new form of the
minimum contacts standard anymore than did telemarketing. Internet contacts are
sometimes different in certain specialized kinds of tort claims, however, particularly those
based on what used to be called "random, fortuitous, or isolated" forum contacts, Keeton
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984), but what now might be better
described as "impulsive, impetuous, and spontaneous" forum contacts. Whether the latter
are the legitimate offspring of the former, and if so, whether they should be treated in the
same way, are difficult questions that the Zippo court does not take up.
510. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (citation omitted). The court is not always
consistent in its usage of scale or spectrum. Id.
511. Id. The court's three categories reduce to its final one, of course, since "doing
business" and "posting information" are just different "levels of interactivity."
512. Id. at 1124-25.
513. This paraphrase combines the two distinct features of the court's statement of the
standard, "interactivity" and "commercial nature of the exchange." Id. at 1124.
514. Id. at 1125-26. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the extent to which the concept is
not understood, some courts even find that an interactive website is sufficient in itself to
support general jurisdiction. See, e.g., Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072,
1078-82 (9th Cir. 2003) vacated reh'g granted en banc, 366 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2004);
Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2002). But see Revell
v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that the maintenance of a website is
"not in any way 'substantial"' contact and cannot support general jurisdiction); Bird v.
Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 873-74 (6th Cir. 2002). Taken literally, the Arneritrade rule would
permit a plaintiff to bring any kind of claim against a party in a state in which that party
has an accessible interactive website, even if the claim has no connection with the state or
the website. Since websites are usually accessible everywhere, this means that a defendant
with an interactive website could be sued on anything, everywhere. In the brave new
world of cyberspace, so it seems, personal jurisdiction knows no bounds. For a rejection of
the "jurisdiction everywhere" argument, see Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 2, 8 (Cal.
2002).
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There is an immediate problem with this analysis if one thinks of it in
traditional "minimum contacts" terms. Zippo argued for specific
jurisdiction over Dot Corn, conceding that general jurisdiction was not
available. 15 Consequently, the court had to determine whether Zippo's
claims arose from Dot Com's Pennsylvania Internet contacts.516 Such a
nexus relationship, one will recall, is the defining feature of specific
jurisdiction. 7  Zippo sued Dot Corn for trademark infringement,
however, a tort, and not for breach of a commercial agreement. 518 Zippo
was not a Dot Corn subscriber and it did not have any other contractual
relationships with the company.519 Given this, the court's use of what, in
effect, was a "doing business" standard (i.e., "the level of commercial
activity conducted over the Internet") for determining the availability of
jurisdiction was confusing9 An "effects plus" test, the standard for
multi-state torts, would have been a more understandable choice. The
court should have asked whether Dot Com's Internet activity produced a
tortious effect in Pennsylvania, and whether the company's business
activities as a whole satisfied any of the so-called plus factors"' designed
to insure that taking jurisdiction would be fair.
The court's conclusion, stated later in the opinion, "that [Zippo's]
cause of action [arose] out of Dot Com's forum-related conduct
[because] 'a cause of action for trademark infringement occurs where the
passing off [of the trademark] occurs,'"" serves to underscore this point.
It was Dot Corn's "passing off" of the Zippo trade name on its website
that gave rise to the plaintiff's claim, not its commercial activity in the
State, and this "passing off" occurred whenever Dot Coin used the Zippo
name.523 The level of the company's commercial activity in Pennsylvania
was relevant only for the purpose of establishing the existence of such
"passing off. '5 2 4 If Dot Com used the Zippo name to solicit business in
the State but was unsuccessful, for example, the "passing off" standard
515. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1122-23 ("[Zippo] Manufacturing does not contend that we
should exercise general personal jurisdiction over Dot Com.").
516. Id.
517. See supra notes 37-38.
518. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1121.
519. Id.
520. Zippo had to show that Dot Corn did business using the Zippo name to establish
infringement, but not that it did business with Zippo. See id. at 1124 25.
521. For an illustration of such "plus" factors, see supra note 263 and accompanying
text.
522. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1127 (quoting Cottman Transmission Sys., Inc. v. Martino,
36 F.3d 291, 294 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Tefal, S.A. v. Products Int'l Co., 529 F.2d 495, 496
n.1 (3d Cir. 1976))).
523. Id. at 1121-22.
524. Id. at 1125-26.
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still would have been met. The court's mistake here, that of mixing and
matching tort and contract-based formulations of the "minimum
contacts" standard, is not a new one, of course, but it is a particularly
troublesome one in an Internet jurisdiction case because Internet cases
are where most of the difficult issues of this sort arise, and where the
greatest doctrinal clarity is needed.
A more serious but equally familiar problem with the Zippo "sliding
scale" test is its susceptibility, in the hands of a willful judge, to being
turned into a kind of all-purpose balancing test. Its open-ended and
flexible terms permit a judge to take all types of factors into account in
ruling on a jurisdictional question, and to weigh and compare those
factors in whatever fashion the judge thinks appropriate, without
necessarily having to rank the factors or make any one of them (e.g., the
purposefulness of the defendant's forum contacts) first among equals.525
When used in this fashion, the Zippo standard does little more than
reinstate the discredited totality-of-the-circumstances policy of McGee
under the guise of a "sliding scale" algorithm, the same policy the
Supreme Court rejected in Hanson, Woodson, Kulko, and the rest of its
modern personal jurisdiction case law. In fact, if the Court has made one
thing clear in the last twenty-five years, it is that a defendant can avoid
the extra-territorial jurisdictional reach of a state by avoiding purposeful
contacts with it.126 A sliding scale test permits, and may even encourage,
a retreat from that commitment.
527This does not mean that the Zippo standard is useless. It works
perfectly well for Internet cases raising claims in the nature of a breach of
contract. In such cases, the jurisdictional question will usually turn on
how the defendant configures its website, both in the kind of information
it makes available on the site and the extent of the interaction it makes
permissible for customers. When customers can do everything on a
website they can do in a store, a defendant's forum contacts are
"virtually" indistinguishable from the contacts created by establishing a
525. See TiTi Nguyen, A Survey of Personal Jurisdiction Based on Internet Activity: A
Return to Tradition, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 527-30 (2004).
526. E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1980).
527. Not everyone feels this way. See Patrick J. Borchers, Internet Libel: The
Consequences of a Non-rule Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 473,
478-81 (2004) (arguing that we should forget about Zippo). Much of the time the question
of Zippo's influence will be moot, since the issue of jurisdiction will be controlled by a
forum selection clause in the parties' agreement. There is no necessary incompatibility
between the "sliding scale" test and such a clause. See, e.g., Decker v. Circus Circus Hotel,
49 F. Supp. 2d 743, 748 (D.N.J. 1999) (accepting Zippo test but enforcing forum selection
clause).
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store in the state and transacting business in person.52 If a defendant
does not want this kind of contact with a particular state, it has only to
make its website inaccessible to customers in that state.12' For claims
based on economic transactions, therefore, questions about cyberspace
jurisdiction are not essentially different from the questions considered in
International Shoe, and it follows that they can be resolved by using
International Shoe type standards. For certain kinds of tort actions,
however, where the focus is on the "effects" a defendant produces in the
forum, the issues are not as simple. It is relatively easier to libel someone
inadvertently or fortuitously over the Internet, for example, impulsively,
on the spur of the moment, usually in reaction to another's comments,
with consequences everywhere,53° than it is in a world where one must
first think about the libel, "write it up" in a magazine article or
newspaper story, and then get it published, and inadvertent and
fortuitous forum contacts have never been enough to support long-arm
jurisdiction.13 1  If the Calder concepts of "effects-plus," "target," and
"expressly aim" are to be used to resolve questions of Internet-based
long-arm jurisdiction, therefore, as it seems they must, 32 they will need• • • 533
some modification.
528. But see Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452-54 (3d Cir. 2003)
(requiring "something more" than a fully interactive website to sustain jurisdiction).
529. This is becoming increasingly easier to do. See Internet Jurisdiction Fears, supra
note 499 (describing "jurisdiction avoidance mechanisms ... to pinpoint the geographic
location of specific users and block access by users hailing from that jurisdiction").
530. Typically by bad-mouthing the person during an argument in a chat room or
newsgroup. When argument fails, epithet is often there to take up the cause.
531. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-99
(1980). Another way to think of this is to see the Internet as eliminating International
Shoe's category of "single and isolated" contacts. No matter how limited the action of a
defendant, if that action is taken on the Internet there is little possibility of being
connected to only one jurisdiction, or for only a single instance.
532. Calder is the key case for long-arm libel jurisdiction, since it is the only Supreme
Court libel case to rely on a tort based formulation of the "minimum contacts" standard.
See Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Minn. 2002). Keeton also involved a libel claim,
but the Court analyzed the jurisdictional issue on a "doing business" standard for the New
Hampshire claim, and a substantive law policy (the "single publication rule") for the
claims arising in the forty-nine other states. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770, 773-74 (1984).
533. Many courts have had a go at this task. See, e.g., Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467,
470-72 (5th Cir. 2002); Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 262-63 (4th Cir.
2002); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002);
Medinah Mining, Inc. v. Amunategui, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1137-38 (D. Nev. 2002);
Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 533-35. For an excellent summary and discussion of the case law in
Internet libel jurisdiction, see Borchers, supra note 527, at 481-89.
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Whether every impulsive chat room comment 3 4 should subject a
speaker to litigation in a distant forum raises different concerns than the
question of whether Larry Flynt should be required to travel to New
Hampshire to defend his well-considered caricature of Kathy Keeton
distributed in 10,000 copies of the March issue of Hustler Magazine,535 or
whether a writer and editor of The National Enquirer should be required
to travel to California to defend their conscious trashing of Shirley Jones
in 600,000 copies of one week's edition of the paper.s 6 Flynt and the
Enquirer writers thought about their comments over an extended period
of time, knew the risks involved in publishing them,38 and were capable
of defending themselves (with the help of company lawyers), in the New
Hampshire and California forums. But the same will not always be true
for every impetuous chat room flame thrower.
Consider the case of Marianne Luban.539 In an extended exchange in
an Internet news group,5 4 Marianne Luban told Katherine Griffis, an
adjunct professor in the University of Alabama at Birmingham's
Department of Special Studies, that she (Griffis) got her degree "from a
'box of Cracker Jacks,"' and otherwise criticized her credentials and
reputation as an Egyptologist1 41 Griffis and Luban traded comments for
about six months, until Griffis's attorney sent a letter to Luban
demanding that she retract her statements and refrain from attacking
Griffis's character and professional reputation in the future.142  The
attorney threatened legal action if Luban failed to do this. 43 Luban may
or may not have stopped criticizing Griffis (the evidence was mixed), but
several months later Griffis filed a defamation action against Luban in
534. Or even an essentially local newspaper story, posted on the paper's website,
which allegedly libels someone from another state in passing, and then is read by that
person in his home state. See Young, 315 F.3d at 258, 260 (describing a story about
Connecticut policy of subcontracting incarceration of Connecticut state prison inmates to
Virginia prison system that describes Virginia prison warden in an unfavorable light).
535. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 772 (1984).
536. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 785 (1984).
537. Even more, they worked diligently at researching the article in question, and at
expressing their comments in the most persuasive form they could devise.
538. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90; Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781.
539. Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002).
540. The group was sci.archeology. Id. at 530.
541. Id. Griffis taught noncredit courses in ancient Egyptian history and culture at the
university and had her own consulting business. Id. Luban also asserted "that Griffis
obtained membership in the International Association of Egyptologists and inclusion on
other lists of Egyptologists by misrepresenting her qualifications, that [she] was a liar, was
not affiliated with the University of Alabama, did not have a juris doctor degree, and that
[her] consulting business was not legitimate." Id.
542. Id.
543. Id.
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Alabama state court.5"4 Luban, a Minnesota resident, failed to appear to
defend,545 and the Alabama court entered a default judgment against
her.546
When Griffis tried to enforce the judgment in Minnesota, however, the
Minnesota Supreme Court refused to give it full faith and credit. 7
Viewing the issue as controlled by Calder, the court held that Alabama
lacked personal jurisdiction over Luban.548 Acknowledging that there
was a dispute among the circuits over the meaning of Calder,149 the
Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the Third Circuit's paraphrase of the
Calder standard as articulated in its Imo Industries decision.5 0 According
to Imo Industries, Calder
requires the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant committed
an intentional tort: (2) the plaintiff felt the brunt of the harm...
in the forum . . . ; and (3) the defendant expressly aimed the
544. Id. Griffis alleged that Luban continued to post comments, but the record before
the court did not include any such statements after the date of the attorney letter. Id.
545. Id. She did this on the advice of her lawyer. See id.
546. Id. The court also ordered Luban to pay Griffis $25,000 in damages. Id.
547. Id. at 537. The actual procedure involved was more complicated- Luban filed a
motion to vacate the Alabama judgment, the Minnesota trial court concluded that
Alabama had personal jurisdiction over Luban, denied Luban's motion, and then ordered
entry of the judgment against Luban. Id. at 530-31. On appeal, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals vacated the trial court's order. Id. at 531. Luban renewed her motion to vacate
the Alabama judgment, the trial court once again found that Alabama had jurisdiction
over Luban, and entered judgment against Luban. Id. This time the Minnesota Court of
Appeals affirmed. Id. Then the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 537.
548. Id. at 534, 536-37.
549. Id. at 533-34. The Seventh Circuit interpreted Calder to announce a broad
"effects test," permitting tort victims to sue in any state in which they suffered the effects
of an injury. Id. at 533. The Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits adopted a narrower
interpretation, holding that Calder required "something more" than "mere effects" for
jurisdiction to attach. Id. For example, the Ninth Circuit found that "express[ly] aiming"
tortious conduct at a party in the forum satisfied the "something more" requirement.
Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). The
Ninth Circuit defined the concept of "expressly aiming" in terms of "targeting," thereby
clarifying one vague term in terms of another. Id. Calder did the same thing. See Calder
v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) (explaining that "petitioners are not charged with mere
untargeted negligence"). For another excellent summary of the split among the circuits,
see Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 2, 7-9 (Cal. 2002).
550. See Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 534 (quoting Imo Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d
254, 266 (3d Cir. 1998)). One might legitimately wonder about the extent to which there
are any real differences of substance among the various circuits' tests. Since a party
intends the natural and logical consequences of his acts one might ask how producing a
foreseeable, tortious harm to someone in a state is a qualitatively different type of
intentional act than "expressly aiming" harm at that same person; and yet the second
activity supports jurisdiction and the first does not.
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tortious conduct at the forum such that the forum state was the
focal point of the tortious activity.55" '
Applying this standard, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that
while "Luban's statements were intentionally directed at Griffis" in
Alabama, they were not "expressly aimed" at the State, 5 ' and thus did
not support jurisdiction.5 This seems a strange, perhaps contradictory,
conclusion-how does one aim at a person in a state without aiming at
the state55 4-but the strangeness is not in the Minnesota Supreme Court's
choice of Calder terminology. Calder used the concept of "expressly
aim[]" 555 to describe a type of behavior that could provide an extra
measure of purposefulness sufficient to establish jurisdiction over an out-
of-state defendant in a multi-state defamation action when the defendant
had no contact with the state other than the defamatory comments.556
The difficulty with the Minnesota Supreme Court's paraphrase of Calder,
and with all opinions using this Calder language, is in knowing what it
means to "expressly aim at" (or "target") a defendant or a state. The
concept is not self-explanatory, and while Griffis provides one of the best
attempts to parse the term, in the end it comes up short .
The Minnesota Supreme Court seemed to interpret the expression as
primarily a substantive concept, concerned with the content of what is
said rather than where it is said, or perhaps even where it has its principal
551. Id.
552. Id. at 535.
553. Id. at 536.
554. See Borchers, supra note 527, at 487-88 ("It is hard to see how [Luban's]
statements could be more clearly 'aimed' at [the state of Alabama] ....").
555. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984). It also described the concept as
"targeting." Id. ("[P]etitioners are not charged with mere untargeted negligence.").
556. Id. at 786, 789-90.
557. It also is hard to know whether it is the defendant or the state (or both) that must
be targeted. It would seem that the object of the libel also would have to be the target of
the tortious conduct for jurisdictional purposes, but the Griffis court's view on this issue is
not that clear.
558. There are several recent Internet and newspaper libel cases adopting Calder's
"targeting" standard, and one could use any of them as a basis for the discussion in this
section. See, e.g., Rcvell Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 473, 476 (5th Cir. 2002); Young v. New
Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 262-63 (4th Cir. 2002). Each has distinctive attributes that
permit discussion of issues not raised by Griffis, and distinctive weaknesses that illustrate
other difficulties with the concept of targeting. I use Griffis because it contains one of the
best descriptions of the circuit split over the meaning of Calder, and the most fully
developed description of what one might call the "geographical" conception of targeting,
what the California federal district court refers to as "geo-targeting," Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2003), a
conception that is rapidly becoming the most popular one, see, e.g., Revell, 317 F.3d at 475;
Young, 315 F.3d at 262-63; Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 258-59 (3d Cir. 2001);
Reynolds v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1119-20 (6th Cir. 1994).
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effect, though the court's view on this latter point is less clear.559 Building
on language in Woodson (and also Burger King and Asahi, though the
court did not cite to these cases), the court concluded that Luban had to
do more than "know" that Griffis was a resident of Alabama, or
"foresee" that she would feel the effects of the tortious comments there,
for the comments to be expressly aimed at the State.56 "[T]he Supreme
Court," it said, "did not 'carve out a special intentional torts exception to
the traditional specific jurisdiction analysis, so that a plaintiff could
always sue in his or her home state. ' '' 6' But then, curiously, since it
seems to describe a "foreseeable effects" test of the sort just explicitly
rejected, the court characterized the critical question in the case as
whether Alabama was the "focal point" of Luban's tortious activity."'
Part of the answer, it said, depended upon the content of Luban's
remarks, and another part depended upon whether the effects of those
remarks were felt principally in Alabama. 63 It was significant, said the
court, that "[tIhe newsgroup on which Luban posted her statements was
organized around the subjects of archeology and Egyptology, not
Alabama or the University of Alabama academic community," and that
there was no "unique relationship" between these two academic fields
and the State. 564 Had Luban disparaged Griffis in Alabama argot, so it
seems, or in terms of her Alabama behavior, the outcome might have
been different. 65  It also was important, according to the court, that
559. See, e.g., Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 535-36 (Minn. 2002).
560. See id. at 532, 536-37.
561. Id. at 535 (quoting Imo Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265 (3d Cir.
1998)).
562. Id.
563. Id. at 534.
564. Id. at 535-36. Contra Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 2, 12 (Cal. 2002)
(refusing to adopt an expansive interpretation of the effects test that would find
jurisdiction just because the industry affected by defendant's tortious conduct is centered
in the forum state).
565. In applying this concept of "geo-targeting," the court pointed out that Luban
posted "only two messages ... on the sci.archeology newsgroup . . . that identif[ied] the
Alabama forum in any way." Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 535 n.3. In one posting she said "that
Griffis was 'from the great state of Alabama,"' and in the other she asked about the
"special studies" program at the University of Alabama. Id. Taking the concept of geo-
targeting to new distances, the Ninth Circuit has held that an act in one state, directed at a
second state, can be considered "expressly aimed" at yet a third state if the plaintiff lives
there. See Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir.
2000) (drafting and mailing letter from Georgia to official domain name register in
Virginia, challenging plaintiff's use of www.masters.com domain name, held to be
expressly aimed at California because plaintiff lived there). But see Schwarzenegger v.
Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2004) (placing ad containing likeness of
plaintiff in Ohio newspaper without plaintiff's permission held to be expressly aimed at
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Griffis did "not present[] evidence that any other person in Alabama
read [Luban's] statements," and that "readers most likely [were] spread
all around the country-maybe even around the world-and not
necessarily in the Alabama forum."'5 6 This combination of factors-that
Luban's comments were not about Alabama and that they were not read
by Alabamians-proved that the State was not the "focal point" of the
defamation, at least as the court saw it, and this, in turn, meant that
Luban had not "targeted" Griffis in the State .
The court's waffling on the question of whether tortious effects, by
themselves, can establish jurisdiction (i.e., rejecting an "effects" test in
principle but applying a version of it in practice) illustrates the difficulty
of giving precise meaning to the concept of targeting, and it also shows
how that standard does not do much to constrain a court that has made
up its mind about whether jurisdiction is available. Moreover, the court's
failure to explain why defamatory comments that mention, or are about,
the forum state should count for more jurisdictionally than comments
that defame the plaintiff in more generic terms, only adds to the
confusion. Defamatory comments destroy a person's reputation whether
they mention the forum state or not, and whether residents of that state
read them or not. The "focal point" of a defamation is usually where the
defamed person has the most highly developed reputation (because that
is where there is the greatest potential for reputational harm to be done),
and typically that is the person's home state. A test which focuses on the
content of the defamation confuses a substantive law concern with a
jurisdictional one. Jurisdiction is about contacts with a forum, not
Ohio rather than California, even though plaintiff lived in California, because purpose of
ad was to convince Ohio readers to lease automobiles from defendant).
566. Id. at 536. Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 473 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that it is an
"insurmountable hurdle[] to the exercise of personal jurisdiction [that] the article written
by Lidov about Revell contains no reference to Texas, nor does it refer to the Texas
activities of Revell, and it was not directed at Texas readers as distinguished from readers
in other states"); Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 263 (4th Cir. 2002)
(stating that in order to determine whether the defendant newspapers "manifest an intent
to target and focus on Virginia readers[, a court must] turn to the pages from the
newspapers' websites ... and . . . examine their general thrust and content [to see if they
are] aimed at a Virginia audience"); Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 258 (3d Cir. 2001)
(stating that the allegations that the defamatory comments had been distributed
throughout the "boxing community" were insufficient because there was no assertion that
Pennsylvania had a "unique relationship with the boxing industry"); Reynolds v. Int'l
Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1120 (6th Cir. 1994) ("[Tihe [allegedly defamatory]
press release [dealt with the plaintiff's] activities in Monaco, not Ohio."); Novak v. Benn,
No. 2020466, 2020848, 2004 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 249, at *12 (Ala. Civ. App. Apr. 2,
2004) (posting of a single comment on an Internet forum for people interested in pet fish
and that is accessible in Alabama is not "'an action ...purposefully directed toward'
Alabama").
567. See Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 535-36.
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comments about it, and comments do not have a greater connection with
a forum simply because they mention or discuss it (or fail to). Such
comments may be of greater interest to forum residents, but this is
relevant to determining the nature and extent of the harm done rather
than the degree of connection between the forum and the comments.68
The problem becomes more complicated if one changes the facts in
Griffis to make the exchange a little more spontaneous and a little more
Alabama-specific. Suppose Luban disparaged Griffis in the same
sci. archeology newsgroup, but this time did so impulsively, on the spur of
the moment, in the exaggerated language of someone who is angry at, or
frustrated by, the way the conversation is going. And suppose that she
also disparaged the State of Alabama at the same time by adding that
"all of Alabama and its rinky-dink University come from the same
Cracker Jacks box as your degree" (and hyperbolic variations thereon).
Suppose she said this just once, felt sorry for it almost instantly, and
apologized in a day or two after the tone of the conversation had calmed
down. Her comments were not carefully planned, she did not deliberate
about or edit them until they expressed her opinion in its most powerful
form, and she did not search carefully for the best publisher. But
suppose also that the comments were circulated widely among the faculty
and staff (i.e., Griffis's peers, friends, and colleagues) of the university in
the perversely curious way that such comments tend to be. If the
Minnesota Supreme Court's (and the Third Circuit's) conception of
targeting is to be followed, and it is the most popular view, 69 Luban
would then seem to have to answer to a defamation action in Alabama
even though, in many ways, what she did had less connection with the
State than her comments in the actual case.
If targeting requires a kind of "geographical marker" in a defendant's
defamatory comments, as Griffis seems to say it does, it is difficult to
understand how this feature satisfies Calder's "super-purposefulness"
requirement. A geographical reference does not invariably evidence a
willful or malicious state of mind, or give comments a greater presence or
accessibility in a forum than they would have had without such a
reference. The idea of "forum contact" has always been used to describe
568. Limiting the conception of targeting to comments that are about both the forum
and the plaintiff also restricts jurisdiction to states likely to have the greatest sympathy for
the plaintiff and greatest antipathy for the defendant, or in other words, states in which the
plaintiff has the best chance of winning on its claim. But this conception of targeting
reinstates a version of the "plaintiff always gets to sue at home" view the Griffis court said
the Supreme Court had rejected. Id. at 535. Here, the Court seems to have looped back
on and contradicted itself.
569. See Revell, 317 F.3d at 473; Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, LLC, 397 F.
Supp. 2d 1154, 1167 (W.D. Wis. 2004); Levin v. Harned, 304 F. Supp. 2d 136, 142 (D. Mass.
2003).
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some sort of link to a state, either the carrying out of an activity, or the
production of an effect, in it, and yet a defamatory comment that harms a
state resident's reputation has the same degree of connection with, or
effect in, the state whether it refers to the state or not. The content of a
comment adds nothing to its degree of forum accessibility or
connectedness. On a "geographical" conception of targeting, however, a
reference to the state is taken to change the "connecting" nature of the
comment altogether. One could legitimately wonder what such a
conception has to do with "fair play and substantial justice. 5 70 It seems
accurate to say, then, that the idea of targeting as a jurisdictional
standard remains an elusive concept at best and is in need of
considerable development 57 ' before it can serve as a workable modern
embodiment of the idea of "minimum contacts.",1
72
570. The geo-targeting concept is well-intended. Some limitation on the idea of
tortious forum effects is needed if inadvertent chat room comments are not, by
themselves, to establish jurisdiction wherever they are read, and if they are, this would
introduce a form of the "jurisdiction everywhere" problem. See supra note 514. But it will
take more than good intentions to satisfy the Due Process Clause.
571. Some of this will involve explaining the role of Burger King's "fairness factors" in
the targeting standard. Targeting is mostly a test for measuring the level of purposefulness
of a defendant's contacts with a forum, but purposeful contacts are just one part of the
"minimum contacts" standard. See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
291-92 (1980). Contacts must be "considered in light of" the institutional and systemic
concerns that make up the "fairness factors" part of the test before one can say whether
jurisdiction exists. Id. at 292. Calder does not discuss these factors to any great extent, but
libel litigation may be an area of law in which fairness factors will play a
disproportionately large rolc.
572. One could argue the opposite, that a "geo-targeting" test, applied literally,
provides a defendant with the greatest possible control over the issue of jurisdiction-
since a sufficiently clever defendant should have no difficulty expressing defamatory
comments in a geographically acontextual manner-and as such, is the strongest modern
embodiment of the defendant veto view of "minimum contacts." But this does not settle
the question of whether the defendant veto view should any longer be taken as valid. As
the modern world becomes ever more communitarian, the relevant social unit for legal
regulatory (including jurisdictional) purposes seems increasingly to be the group as much
as the individual. Think of the plaintiffs in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S.
585 (1991), for example, who were held to have agreed to a forum selection clause they
neither knew about, read, nor understood, simply because the clause was fair in the
aggregate to all of the parties and institutions involved in the dispute, as well as to
consumers generally. See id. at 590.
[A] . .. forum clause in a form contract ... well may be permissible [because] a
cruise line has a special interest in limiting the fora in which it potentially could
be subject to suit. [The] clause . . . dispel[s] any confusion about where suits
arising from the contract must be brought and defended, sparing litigants the
time and expense of pretrial motions to determine the correct forum and
conserving judicial resources that otherwise would be devoted to deciding those
motions .... Passengers... benefit in the form of reduced fares.
Id. at 593-94 (citation omitted). The due process right to fair (jurisdictional) treatment
may slowly be becoming a collective right, in other words, as much as an individual one.
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The confusions and contradictions evident in the "sliding scale" and
"targeting" standards of Zippo and Griffis are symptomatic of the state
173
of affairs in modern personal jurisdiction case law. These two tests are
the most popular reformulations of International Shoe's original
"minimum contacts" standard for contract and tort based claims
respectively, and yet each lacks the coherence and clarity one has a right
to expect from a due process standard. Neither concept is very well-
defined, neither is intuitive or possessed of clear heuristic value, and both
can be used to justify different and sometimes even opposite results on
the same facts. Moreover, neither has any explicit linguistic connection
Perhaps the old New Yorker cartoon of a parent explaining to a child that a multi-person
statute illustrates that "there are no great men anymore, only great committees," has
finally come true. See generally Donald G. Gifford, The Assault upon the Citadel of
Individual Causation (Aug. 16, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author)
(describing trend in common law tort doctrine toward defining causality in terms of
collective plaintiffs and collective defendants); Charles A. Sullivan, The Under-theorized
Asterisk* Footnote 17-18 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (describing
"explosion" of communal work in law and other areas of the academy).
If so, this change is not necessarily all for the good. If individual defendants no longer
have veto power over extra-territorial jurisdiction, states will be on an equal footing to
compete for litigation, and this is likely to result in an unseemly race to the blandishment
bottom. The absence of individualist based obstacles to jurisdiction will permit courts
everywhere to emulate courts in Harris County, Texas; Cook County, Illinois; Dade
County, Florida; and others (the names change on a daily basis), in promising the "largest
damage awards," and the "greatest likelihood of plaintiff success on the merits." See
Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Trial Outcomes and Demographics: Is There a
Bronx Effect?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1851-54, 1865-70 (2002) (study of the correlation
between population demographics and jury verdicts); Erik K. Moller et al., Punitive
Damages in Financial Injury Verdicts, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 332-34 (1999) (describing
the differences in punitive damages awarded by courts in California; Cook County,
Illinois; metropolitan St. Louis; Harris County, Texas; and New York State); Edward A.
Purcell, Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-Selection Clauses, and
the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423, 445-49 (1992) (describing the impact of
geography on claim disputes); Laurie P. Cohen, Southern Exposure: Lawyer Gets Investors
To Sue GE, Prudential in Poor Border Town, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1994, at Al
(describing why Eagle Pass, Texas, "may be the most pro-plaintiff county in America").
Litigation will become more geographically concentrated as some states win in this race
for the most plaintiff-friendly reputation and others lose, and the effect on litigants will be
equally uneven. Both individual and corporate parties will become more vulnerable to
extra-territorial jurisdiction, of course, since both individuals and corporations can be
defendants as easily as plaintiffs, but overall, corporations will be better able than
individuals to turn the uncertainties and expenses of these new conditions to their benefit.
In a world where individual interests can be outweighed by collective ones, bigger fish cut
a wider swath.
573. Courts also have had difficulty adjusting the concept of "minimum contacts" to
developments in Internet technology. The best example is the California federal district
court's discussion of the application of the standard to peer-to-peer networking in the
Grokster MP3 file sharing case. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
243 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1088-95 (C.D. Cal. 2003), where the court's discussion of the
standard reads like a compendium of every formulation ever used.
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with the original language and policies of the personal jurisdiction
doctrine, and each permits lower federal and state courts to turn
jurisdictional analysis into a free-wheeling, black-box process in which
whatever particular judges happen to think is correct becomes the
operational standard. "Sliding scale" and "targeting" reduce the
complex conceptual and political legacy of several generations of
personal jurisdiction doctrine to amorphous, nondescriptive aphorisms,
and move the analysis of jurisdictional questions away from the realm of
fair play and substantial justice to the realm of idiosyncratic private
judicial vision. It is not an overstatement to say that the cacophony
which surrounds the personal jurisdiction doctrine is now out of control.
The doctrine has come so far, so to speak, that it has seemingly
disconnected from itself, or like a very confused snake, has begun to
swallow its own tail. Only the Supreme Court can hope to prevent it
from self-destructing, and it should.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since the middle of the last century the Supreme Court has made a
major refinement of the "minimum contacts" standard about once every
twenty years, usually in response to widespread lower court confusion
and disagreement over what the standard has come to mean. It has been
twenty years since the decision in Burger King, the last of the Court's
major personal jurisdiction decisions,574 and confusion and disagreement
are the order of the day. Examples are not hard to come by. General
jurisdiction has become a crazy-quilt pattern of jurisdictional policies and
standards that no longer resembles its historical antecedents or has any
unifying principle, consistency, or predictive capability. It is perhaps as
confusing a concept as any in the long history of due process
jurisprudence. And specific jurisdiction is not much clearer. Lawyers
and judges seem to understand that specific jurisdiction requires some
sort of relationship between a defendant's forum contacts and a
plaintiff's claim, but they rarely agree on what that relationship must be,
or what kind of evidence it would take to satisfy it. In what now has all
of the outward appearances of a deeply embedded rhetorical ritual,
lawyers and judges routinely combine an argument for specific
jurisdiction with one for general jurisdiction as if the two were "paired in
the voting," thinking that one or the other must apply, but darned if they
know which one. And given the case law, who can blame them?
In addition, the problem of whether courts are entitled to take
institutional and systemic interests, including sovereignty interests, into
574. Burger King was the Court's last major discussion of the "minimum contacts"
standard. Burnham post-dates Burger King, but it was about transient jurisdiction.
Catholic University Law Review
account in resolving jurisdictional disputes has never been adequately
resolved. Here, the doctrine is predictable; the Court definitely will take
such interests into account, but a serious question remains as to the
legitimacy of doing so. Similarly, in many jurisdictions it is no longer
clear whether defendant forum contacts are a necessary condition for
extra-territorial jurisdiction. The "fairness factors," codified in Woodson
and refined in Burger King, have become an independent jurisdictional
test for many courts, while for others they may be used only to bolster or
weaken a defendant's purposeful contacts with the forum. But whatever
their role, they lack an internal structure and order of their own so that it
is not possible to tell whether some factors are more important than
others, if so, which ones, how much of one factor it takes to offset how
much of another, and whether this analysis is different for rich and poor
defendants.
Finally, modern formulations of the purposefulness requirement, an
essential ingredient of all types of jurisdictionally relevant forum
contacts,575 are all over the lot. Individual courts seem to have an almost
limitless number of ways of expressing the idea, some treating it as a
synonym for purely foreseeable defendant connections with a forum, and
others seeing it as a requirement of willful and consciously directed in-
state activity on the part of a defendant. Whatever their form, however,
these definitions do little more than delegate discretion to individual
judges to find purposefulness (or its absence) wherever they want to,
causing what was once a central unifying feature of the defendant-veto
view of personal jurisdiction to lose all doctrinal power. The "minimum
contacts" standard was once a wonderfully simple two-factor, four-
permutation formula that gave clear guidance in almost all cases, but in
the years since International Shoe it has become almost fractal-rough,
irregular, and fragmented-constantly reproducing itself at increasingly
smaller levels of scope and usefulness, and no longer representable by
any classical formula. Benoit Mandlebrot might welcome this
development,576 but litigants and lawyers need more than irregular shapes
575. Even contacts used to support general jurisdiction are purposeful, though courts
do not discuss them in this way, since it is not possible to be domiciled or incorporated in a
state by accident, or establish a principal place of business in a non-purposeful way.
576. See generally JOHN BRIGGS, FRACTALS (1992); BENOIT B. MANDELBROT,
FRACTALS AND CHAOS (2004); BENOIT B. MANDELBROT, THE FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF
NATURE (1983); DIETRICH STAUFFER & 1-. EUGENE STANLEY, FROM NEWTON TO
MANDELBROT: A PRIMER IN THEORETICAL PHYSICS WITH FRACTALS FOR THE
PERSONAL COMPUTER (2d ed. 1996); Press Release, Yale University, Yale
Mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot Elected to the American Philosophical Society (June
7, 2004), http://www.yale.edu/opa/newsr/04-06-07-04.all.html (June 7, 2004) (describing
election of "father of fractals," mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot, to the American
Philosophical Society).
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and vague shadows to find their way through the maze of the American
jurisdiction system, and only the Supreme Court can show the way. It is
time for the Court to clear up the personal jurisdiction standard once
again.
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